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PREFACE
This study began with a desire to combine political science
research with a contribution to social justice. My initial involve-
ment in political organizing in 1976 was a bicentennial gift to
American politics—a low- and moderate- income community organization,
That experience made a lasting impression on me both for its sense
of having accomplished something significant and for its whetting of
my curiosity about low- and moderate-income political organizing.
Ten years later, both of these feelings are still strong and have
contributed to the writing of this study.
There are numerous individuals who have aided in the success-
ful completion of this effort. The success of my work in 1976 is
largely due to the help and cooperation of Wade Rathke, Alice Baudy,
and Zach Pollett
. They are three remarkable individuals who were
extremely helpful in that effort. Since that time, my continued
involvement in ACORN has borne fruit only because of the acceptance
and warmth of the members and organizers I encountered in my activi-
ties with ACORN and in informal settings.
This study of Boston ACORN was aided on two ends, in Boston
and in Amherst. In Boston, I had the privilege to work with Barbra
Gross and her staff and the members of Boston ACORN. They were not
only informative and insightful but a pleasure to know. The time I
spent in the research in Boston was dear to me as a result. In
v
Amherst, on the academic end of the project, particular thanks are
due Jerome Mileur whose careful and patient guidance throughout was
essential to the entire project. Debra Gross provided essential
substantive input complemented by Glen Gordon’s profound sense of
good scholarship. I also wish to thank the members of my committee
Gordon Sutton, whose insight has been invaluable and John Fenton,
whose participation is highly regarded and appreciated. Also
essential to the success of this study was Brian Anastasi, whose
careful work and extra effort to meet schedule eased the entire
process tremendously.
I also wish to express my appreciation to my parents, who
so often provided the wherewithal, materially and supportively,
to complete this work. Finally, I owe my wife, Beth, a tremendous
debt and wish to thank her for her support throughout—when things
were going smoothly and when they were not.
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ABSTRACT
Alternatives in American Politics:
A Study of the Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now
(September 1986)
Daniel M. Russell, B.A., University of New Orleans
M.A., University of New Orleans
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Jerome M. Mileur
The study of political organizations has been an important
topic in American political science from early in its development.
This is due to the importance of political organizations in the
shaping of public policy, influencing other institutions in the
political system, and shaping the political behavior of individuals.
This research is a case study of those who are participating in the
Boston chapter of a specific organization of low- and moderate-
income people, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now (ACORN).
This study researches questions that have been basic to
political science studies of political organizations by using
information obtained by the researcher's participant-observation in
ACORN over a period of ten years and responses to interviews with
twenty-four members and organizers of Boston ACORN.
vn
The first chapter discusses the development of the political
science literature on political organizations, emphasizing those
concepts that are important to low- and moderate-income organizing
and developing the concept of an "organizing strategy." The second
chapter discusses theories of low-income organizing. The third
chapter examines the .organizing strategy that ACORN uses in its
organizing
.
The second part of the research discusses the responses of
the organizers and members to the interviews. It identifies the
issues that they consider important and compares responses of the
organizers and members regarding their involvement in ACORN.
Chapter four discusses the organizers' responses, chapter five, the
members'. Chapter six ties together the literature and the inter-
view responses, raising issues about the problems of understanding
the complex behavior of individuals in such an organization.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
xii
Chapter
I. THEORIES OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION i
Theories of Political Organization 3
II. PRINCIPLES OF LOW-INCOME ORGANIZING 18
Organizational Problems in Low-Income
Organizing 21
Constraints and Available Choices 29
Available Choices 33
III. THE ACORN ORGANIZING STRATEGY 42
The Targeted Constituency 45
The Exchange Relationship 46
"Deliverables" 45
Non-purposive Selective Incentives 49
Purposive Incentives 50
Anti-Ideology in ACORN 55
Anti-Corporatism in ACORN 58
The Members’ Contribution 59
Organizational Structure 60
Participant Roles 63
Regional Structure 65
IV. THE ORGANIZERS 70
Organizers' Incentives 70
The Organizer Role 7 6
Membership Incentives 80
Organizational Goals 90
Views on Tactics 96
The Decisionmaking Process 104
Summary 109
ix
V. THE MEMBERS
.
. Ill
The Characteristics of the Interviewees
The Membership Decision
Why People Stay
The Decision Making Process
Members’ Political Views
ACORN Activism and Political Views
Organizational Goals
Tactics
Conclusion
112
115
119
123
129
135
141
147
154
VI. CONCLUSION 155
Theories of Group Formation Revisited
Group Formation According to ACORN Members
. . .
Maintenance of Membership
Organizers
The Organizers Relationship to the Members • • .
Ideology as Incentive
Confrontation as Ideology
The ACORN Organizing Strategy and the
Majority Constituency
Organizing Strategy and Political Analysis
. . .
APPENDIX: INTERVIEW SCHEDULES
159
162
165
171
173
176
178
182
190
195
BIBLIOGRAPHY 205
x
LIST OF TABLES
2 1. Proportions Organizationally Active in Lower, Middle
and Upper Third of SES (in per cent) 19
1 • Age and Education of Interviewees .... 11 ?
5-3. Members' Issue Stands
* ’ ‘ * * *
*
1315-4. Ideology of Members and Organizers P34
“* • Party Identification of Members and Organizers ... 1355-6. Activity Scores. (Years in ACORN x Activities)
v. Political Views 13 y
^ • Activity Scores v. Ideology and Party ID 1395-8. Coalition Partners *
5-9. Members' Perceptions of Effectiveness of Tactics
. . . 150
xi
INTRODUCTION
Enough is enough. We will wait no longer for the
crumbs at America's door. We will not be meek, butmighty. We will not starve on past promises, butleast on future dreams.
—ACORN People's Platform1
The assertion of dissenting political views in American
politics is protected by Constitutional guarantees; there are no
guarantees that efforts to promote those views will succeed. The
authors of the statement above, members of the Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), have chosen a goal
that is particularly difficult to attain: empowerment of low- and
moderate-income Americans through a national organization of commu-
nity organizations. To the degree that it has been successful, it
is due to a well-considered plan executed by dedicated and talented
professionals and volunteers. The researcher has been privileged
to have the opportunity to join in ACORN political activities on a
number of occasions. He became involved in ACORN out of political
conviction, but quickly discovered that there was much to be learned
about the American political system from this group of people and
their organizational efforts.
The researcher's association with ACORN over the last ten
years has convinced him that they are a remarkable group of people.
His conversations with them and his observations of their activities
xii
have provided him with numerous insights into politics, communities,
and organizations. It is for that reason that he has chosen ACORN
as a subject for study and chosen to use the perceptions of ACORN
participants as a primary source of data.
The method used is a case study based on structured inter-
views with a non-sc ient if ic sample of the people involved in the
Boston chapter of ACORN. The most recent studies of voluntary
political organizations, Terry Moe
,
2
and David Knoke and James R.
3Wood, use surveys and statistical analysis of survey responses.
Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein4 use interviews and
historical data. As yet, there are no major studies of low-income
organizations that have used participant-observation.
Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses. Surveys
give the researcher a large body of respondents that assure a valid
sample. Moreover, they provide data that can be statistically
manipulated to determine relationships among variables. They do
not allow the researcher to probe the respondents’ responses to
assure a common understanding of terms or to allow respondents to
offer their own ideas of what is important. Finally, as Sidney
Verba and Norman Nie’s attempts to determine the causal relationship
between variables related to organizational membership illustrates,
establishing causality is also problematical.^
Interviews give the researcher opportunities to delve into
the respondents’ minds and explore their ideas. Open-ended questions
allow respondents to contribute their own insights and to clarify
xiii
points that the researcher may not appreciate at the beginning of
the study. The number of interviewees must remain small, however,
raising the possibility of an unrepresentative sampling of the
population being studied. The data derived from interviews is also
vulnerable to potential bias in the interviewing process. The
participant-observation process also places the trained social
scientist in a situation to report experiences and perceptions.
This process contains the potential for bias that interviewing does,
perhaps in even greater degree as the participant comes to share
values and orientations of the group. Thus, each technique offers
opportunities and contains pitfalls for the researcher.
Interviews for this study were designed to ascertain how
Boston ACORN has succeeded (as have ACORN chapters in other places
since 1970) in attracting and maintaining members since 1980. The
method of data collection is open-ended interviews with volunteer
activists, leaders, and organizers of Boston ACORN.
The interviews probed the following kinds of questions:
1) What incentives does the organization use to attract
members and keep them active?
2) To what extent do members get involved in the
activities of the organization?
3) What do the members perceive as the goals of the
organization?
4) How much consensus is there on important political
issues among members and between members and organizers?
*
See Appendix I for the interview questionnaire.
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5) How are important decisions made in ACORN?
6>
Amo/ 176 thE mem i’ers ' Perceptions of the means by whichCORN pursues political goals?
7) What are the members’ feelings of efficacy and percep-
tions of politicians?
Responses to these questions yield a picture of the means
by which ACORN, a voluntary organization, is able to get its
constituents to join and contribute their time, energy, and other
resources to the organization on a sustained basis. In addition,
it provides insights into the internal politics of the organization
and the self
-perceived impact of membership on the constituents.
The Interviews
The researcher drew volunteers for interviews by asking
the Head Organizer of Boston ACORN to provide him with a list of
willing interviewees. The Head Organizer asked the organizers in
the office for possibilities and these names were given to the
researcher to contact and schedule. There is no sense, therefore,
in which the interviews constitute a random sample of ACORN members.
Several of the interviewees signed up at a board meeting of the
organization; others were contacted by phone by the organizers.
The data shows that the sample is biased in favor of older members
and leaders, but includes some who are less active and newer. (The
researcher interviewed all of the professional organizers who were
assigned to that office at the time.) The interviews were scheduled
on enough weekends to enable working members to be included as well
xv
as retired members or those on welfare.
The questionnaire is designed to satisfy three criteria:
1) it addresses the basic questions raised in the literature; 2)
it is sufficiently open-ended to stimulate independent responses
from the interviewees; and 3) it addresses experiences that might
result from ACORN activities, e.g., confrontational tactics,
neighborhood organizing, and participatory membership. The inter-
view was administered in a conversational format and, at the end
of the interview, respondents were asked if there were any topics
they felt were not covered adequately by the questionnaire. Several
added comments about their experiences. Finally, interviewees were
asked to complete a second questionnaire, the text of which is also
in Appendix I, to determine pertinent demographic information.
AH interviewees agreed to have the interview taped to insure
accuracy. The researcher advised the interviewees that no part of
the interview would be attributed to them without their explicit
permission in order to preserve confidentiality. All interviews
with members took place in private homes with the exception of one
that was held in the ACORN office in a private room. The inter-
views with organizers were conducted in private at the ACORN office
or in a deli across the street.
The interviewees were quite generous with their time and
ideas. The data from the interviews, most of which is included in
this study, provide many insights into the experiences and percep-
tions of the dynamic and interesting group of people engaging in
xvi
an unusual pursuit and belonging to an unusual organization.
Their comments provide a useful contribution to the understanding
of voluntary political organizations.
xv 11
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CHAPTER I
THEORIES OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
On July 12, 1980, thirteen delegates to the Republican
National Convention that chose Ronald Reagan as its presidential
standard bearer accepted an invitation to tour the poorer neigh-
borhoods of Detroit. It came from a leftist organization that
represents low- and moderate-income people called the Association
of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). The organiza-
tion was trying to point out the contradiction between tremendous
development in Detroit's Renaissance Center and neighborhoods
outside of the commercial district that had not benefitted from
federal development grants. The ACORN members rode with the
delegates on a church bus and offered their solutions to the problems
of urban decay in a document they called "ACORN's People's Platform."
Their suggestions included federal public housing, low- and moderate-
income representation on corporate boards, and bank financing for
rehabilitation of low-income housing. ^ According to the New York
Tlmes reporter, Iver Peterson, one delegate, a Ms. Joanne Mueller,
of Hibbing, Minnesota, made an interesting comment: "I tried to
tell them if they had a concern they should get involved in politics,
that's what I did."^
Despite her willingness to participate in ACORN's tour of
1
2Detroit and her concern that social problems be addressed through
political action and membership in political organizations, Ms.
Mueller failed to recognize political activity when it confronted
her. Moreover, she failed to recognize a relatively sophisticated
form of political activity, undertaken by people from the lower
end of the income scale who are generally noteworthy for their
lack of participation in American politics. Indeed, what is perhaps
most striking about the event is that low- and moderate-income people
participated at all in an organization that staged a media event to
demonstrate a contradiction within federal urban policy by inter-
acting with the more conservative of the two major parties at the
time it was nominating its most conservative candidate in almost
twenty years.
Political scientists have not taken such activities for
granted or failed to recognize how unusual they are among low-income
Americans. Rather, they have attempted to develop theories to explain
when and how such activities are likely to occur. While the most
rigorous of these arguments apply to middle— and upper-income
Americans, the long commitment of the left in American politics to
organizing and mobilizing lower income people has shed some light on
that phenomenon as well. This study attempts to clarify certain
issues in the general literature on political organizing by applying
them in a case study of ACORN. Organizational theories will be
tested against ACORN's efforts to organize low- and moderate-income
people for sustained political action. The discussion begins with
3a review of the basic concepts in the literature on political
organizations.
Theories of Political Organization
It is precisely the kind of activity in which ACORN
engages-overt attempts to influence public policy-that provides
the impetus for the study of political organizations in American
political science. Arthur F. Bentley, writing in 1908, attempted
to develop a systematic understanding of political behavior divorced
from rhetoric and constitutions. 3 He emphasized the role of groups
and group interests in American politics, arguing that neither
Fourth of July speeches about freedom nor constitutional language
on the powers of the president is the engine that drives the American
political system. It is, instead, the interaction of political
interests expressed by groups in the political system. Bentley's
goal was to "fashion a tool" for this analysis. 4 His work prompted
subsequent studies by Pendleton Herring, E. E. Sc ha tt schneider
,
5
and others that eschewed the traditional study of political ideas
and government institutions. From that time onward, a major theme
of political science would be the activities of groups and
organizations.
The post-war study of political organizations in political
science dates from David B. Truman's seminal work, The Governmental
Process
,
published in 1951. It prompted renewed attention to
interest groups and other forms of non-electoral political
4organization
.
6
Truman developed a theory of Ameriean politics that
explains political outcomes as a meshing of interests expressed by
the various groups in society. He directed attention to both
organized and unorganized groups, which could be identified by
their shared interests. Truman's influential work provoked an out-
pouring of studies of interest groups—how they interact, express
preferences, and form organized groups as institutionalized expres-
sions of their interests.
Two of Truman’s arguments have a special relevance for this
work. First, he says that organized groups form during periods of
stress or rapid changes when people with shared interests interact
more frequently. Second, he contends that behavioral and internal
dynamics of political groups are "shared in their essential features,
with non-political patterns of social interaction. The first of
these claims has become a pivotal point in the study of the formation
of political organizations, while the second has become a precedent
for studying the behavior of political organizations.
Truman s first point suggests a sociological model of group
formation that sees political organizations as emerging from "a
disturbance in an institutional pattern... or frustration in varying
degrees of the habits of the participants, a circumstance that is
always unpleasant and may be extremely painful. Truman’s claim
is rooted in apparently rational patterns of behavior
—
people
responding to stress by seeking others with whom they can alleviate
that stress. Truman’s assertion which views political organizations
5as operating on essentially the same principles as non-political
organizations leads him to borrow theoretically from anthropology,
sociology, and organization theory 9 and to use concepts developed
in research on work organizations and bureaucracies to develop
insights into political organizations. Many subsequent studies
follow Truman's lead in this respect, other studies, however,
challenge this understanding of political organizations, claiming
instead that political organizations are unique and operate on
their own principles.
James Q. Wilson and Peter Clark, for example, apply general
principles of organization to the study of political organizations
.
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They argue that all organizations "provide tangible or intangible
incentives to individuals in exchange for contributions of individual
activity to the organizations ."11 Their analysis borrows an incentive
classification from Chester Barnard and claims that "much of the
internal and external activity may be explained by understanding
their incentive systems ."12 Barnard, in his analysis of bureaucratic
13organizations, identifies three basic types of incentives: material,
solidary, and purposive. Material incentives are exchangeable,
referring to tangible rewards such as salary, tax benefits and the
like. Solidary benefits are intangible socially-derived rewards,
such as status, social interaction, and conviviality. Purposive
incentives are motivations deriving from a desire to achieve a
worthwhile goal. Clark and Wilson argue that this "incentive system
may be regarded as the principle variable affecting organizational
6behavior
.
n1 ^
Other studies of political organization have challenged
this approach, arguing instead that political organizations are
unique and operate on their own principles. Mancus Olson, Jr.,
an economist, applied economic and marketing theory to the question
raised by Truman’s analysis of the formation of political groups.
His analysis, though strictly limited to economic interest groups
and argued within an economic rational choice model, raises serious
questions about Truman's sociological model of group formation
.
15
Olson shows that one cannot take for granted that it is logical
for people to respond to threats to their interests by contributing
resources to an organization. His application of economic
statistical analysis, using rational economic models, casts new
light on the organization of interests and suggests that it is not
reasonable to assume that organizations will form in the political
system except under specific sets of circumstances.
Olson's argument rests on the distinction between collective
and selective benefits. Collective benefits are those that affect
everyone equally. Selective benefits can be divided only among
those who have contributed to their creation. Olson contends that
it is unreasonable to expect an individual to expend resources
toward collective economic benefits expecting to "return a profit."
The only circumstances under which it is reasonable to expect people
to join and contribute to an organization are those in which there
is a positive balance of costs and benefits. Olson claims that the
7only way to create such a balance is to (1) offer unrelated selective
benefits to contributors, like group insurance, (2) apply legal
coercion, such as union shops and medical associations do, or (3)
only organize small groups that are able to profit by their efforts. 16
Olson analysis is of particular importance to low-income organizing
since success requires recruitment of relatively large numbers.
Numerically, the most successful attempt to organize low-income
Americans, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, did not really
grow steadily until legal coercion was implemented in the form of
the union shop. Even then, however, unions continued to provide
selective benefits such as job-training, conviviality and newsletters.
Robert H. Salisbury's research on political organizations once
again borrows from another discipline, operating from Truman's premise
regarding the universality of organizational dynamics. 17 He applies
exchange theory from sociology to devise a theoretical approach to the
formation and maintenance of political groups. He claims that a
political organization is an exchange system in which an entrepreneur/
organizer offers inducements to consumer /member s to join, participate,
and pay dues. The model he proposes is similar to Olson's marketing
concept but personalizes it in the form of the entrepreneur. His
is neither true nor false but to be tested by its intellec—
18tual utility." Its importance stems from the historical insights
it provides by focusing on "origins and originators"19 of organiza-
tions as calculated acts and rational actors.
The above studies have laid the groundwork of basic concepts
8and approaches to political organizations, borrowing from social
psychology, anthropology, organization theory, economics, and
marketing theory. Recently, several social scientists have tested
and evaluated these theories using behavioral social science
approaches. Two studies in particular, Terry Moe's The Organization
--
Interests 20 and David Knoke and James R. Wood's Organized for
Action, 1 have taken this approach and develop syntheses of the
above theories backed by empirical social science arguments.
Moe s research focuses specifically on economic organizations
in an effort to test the model he develops based on Olson's analysis
He includes the Minnesota Farm Bureau Association, the Minnesota
Farmers Union, the Minnesota Retail Association, the Minnesota-
Dakotas Hardware Association and the Printing Industries of the
Twin Cities, all economically oriented organizations that pursue
their goals by political means, principally lobbying. From his
study, Moe offers revisions in Olson's theory of interest group
formation that expand the scope of Olson's analysis to make the
explanatory model "simple enough to clarify the nature of individual
and organizational behavior, yet elaborate enough to address
questions that are obviously important to a more comprehensive
7 7
understanding .
"
Moe's analysis addresses three areas pertinent to an
understanding of political organizations: the decision individuals
make to join, the organizational framework, and the internal
politics of political organizations. The membership decision
9involves the prospective member's rationale for joining an
organization. Moe argues that, in Olson's economic rationality
model, the assumption of perfect knowledge of costs and benefits
restricts unduly the applicability of his theory. In Moe’s model,
actors possess "bounded rationality," and "imperfect perception of
the objective situation...."^ Moe retains the collective/
selective distinction but expands the concept of benefits to
include the typology Clark and Wilson offer—material, solidary,
and purposive—rather than strictly economic benefits. By
increasing the complexity of individual motivation, Moe injects
a clearly political dimension into the analysis that Olson fails
to do
.
The organizational side of Moe’s analysis includes an
entrepreneur/leadership concept as devised by Salisbury, accompanied
by staff and other paid personnel such as lobbyists and researchers.
The entrepreneur serves as a focus of attention to examine
entrepreneurial options under varying conditions...." and their
r\ f
effects on the organization. He includes the internal politics
of organizations to add depth to the model and the degree to which
the decision making process includes members, leaders and groups
within the organizations.
Moe is eclectic in his choice of concepts and analytical
techniques. He relies heavily on variations in Olson’s analysis,
yet expands it to make it more inclusive, to inject more of a
political dimension, and to reflect as much as possible the kinds
Of organizations and phenomena one is likely to find in the
political system.
10
[0]nce we move beyond the idealized world of perfectinformation and economic self-interest, we are nolonger led to Olson’s non-political perspective. We
are led, rather, to a broader view that leaves a good
eal of room for political action and that outlinesthe theoretical roles of perceptions and values in
explaining why political action occurs.^
Moe’s model, for example, includes the possibility of an entrepreneur
manipulating information critical to the decision to join. It is both
possible and likely that entrepreneurs will exaggerate members’
efficacy and the value of benefits, and also minimize the costs of
joining and participating in order to persuade people to come into an
organization. In this way, Moe seeks a median point in his analysis
between the simple and theoretical, the complex and real.
Knoke and Wood emphasize the role of internal controls as a
determinant of organizational success:
The internal social control system plays an essential
role in an organization’s ability to acquire resources
necessary to sustain collective life. Resources
available to the organization, in turn, are crucial
for the attainment of the group’s external goals.
^
Their organizational model highlights what they consider the three
most important determinants for success: purposive incentives,
opportunities to participate, and the legitimacy of leadership.
They reason that an organization must mobilize its resources in
11
order to achieve its goals. Mobilization occurs when the organi-
sational control system can elicit commitment from membership and
apply resources toward organizational goals. Their findings
indicate that
Associations trying to develop high levels of membership
enthusiasm should try to foster all three conditions
conducive to more effective organizational self-
regulatiou: an emphasis on the purposive benefits from
affiliation, widespread opportunities for membershipparticipation in making important decisions, and tiesto supralocal units that exercise formally legitimate
restraints on local policy.
By arguing for the importance of purposive incentives, Knoke
and Wood favor the Truman approach to group organization. Their
arguments for the importance of participation and legitimacy diverge
from Olson's analysis of benefit distribution problems. Their
findings, however, should not be seen as a refutation of Olson's
claims, especially in light of what Moe argues: Olson's view is
limited to a specific type of organization, and the applicability of
his analysis to that organizational type is further limited by his
ideal type economic model.
This discussion of political entrepreneurship and incentive
theories of political organizations strongly suggests parallels
between political organizing and product marketing. Olson's writing,
in particular, develops analogies between these activities. It is
useful, therefore, in both an analytical and practical sense, to
think of political organizations as products to be marketed. In
12
this case study of ACORN, the market is low- and moderate-income
citizens and the product is membership and participation in a
political organization. Owing in part to the peculiar nature of
this market and product, this analysis focuses on a somewhat
different notion: the idea of an "organizing strategy." It is a
concept familiar to community organizing professionals and a term
that Moe uses at least once. 28
An organizing strategy is a long-range plan for creating
and maintaining a political organization. The components of an
organizing strategy are (1) the targeted constituency, (2) the
terms of the exchange relationship, and (3) the organizational
structure. Each component is dependent upon the others and plays
a crucial role in the life of the organization. While the
relationship between these organizational features obtain in any
kind of political organizing, no matter the constituency or goals
of the organizer/entrepreneur, the concept of organizing strategy
has not been fully articulated in the political science literature.
It is so basic to so much of politics, however, that analysts have
discussed parts of the concept, either directly or indirectly, and
occasionally used the Salisbury thesis in this way. 29 But the
notion has not been applied as explicitly as its centrality to
political action demands.
The targeted constituency is the segment of the entire
population from which a political organizer attempts to draw members.
Many criteria are possible: sex, income, race, age, occupation.
13
ideology, and so on. The choice
decision the entrepreneur makes,
resources to seek from members,
of criteria shapes every other
including the incentives to offer,
organizational structure, and issue
agenda
.
Like the market in the economy, the constituency one chooses
to attract determines the terms of exchange. The question must be
asked. What can I offer, and what can they give? The incentives
the organizer offers must be suited to the tastes of the constituency
to motivate prospective members to join, be active, and contribute
resources. The constituents’ status in society—the role they play
m the social, economic, and political spheres—determines the
resources they can most easily and effectively supply to the organi-
zation. Harry Spence, for example, notes that "The exercise of
economic power by the poor to relieve their condition is foreclosed
to them by definition. They have only the choice of political
power or violence.... Thus, the organizer /entrepreneur must
offer the targeted constituents something they need in return for
something they have and can afford to expend.
Organizational form is the physical shape of the organization.
It includes factors such as the size of constituent groups, the
presence or absence of meetings, dues, the physical location of
organizational headquarters, and so on. One need only consider the
differences between community and workplace organizing or mailing
list and grassroots organizing to appreciate the importance of this
factor in an organizing strategy. While this concept is not
14
entirely distinct from the exchange relationship-the higher the
dues, for example, the greater the demand made on the constituents-
it is useful to account for the differences that unit size makes to
the operation of an organization and its ability to attract and
sustain members, for example.
Thus, it is possible to distill the concept of "organizing
strategy from the literature on political organizations. The
concepts of incentives, entrepreneurs, rational choice, and
marketing strategy all suggest such an approach. Like a marketing
strategy, however, an organizing strategy must suit its constituents,
and some approaches are more fruitful than others. The next chapter
will discuss the kinds of organizing strategies that have been tried
with low-income organizing and attempt to formulate some research
questions that might yield a better understanding of political
organizing. Some of the questions to be addressed are:
1) Under what circumstances will targeted constituents decide
that it is in their interests to join a political organization?
2) What kinds of incentives are used in the circumstances found
in this specific case and why?
3) Are those the same incentives that keep members active?
4) How do members perceive the purposive incentives the
organization offers?
5) Are purposive incentives shared by members and organizers?
6) How important is participation in the decisionmaking
process as perceived by the members?
7)
What role does the organizational structure play in the
success or failure of the organization?
15
This study concentrates on the activities
members and organizers of one low-income
goal of shedding new or additional light
pertaining to political organizations.
and perceptions of
group
—ACORN
—with
on the questions
the
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CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES OF LOW-INCOME ORGANIZING
Major studies of political participation show a clear,
consistent and strong correlation between socioeconomic status
(SES) and membership in political organizations: higher income
and upper status citizens participate more, both quantitatively
and qualitatively, than do those at the other end of the income
and status continuum. 1 While many studies document the relationship
between SES and group membership, Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie
explore the implications of that relationship for public policy
and power relationships. They find, in cross-national studies,
that the correlation between political participation and SES in the
U.S. is as high or higher than in any of the other nations studied. 2
They note, for example, that 57% of the respondents who scored in
the highest one-sixth category of participation on their scale were
in the upper third of the SES index. Only 14% of them were from the
lowest third. Hence, the upper SES people who participate at the
highest rates numerically outnumber the lower two-thirds SES group.
It is not a statistical sleight-of-hand that makes SES and political
participation seem so closely connected. As Verba and Nie explain,
the "relationship that looks so moderate from some perspectives
(the correlation between our SES and participation scales is, after
18
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all, only
.37) is in fact a quite striking one from the point of
view of what it implies about the composition of a population."4
Verba and Nie speculate as to whether group membership is a
factor that increases or decreases the impact of SES on political
participation. They find that for an individual
,
group membership
increases the amount of participation more for low SES participants
than for high SES participants. Given the higher rate of membership
among upper SES citizens, the overall effect of group membership in
American politics is to "push in the direction of increasing the
disparity” 5 of influence between class.
Table 2-1 illustrates the organizational activity of people
in different SES categories:
TABLE 2-1
PROPORTIONS ORGANIZATIONALLY ACTIVE IN LOWER MIDDLE
AND UPPER THIRD OF SES (in per cent)*”1
Lower SES Middle SES Upper SES Total
Nonmember 56 34 20 38
Passive Member 23 22 21 22
Single Active 16 28 24 22
Multiple Active 6 16 35 19
Total 101 100 100 101
20
The findings of Verba and Nie strongly suggest that lack of
participation in political organizations by lower SES groups
reduces their influence on public policies that affect their lives.
Truman’s sociological model of group formation is problematic
for the study of low-income organizations. He argues that political
organizations emerge in times of stress, yet low-income Americans
are in a more or less continual state of distress but join organi-
zations in lower numbers than higher income Americans. Truman
points out that while low-income people suffer unemployment and
other dislocations during economic slumps or adjustment periods,
their low rate of political participation means they have no
organized channels through which to express grievances. This
increases the potential for radical political movements, which have
not internalized the prevailing political folkways that encourage
stability in the political system. Short of a radical outcome,
Truman believes that government will continue to be skewed in favor
of upper-income citizens at the expense of lower-income interests.
^
The lower rate of low-income participation in political organizations
thus both renders the political system less stable and denies a major
portion of society equal opportunity to express its political interests.
The concern of political analysts for the low rate of
participation among low-income Americans spans the political spectrum.
The question of how to attract and maintain low-income members is of
critical importance to both leftist organizers and conservatives,
although for different reasons. It is a widespread belief among
21
:ics
leftists that the way to achieve social justice in American politi,
ia through sustained, organized political power of the lower classes,
which has led among other things to their support for the labor
movement. Saul Alinsky premised his early organizing and writing
on this idea. Conservatives have also considered ways to build
organizational ties among low-income Americans as a way to stem anomie
and potentially destructive radical mass movements. Among social
scientists, however, there is little agreement about the most
effective way to organize low-income people. To understand the
debate and the possibilities for success in this endeavor, it is
first necessary to examine the explanations commonly given for the
difficulties encountered in organizing low-income people.
Organizat ional Problems in Low-Income Organizing
Almond and Verba, as well as Verba and Nie, suggest hypotheses
to explain the lower rate of organizational membership among lower-
income respondents. They suggest that factors contributing to
upper SES activism might include higher levels of social and
organizational skills, socialization processes that encourage group
activity, greater resources like time and money, stimulation by
their active SES cohorts, and a higher sense of efficacy with respect
to political activism. At this point, however, it becomes difficult
to determine the flow of relationships. For example, which of the
following most accurately depicts reality?
22
1
2
3
SES
SES
EFFICACY —* GROUP MEMBERSHIP
GROUP MEMBERSHIP EFFICACY
SES GROUP MEMBERSHIP
l
EFFICACY
Survey data that is available does not permit determination of the
causal flow with any certainty. Verba and Nie, for example,
qualify their claim that "organizations do have an independent
effect over and above any such general propensity toward activity”
because "participation proneness" can only be measured indirectly
.
8
They are clearest in connecting the importance of low-income group
membership to political participation and political outcomes in
the U.S. when they point out that, while group membership's effects
on political participation exaggerates upper-income political
influence, this is not the case in other political systems:
Participation, looked at generally, does not necessarily
help one social group rather than another. The general
model of the sources and consequences of participation
that we have presented could work in a number of ways.
It could work so that lower—status citizens were more
effective politically and used that political effective-
ness to improve their social and economic circumstances.
Or it could work, as it appears to do in the United
States, to benefit upper-status citizens more. It
depends on what organizations, parties, and belief
systems exist, and how these all effect participation
rates. Participation remains a powerful social force
increasing or decreasing inequality. It depends on who
takes advantage of it .
^
Hence, those seeking political equality would do well to engage
low-income people actively in voluntary organizations, especially
23
those that deal with community problems and political issues. To
do so requires an understanding of the problems encountered in low-
income organising, and the political organization literature
provides limited guidance in this area.
W11S°n,S
argues that low_inCQme
citizens are best organized around material incentives, solidary
incentives that provide "opportunities for vivid and uninhibited
expansion of core lifestyles," and purposive incentives that
"involve personal and intense, not anonymous or vicarious
experience. He claims too that low-income activists operate in
a relatively shorter time frame than do upper-income activists
.
12
That claim is echoed by Saul Alinsky and others who have studied
the organizational politics of low-income citizens
.
13
As a result
of this shorter time frame, low-income activists need to be
constantly working on issues or member activism diminishes. Thus,
the combination of incentive types and shorter time frame requires
political organizations of low-income citizens to produce a stable
supply of what Sherry Arnstein terms "deliverables," 1^ i.e.,
outcomes of political demands expressed by the organization and
conceded by government or other opponents in the political system.
Arnstein' s analysis closely parallels Alinsky' s contention that
low-income organizing requires the delivery of "wins," that are
quickly achieved and yield visible benefits wrested from political
and economic institutions
.
15 Without a steady supply of
"deliverables," building a political organization of low-income
24
citizens is thought virtually impossible by Arnstein and Alinsky.
Hence, it is necessary for an organizer of low-income people to
include ways and means of procuring such benefits on a regular
basis. This leads Alinsky to enunciate three basic tenets of
community organizing: 1) issues must be winnable; 2) tactics must
entail confrontation; and 3) the organizing process must provide
opportunities to express anger and overcome fear.
These analyses yield useful insights into participation of
low SES individuals. None of them, however, adequately explores
the perspectives of the groups least likely to participate in
political decisionmaking: racial minorities and low-income people.
A full study of why certain groups in the system are participating
far less regularly and effectively should examine the experiences
and perceptions of those groups more carefully. It should also
examine the integral relationship between power and participation.
A recent study of politics and power in Appalachia by John Gaventa
takes this approach."^
Gaventa’ s analysis is a study of power. He argues that
neither the pluralists nor their critics explain enough about the
relations between the powerful and the powerless, nor does either
adequately identify the causes of class differences in participation
rates. He claims that there are three dimensions of power in
American politics, the first treated by the pluralists, the second
by the critics of pluralism, and the third primarily by sociologists
like C. Wright Mills and Steven Lukes.
^
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The pluralists, Gaventa argues, accurately depict power
struggles in American politics, but only those that pit reasonably
evenly matched opponents within decisionmaking institutions. These
struggles are based on democratic principles of conflict and involve
opposing arrays of strategies and resources applied in public policy
settings. When an issue arises between less evenly matched opponents,
however, the stronger side is able to apply resources to deny the
other side access to decisionmaking institutions and can thereby
prevent an issue from being placed on the political agenda.
Schattschneider describes this as the "mobilization of bias," and
it is the second level of power analysis. Gaventa, however, sees a
"third face of power."
This third dimension of power exists when power resources are
so highly skewed in favor of one group that they are able to go
beyond bias." This third face of power is more extreme. It
influences, shapes, or determines conceptions of the necessities,
possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations of latent
18
conflict." Hence, powerless people do not challenge the status
c[uo; they accept it as legitimate and inevitable. Gaventa suggests
a number of processes by which powerholders maintain consensus
through apathy and quiescence of the powerless despite clear
conflicts of interest: 1) controlling information and manipulating
symbols; 2) instilling fatalism by consistently denying opposing
claims; 3) denying the benefits of participation, including political
education; and 4) manipulating emerging attempts to challenge the
26
status quo . 19
In the case of low-income citizens who attempt to become
politically active by promoting economic issues that will redistribut
wealth, the third dimension of power works in the following manner:
1) public and private institutions withhold as much information as
possible and couch their arguments as defending free enterprise
against "creeping socialism"; 2) the low-income activists are easily
intimidated as they have no experience or tradition of political
victory to bolster them; 3) the activists are also somewhat weak
in their convictions since they do not have a background of
political activism to educate them "in the broadest sense"20 about
their rights in a democratic society; and 4) for the above reasons,
the activists are easily intimidated and misled by the arguments and
strategies of their opponents. Thus, where the pluralist political
system is populated primarily by upper-income, better educated
people, and Schatt Schneider
’ s analysis adds only one dimension to
the process by which large portions of the citizenry are excluded
from the political process, Gaventa explains much more and in terms
that are testable and therefore suited to the tools of political
sc ience
.
Gaventa applies his theory of power relations to an
explanation of apathy and quiescence among people in Appalachia who
are clearly receiving a disproportionately low level of benefits
from society. In his view, it is not a matter of cultural values,
consensus, or a lack of resources as pluralists claim,
^
nor is it
27
merely a matter of the
.obligation of bias successfully excluding
them. It is, rather, a situation in which "power serves to main-
tain [the] prevailing order of inequality.
.. through the shaping of
beliefs about the order's legitimacy or immutability"22 that makes
it difficult to organize low-income citizens into unions, welfare
rights organizations, or groups like ACORN. Robert Botsch, for
example, interviewed North Carolina furniture workers who objected
to union organizing despite the clear benefits of increased wages,
safer working conditions, and the fairer work practices they agreed
unions provide, and concluded that people who have been dominated
tend to lose sight of the possibility for change
.
23
In his analysis of power, Gaventa offers a process by which
he claims powerless groups can build power that will enable them
to bargain and compete successfully in a genuinely pluralist
fashion. His theory is essentially a reversal of the three
dimensions of power by developing a "consciousness of the needs,
possibilities, and strategies of change "; 24 then, they must "over-
come the mobilization of bias "; 25 and finally, they must develop
resources with which to conduct political action in decisionmaking
areas of the first dimension of power. It is, in fact, only in
the first dimension of power, Gaventa claims, that "genuine
participation" takes place: "self-determined action with others
similarly affected upon clearly conceived and articulated
2 6grievances.
"
Gaventa' s prescription for arriving at that point and his
28
analysis of the dimensions of power suggest the basic tenets of
community organizing. First, winnability is crucial, because a
"single victory helps to alter inaction owing to the anticipation
of defeat, leading to more action, and so on. Once patterns of
quiescence are broken upon one set of grievances, the accumulating
resources of challenge-e.g.
, organization, momentum, consciousness-
may become transferable to other issues and other targets ."27
Second, confrontational tactics~"to err on the side of too
much action" help to overcome institutional barriers against low-
income activism. Confrontation gives institutional leaders reason
to want to include the activists without having to be subjected to
confrontational politics. Clearly, if an organization of low-income
activists has what it considers effective access to an institution’s
decisionmaking process, it will not take the trouble to fill
meeting rooms with raucous, shouting protestors. If they must,
however, the resistance that they experience demonstrates for the
politically uninitiated the nature of institutional barriers and
their effectiveness in preventing grievances from being aired in
the institutional agenda. The members who learn this lesson are
then better able to begin working on bringing down those barriers
and perceive others more readily.
Finally, when low-income activists have dealt effectively
with their anger and fear, other things being equal, they are
prepared to use their available resources more effectively in power
struggles with government and corporate leaders. It is at that
29
Point that Dahl's advice in M^ejlevclntion? is apptoptiate:
In order for those who are politically weak to pushthrough a crucial if still incompleted process ofdemocratization, they have to learn howto pyramidhe ir political resources very much in the way thatxn the economrc realm, an aggressive young man-on-
’
the make sometimes arranges to transform his personalsituation from poverty to riches. 28
Prior to that, however, resources, energy, strategy and organization
must all be focused on the highly unequal struggle to achieve some
degree of political parity on the road from quiescence to meaningful
activism. Gaventa argues that, in addition to the special problems
that Wilson and others cite in organizing low-income people, the
power relations that exist prior to any organizing attempt are a
critical factor in the means by which the organizing must be
conducted. According to Gaventa, the three dimensions of power
determine the course of any organizing projects by requiring the
three techniques mentioned above. Clearly, they are mainstays of
low-income organizing. There are, moreover, other considerations
that play roles in determining the most desirable organizing
strategies to use in low—income organizing.
Constraints and Available Choices
There are constraints on the organizing strategy that an
organizer must accept. Constituents cannot give what they do not
have, will only respond to meaningful incentives, and require a
profitable exchange before they will join and maintain an organiza-
30
tion. The resources the organizer wishes to offer must be avail-
able in some form at a price that "customers” are willing to pay.
In addition, the organizational form the organizer adopts must
suit both the constituents and the resources the organization seeks
to offer. Richard Rich describes a "political economy" of
community organizations that delineates many of the constraints
that community organizations face
.
29 He argues that the two
major costs are decisionmaking costs and deprivation costs
.
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Decisionmaking costs are the resources expended in collective
decisionmaking, while deprivation costs are the price of "being
bound by group decisions that run counter to their [individual]
preferences ."31 The decisionmaking process with the highest cost
is the unanimity rule, i.e., it requires much more effort to
achieve unanimous agreement than majority agreement to binding
decisions. The highest deprivation costs are experienced in
oligarchical groups in which a small leadership cadre makes and
enforces binding decisions on the membership as work organizations
do. The interplay of these factors means that the rational choice
for communities with few resources and high demands is to remain
unorganized and risk nothing or to adopt an "exit choice," i.e.,
allow for an option to quit, both of which would minimize both
32types of costs. 'From the individual's short-term perspective,"
Rich argues, voluntarism may be a highly rational response to the
resource situation of poor citizens, even though it may handicap
O O
the community in the long run." Thus, minimizing risk-taking
31
for individuals and making the der-icinr, • .8 n a c slon to join more attractive
weakens the organization that nay subsequently be created.
The need to form voluntary organizations with exit choices
in low-income neighborhoods leads to an increase in the costs of
organizational maintenance and the reliance on selective and
purposive incentives as substitutes for coercion
.
34
Rich compares
neighborhood groups from communities of varying SES and finds that
the higher the SES, the greater the likelihood that coercive
organizations—property owner groups and community development
organizations will exist. The greatest concentration of
neighborhood organizations of any kind was in middle-income
neighborhoods, since low-income neighborhoods are handicapped by
the dynamics described above and upper-income neighborhoods reflect
individualist strategies to meet residential needs. In addition to
the higher maintenance costs of the voluntary organizations. Rich
found that coercive organizations were more effective in obtaining
collective material goods for their neighborhoods.^ Hence, Rich
argues that the choices available to low-income neighborhoods are
limited and not very attractive. Moreover, they impose additional
constraints on the organizer as well.
It is generally agreed among those studying voluntary
organizations that the problems posed by Olson regarding rational
choices in pursuit of collective action demand that organizers
adopt two somewhat contradictory strategies: reliance on purposive
incentives and stimulation of maximum constituent participation.^
32
This dynamic Is exaggerated among low-income constituents where
1) purposive incentives are easily obtainable, while material
goods are not, and 2) the lack of material resources requires that
low-income constituents contribute their labor tn bU11 i D o the organization.
Moe argues that these dynamics conflict, since purposive incentives
or ideology increase the power of professional staff and frequently
displace the goal of organization-building. 37 He argues that the
staff "who control political information and expertise and perform
valuable political services will find they have a stronger basis
for influence."38 Goal displacement occurs when "the group's goals
are not a means to. ..ends, but are ends in themselves that take on
value because of the ideological nature; they are, from the
entrepreneur's standpoint, the raison d'etre of the association."39
When goal displacement occurs, Moe argues, "entrepreneurs" or
organizers attempt to prevent constituent input into goal-setting
by developing other incentive structures, propagandizing, manipulating
group activities toward group goals only, and hiring staff according
to their beliefs rather than their competence AO
Constraints therefore pose real problems for organizers
attempting to build low-income organizations. The effect of these
constraints is that organizers are forced to rely on voluntary
organizations, develop some form of purposive incentives, and
stimulate constituent participation as much as possible. Accomodating
these constraints, however, are only the first set of choices to be
made.
33
Available Choices
The idea of constraints on choices of organizing strategies
is of course theoretical. Organizers have historically chosen a
wide variety of exchange relationships and organizational fores
with varying degrees of success. To develop further the notion of
organizing strategy and to delineate the available options requires
an exaeination of different organizing strategies that have been
attempted with low-income constituents.
One of the more closely studied organizing strategies for
low-income constituents is that of the National Welfare Rights
Organization (NWRO)
. The constituency of the short-lived NWRO
was welfare recipients, mostly female, black, and clearly low-
income. Lawrence Bailis found that NWRO members had an especially
intense dependence upon governmental service agencies for their
livelihood and that many were not receiving nearly the amount of
government benefits to which they were entitled. This clear and
easily remedied gap between entitlements and benefits provided a
unique opportunity for organizers of the NWRO. It offered the
chance to obtain "tangible benefits that are quickly realizable ."^ 1
An exchange relationship could thereby be created in which
material incentives were offered to members by the organizer's
ability to manipulate welfare entitlement regulations while making
the least possible demand on their welfare constituency. As Bailis
put it, demands on the membership should be minimized: the less
34
asked, the better ."^ 2
The organizational form of the NWRO was simple. The
organizers developed lists of welfare recipients by any means they
could and contacted prospective constituents to persuade them that
they could obtain increased benefits through the NWRO. The
organizers then staged a mass meeting of recipients in a local
church or hall, elected pre-appointed officers by acclamation,
and took the meeting to the local welfare office to demand
supplementary benefits for items such as furniture, winter clothing,
and other special grants written into welfare legislation but
poorly publicized. Dues were one dollar per year, used largely
as a token of members' contribution and an expression of commitment
and to accommodate the standard organizational rituals for the sake
of lobbying claims and inquiries regarding funding sources
.
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Finally, although individual NWRO chapters lasted less than a year,
during that time, organizers maintained "intensive and continuing
personal contact" with the members
.
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For the most part, the groups
were loose, short-lived, closely managed by staff, and based largely
on personal relations between members and staff.
Nationally, the NWRO could not sustain itself long either.
The source of its incentives, the special grants from the welfare
offices, dried up when state legislatures instituted flat grant
systems of benefits. Other strategies, such as advocacy and
grievances, were insufficient to maintain the organization since
recipients of such benefits from the NWRO no longer had reason to
35
Stay in the organization when their problem was resolved. The only
purposive incentive attempted was to convey the belief that "(t]he
reason welfare is so bad is because welfare recipients are not
organized. One by one they can't get what they need because they
have no power—and that's what this country responds to, power ."45
Any ideological articulation beyond that was eschewed: the NWRO
organizers "put down attempts at ideological justification for a
course of action as 'radical bullshit .'"46 Nor, as their organizing
strategy dictated, did the NWRO attempt to stimulate constituent
participation. Rather, they made as few demands as possible in
order to keep the benefit/cost ratio as high as possible.
The NWRO was therefore incapable of developing or maintaining
incentives adequate to the constituents it sought to organize.
Material benefits had only a short-term effectiveness, and the
organizers chose not to develop members' commitment through parti-
cipation or purposive incentives to inspire constituent allegiance.
The combination of targeted constituency, exchange relationship,
and organizational form was not effective in the environment in
which it was attempted. While a single case does not prove a rule,
it is clear that this organizing strategy did not operate within
the constraints outlined above with the predicted consequences.
Another organizing strategy that has been widely attempted
is Saul Alinsky's technique of community organizing. Unlike the
NWRO, as Joan Lancourt has shown ,
^
Alinsky's groups lasted, in
some cases, for many years, rescuing several communities from
36
urban blight and providing services to community residents on a
long-term basis. The constituency targeted by Alinsky organizers
was the leadership of local community organizations within low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods. These included religious leaders,
block club officers, people in business organizations, and officers
of ethnic organizations. Alinsky and his organizers tried to
enroll these leaders and their organizations as constituent groups
under umbrella organizations set up by Alinsky.
The exchange relationship between organizer and constituents
was more varied and intense than the NWRO's. It is basic to
Alinsky groups to offer immediate, tangible incentives to their
constituents, such as jobs, fair treatment at the local supermarket,
and improved city services. Longer-term goals of Alinsky groups
included establishing services such as Community Development
Corporations and protecting neighborhoods from urban redevelopment
and freeway construction. The purposive incentives offered were
the ideals of democratic participation in the political system for
the local leadership of the community. The intended result of the
incentive system was to enable "each intermediate or short-term
struggle to broaden the participants' consciousness, propelling
them on to the next set of issues. Without this clear, overall
perspective, which imbues individual victories with a larger
significance, the benefits of each advance, no matter how valuable...,
may dissipate, overwhelmed by the new problems arising from the
48
ever-changing reality." Hence, the incentive system is structured
37
to expand the constituent cogent and understanding iron, the
immediate and concrete to the more distant and idealistic.
The demands Alinsky groups made on the constituents were
greater than the NWRO's. The Alinsky confrontation technics
required members to picket rallvP , y, and protest at times, and to
PP rt local institutions such as the Community Development
Corporations at others. Lancourt points out that the demands on
leaders was far greater than it was on members of the constituents’
4 9groups. Compared to the NWRO, however, participants in Alinsky
groups were asked to provide a great deal more of the resources
necessary for organization-building and achievement of community
goals.
The organizational form of the Alinsky groups, as noted
above, is the federated umbrella structure. The dues payers are
constituent groups churches, ethnic organizations, and block
clubs. The boards of the Alinsky groups consist of leaders of the
constituent groups who meet regularly and make the important
decisions about group goals and strategies. The boards receive
a great deal of guidance from the organizers early in the process
who then withdraw until they actually leave the organization
completely to its own devices after a pre-determined period of
time—usually four years.
The Alinsky groups generally stay within the constraints
outlined above. They exercise some important options regarding
constituency and organizational form as well as applying conscious
38
progression of incentives designed to develop the allegiance and
sophistication of its constituents. They also demand a fait
degree of participation from constituents, as Moe argues is
necessary. White that increases the cost of a henefit/cost ratio,
the relative success of Alinsky groups and the NWRO suggests that
there may be utility in that strategic choice.
There is then no consensus as to the most effective means
of organizing low- and moderate-income people for political action.
There are principles and techniques that have been developed and
rules guiding their use given the constraints of different
settings. But there is no one right wa*. Understanding the
politics of low-income organizations requires further examination
of these groups, and that of course is what the study does. It
looks specifically at the organizing strategy of the Boston ACORM
chapter to determine which choices they have made to attract and
maintain members in their organization.
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CHAPTER I I x
THE ACORN ORGANIZING STRATEGY
The plan that ACORN uses as an organising strategy for low-
income people lends itself to analysis because it is clearly
articulated and recorded in a variety of places. The founder of
ACORN, Wade Rathke, drafted this plan, much as the Boston Model of
the NWRO was drafted, before he began his work. Rathke designed
the ACORN organizing strategy so that it could be executed and
replicated throughout the country. Moreover, he has cited the
sources that inspired his organizing plan. For these reasons, it
is possible to apply the foregoing analysis of organizing strategy
to the ACORN organization.
When Rathke began the organization he was working as an
organizer for the Massachusetts Welfare Rights Organization (MWRO)
.
He developed a plan to organize a majority constituency using
techniques that would mobilize lower class Americans. He promoted
the idea with the MWRO and received a grant to go to Little Rock,
Arkansas to create such an organization. Rathke described his
goal
:
With the welfare issue, you're always dealing with a
minority. We all knew that we had to break out of
the single-issue campaign. I wanted to build on a
majority constituency rather than on a minority,
where the next-door neighbors are in it together,
not fighting each other.
^
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Hence, Rathke clearly fits the Salisbury model of an organizer/
entrepreneur with a strategy for selling an organization to a
group ln the political system. Moreover, he has discussed his
Plan in a variety of sources, including m«os, news artlcles> and
commentaries on organizing techniques.
Rathke also provides the sources of ideas for his organizing
strategy. The nature of the sources and the manner in which Rathke
blended them shows both what his intentions were and the kinds of
problems he thought were important. All of the sources of ideas
were organizations attempting to organize low-income people. The
Civil Rights Movement developed the ideas of using confrontational
tactics, as did Saul Alinsky's community organizing. Fred Ross of
the United Farm Workers developed the notion of house meetings "to
build a sense of community among potential organization members ..."2
The membership dues system started with the labor movement and the
Non-Partisan League of North Dakota . 3 The notion of training and
supporting professional organizers was also a product of Non-Partisan
League organizing. Finally, the idea of developing a clearly
articulated model and applying it in neighborhoods across the
country was inspired by the Boston Model created by Rhoda Linton
and Bill Pastreich.
The Boston Model was used as "the basis for NWRO's ability
to send raw white organizers ... into Minnesota, Ohio, Illinois,
Rhode Island, and New York and, in a matter of months, produce
4
organization. Rathke, the former NWRO organizer, devised a
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similar organizing strategy designed for a majority constituency.
Because the plan is inspired by previous attempts to solve
specific organizing problems of the past, it is possible to
identify in the ACORN organizing strategy what Rathke saw as the
relevant problems and the most suitable solutions, i.e., how do
you create and sustain a political organization of low- and
moderate-income citizens in American politics?
The fact that the ACORN organizing strategy is, like the
Boston Model, designed to be implemented and replicated anywhere
in the country also reinforces the notion that it is very much
like a marketing strategy consciously designed to appeal to a
specific constituency within the political system. The fact that
the strategy has been applied for over fifteen years in settings
both urban and rural and in twenty-six states, plus the District
of Columbia, clearly indicates that the strategy is capable of
dealing with many of the problems of low-income organizing cited
in the previous chapter.
Finally, the goal that Rathke set for ACORN, "Power to the
People, makes clear the intention of its founder and provides a
guide for evaluating its success. In more formal terms, Rathke
describes the goal of the organization in the beginning of his
detailed memo entitled "ACORN Community Organizing Model":
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.
bulld a mass community organization which hasas its prynary principle the development of sufficient
tatere^s^Us
t0
h .
aChleVe lts ^dividual members’
other groups its % r JecClves ' and ln connection with, state interests. The oreanhshinn
must be permanent with multi-issued concert achievedthrough multi-tact iced [sic] direct action, and m^terip participating in policy, financing, and achievementgroup goals and community improvements. 5
The model, when applied in neighborhoods across the country, aims
at building a national organization made up of the local chapters
which can "deal with the manifestations of power in whatever
rm they take. When the local groups coordinate their efforts,
Rathke believes, they are capable of redistributing power in the
American political system to the ACORN constituency.
The Targeted Constituency
The targeted constituency in the ACORN organizing strategy
is a majority of the American people. Writing in 1975 with Steven
Rest in the ACORN Organizing Handbook #2, Rathke stated:
it is imperative that ACORN see as its constituency
all the people in this country who are shut out of...
Power.
.
As a rough working guide ACORN has
traditionally defined this constituency as consisting
of those of low to moderate income. By any standards
you hit upon, that constituency contains within it a
majority of the people in this country. It is that
majority that is going to have to be organized if
there is any hope for changing—for reversing—the
prevailing distribution of power .
^
Hence, the constituency that Rathke targeted is defined by its
income and lack of power. It is clear from ACORN’s history that
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an racial groups are included, and that, essentially, the
criterion of income has remained consistent.
The selection of members occurs by the area in which people
live. Since neighborhoods are heterogeneous in their economic
makeup
,
it is possible for members to be relatively well off. The
choice of neighborhoods that ACORN organises is determined by a
variety of considerations:
This happens in one of two ways: Either ACORNinvited into a neighborhood by some of its reL -
P ic^/^or :arL^
S
st::tegJc
S>
easons a neighborhood to be organized. The Boardmight choose a neighborhood because it is in a citv
Uke
C
to £e-
d
or
h
b
re AC°RN
,
1Sn,t as as it wouldiRe b , ecause the racial or income characterOf the neighborhood will help give the overall
organization its vital balanLt; or c
“
important issue that might affect the whole area(a new highway, for example) is making its firstappearance in that neighborhood. 8
Thus, the choice may be either tactical or for the types of people
residing in a neighborhood, but historically, the basic determinant
has been income. Cary Delgado's study of ACORN's membership found
that, of 50,000 members, 70% are "black and Latino, 70% female,
and almost all from the working class....
The Exchange Relationship
"Deliverables." The organizers of ACORN seek members from
their low- and moderate-income constituency who will contribute
time and resources. In pursuit of those members, they initially
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offer the
"deliverables" described in the previous chapter.
Organizers are instructed on how to develop and pursue such issues
when the organizing model is applied in each neighborhood. The
initial organizing drive that creates the individual neighborhood
groups virtually every ACORN group is started de novo by ACORN
organizers is where the exchange process begins.
The Organizing Model describes the process by which
organizers should look for issues that will interest prospective
members to join:
o^In"
8
°e
“alk"g throu8h ^ neighborhood you can
drainage bT! : f ‘*-ts, open ditches?, ad lighting, condemned or dilapidatedhousing, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, litter domestic
lack
C
of
m
nart
al eyeS°reS
’
ueeds and overgrown lots,
andV n kS " recreatl°nal facilities, bus routesnd a number of other issues. Depending on thesituations, all of these things are potential
organizing issues. ®
While seeking issues that are winnable and relatively easy to
achieve, the organizer must also discuss what the residents perceive
as the most important issues in the neighborhood.
At the beginning of an organizing drive, there are two basic
means through which neighborhood residents may identify issues,
the "Organizing Committee" and the residents contacted in their
homes through the process of "doorknocking. " The Organizing
Committee is a small group of twelve to twenty people who are the
core of the organization during the drive They usually consist
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Of people who have contacted ACORN requesting that a group be
organized in their neighborhood, friends of those contacts, or
People known to the contacts as interested in political activity “
They provide legitimacy for the drive and become leaders in the
organizing work and are often the original officers of the group.
"Doorknocking" is the process by which the organizer and as many
members of the Organizing Committee as can be recruited contact as
many of the people in the neighborhood as possible before the
"First Meeting,” or initial neighborhood-wide meeting. The inter-
action "on the doors" is critical to the success of the drive and
is where a great deal of the "salesmanship" for the organization
occurs. The Model states:
There is no substitute for personal contact in convincingpeople to become active in the organization. Doorknocking
oes it best. It gives the doorknockers a chance to
answer questions and create the impressions of the organi-
zation. It allows you to bring people in, and define somepeople out
.
In each relatively brief interaction (fifteen minutes is recommended)
the doorknocker learns what the residents think about the neighborhood
and what issues they consider important. It is an unusually direct
interaction between citizen and political organizer, and occurs with
nearly a thousand residents in each neighborhood organized.
Typically
,
the issues with which the organizers begin are
relatively easy to identify, such as clearing vacant lots, obtaining
needed traffic control, open ditches, and so on. In most cases, a
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visit to a city official is all that is needed to obtain satis-
faction for the residents. These "wins" are tangible, quite
visible, and provide clear proof of success for the local organising
drive. In organizational terms, the deliverables can be defined as
collective material benefits, i.e., they are tangible and all of
the residents of the neighborhood benefit regardless of whether
they pay dues or participate in ACORN. Thus, the incentive that
ORN organizers rely on to launch each community group and to bring
members into the organization are material collective ones. They
deal in any significant way with the problems of free riders
or maintaining supplies of accessible "deliverables."
^2IlZ£H££gsiv^Se^ctive Incentives
. There are three types
of non-ideological selective incentives available: material,
camaraderie, and status. Surprisingly, in light of the political
organization literature, ACORN's organizing strategy does not
mention the social incentives, and does not treat selective material
incentives as critical to organization building. While it is
difficult to conceive of an organization that does not offer any
social incentives in practice, ACORN does not cultivate that type
of incentive m its model or its literature. The Organizing Model
discusses the development of discounts from local merchants that
only ACORN members can receive. But it does not discuss discounts
as a means of attracting members for the value of the discount,
but rather states that discounts make "it easier to build legitimacy
with your community contacts "13 The types of selective material
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incentives offered by ACORN groups around the country> such ^ ^
co-ops, are not intended to be primary motivations for members to
join or remain involved in ACORN. The main reliance, however, is
on purposive incentives. Organizers ground their appeal on the
organization
* s goals.
Ideology, as it is generally discussed
in political views, includes the Rinds of world views epitomized by
liberals, conservatives, and socialists. In that realm, one might
expect low-income organizers to espouse and apply ideologies to the
left of the political spectrum. However, this is not always the
case. As Fainstein and Fainstein discovered, urban political
activists are sometimes forced into a position of opposing liberal
id ea 1 s
:
While the costs of attacking "liberal" institutions maybe htgh, their salience to the lives of ghetto inhabi-n s is great; Congress or big business might be moreimportant causative factors in the situation of thepoor but they are much less visible and much less thelmme late creators of the people's misery than the
schools, hospitals, and welfare offices. The latter
therefore, become the foci of attack, and the movements
evelop an ideology to counter the Progressive ideology
which supports these institutions. 14
Moreover, the more extreme leftist ideologies have been discredited
in American politics even among low-income citizens. Hence, there
is no clear option for low-income organizing on the ideological left.
ACORN has dealt with this dilemma in several ways in its
literature, public pronouncements and organizing practice: 1) it
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has adopted the term
"populist'’ to describe the organisation; 2)
it has taken an anti-corporate stance on a consistent basis; and
3) it has eschewed ideology and proved an "action as ideology"
approach, especially in its internal
_ications. Ihe result
of these three approaches in their public statements and organizing
strategy creates confusion and is somewhat muddled, but may
provide some important insights for the use of ideology as an
incentive in low-income organizing.
ACORN frequently refers to itself, on fliers and in the
press, as "populist". The term, however, denotes little and
connotes much. It has been associated with a wide variety of
political views and politicians, as well as a major political
movement of the late Nineteenth Century. Political scientists have
rarely tried to use the term with any precision, associating it
negatively with racism and anti-intellectualism 15 or positively
with the practice of initiative and referendum and increased
political participation generally.16 Recent historlcal revislon
by Lawrence Goodwyn 17 has altered the view of the Populist Movement.
He argues that the Populists were egalitarian anticapitalists, not
backward
-loo king racist romantics as many historians have depicted
them.
Similarly, George McKenna argues that populism is a bona
fide ideology with a reasonable degree of complexity and an historic
consistency that he attempts to document with letters, speeches and
platforms from American political history. McKenna distills six
52
basic tenets of populistic ideology n , af.p „ f .by- ) l ck o class consciousness
2) the assumption of consensus among "the people"; 3) strong
patciotism; 4) the belief ttat wealth should belong to all and not
lust some Americans; 5) a fear of bigness, corporate or govern-
mental
; and 6) mistrust of intellectual elites. Despite a lack of
systematic effort by ACORN staff or m^bership, ACORN's rhetoric
and strategy bear striking similarities to populism.
ACORN's avowed aim is to organize the lower seventy per
cent on the income ladder. ACORN rhetoric always refers to "the
people", and avoids identifying race, gender, class, region, or
other divisions within the American public. As an organization,
therefore, ACORN operates on the assumption ttat American society
is divided between what ACORN refers to consistently as "low- and
moderate-income people," or "the people," and those to whom they
refer to as the "fatcats" or "the few." ACORN does not, however,
expound theories of class struggle, keeping the analysis at the
level of "the people" struggling to be heard or the "majority"
trying to take control of the government." Like the Populists,
they maintain that the struggle is between "the many" and "the few"
where the many struggle for their rights as American citizens.
ACORN operates on the premise that there is a consensus
among "the people" regarding what McKenna calls "what is right and
wrong, fair and foul, legitimate and crooked. ACORN organizers
argue that as long as ACORN deals with economic issues or the
building of political power, low- and moderate-income people will
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hold together
.
20
ACORN’s People's Platfnrm fP S Fi ° , for example, clearly
argues,
"[Hike many populist organizations ACORN.
. .opted to
preserve class unity by developing an anti-corporate political
program that did not directly address salient issues of race and
This has been an integral part of ACORN’s organizing
strategy from its inception: to organize people around economic
Issues using government and corporations as its target and avoiding
divisive social issues.
Patriotism has not been a salient issue in ACORN's history.
The only issues that relate to patriotism in any manner are ACORN
protests of President Reagan’s increased military spending, and in
some instances, the nuclear freeze. However, there have been no
Vietnams to divide people who might otherwise unite, or to raise
doubts about the patriotism of ACORN as an organization.
ACORN's ideological approach to private property is similar
to McKenna's depiction of populism. The idea that "the land and
commodities of America belong not to some but to all of the American
people" is expressed by ACORN in both word and deed. The ACORN
People's Platform provides clear evidence of this belief in the
preamble when it demands "the best of our energy, land, and natural
resources for all people." The clearest expression of this belief
came from ACORN's "squatting" campaign. ACORN saw a contradiction
between a housing shortage, on the one hand, and the existence of
thousands of vacant houses in ACORN neighborhoods, on the other.
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These houses had been abandoned by their o»ers and frequently
assumed by city and federal governments for unpaid taxes, HUD
mortgage foreclosures, or other reasons, and they became the target
for ACORN squatters. ACORN organized public rallies to break into
and claim the houses for low-income families in need of housing.
Claiming no legal grounds for their actions, ACORN instead
justified and publicized squatting on the moral grounds that
people were "Taking What's Ours!" Many squatters were evicted
and arrested for trespassing, but in Congressional hearings ACORN
members expressed determination to continue squatting despite
police and official action
.
22
Hence, unused resources, in this
case, abandoned houses, have been claimed by ACORN to promote
views on human rights versus property rights.
McKenna’s claim regarding populist fears of bigness is some-
what muddled in ACORN. Delgado argues, for example, that the
People’s Platform expresses "ambivalence between anti-corporate
populism and the social-democratic state ."23 While a great deal
the platform is directed at control of corporations and their
abuses, and the difficulty in controlling big government, some of
the proposals would require massive bureaucracies and tremendous
budget outlays that have historically led to unresponsiveness to
and abuse of low-income citizens. The demand for federal programs
capable of building a million units of housing per year seems
contradictory in the face of ACORN’s organizing strategy which
dictates extreme localism and a scale responsive to individual
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inputs, and the association bylaws which include an explicit goal
of maintaining organizational democracy. Thus, ACORN appears
ambivalent about the most desirable size of institutions; it
struggles against large corporations and goverm,ent bureaucracies,
is attracted, at times, to large government programs.
ACORN has had little to say about intellectual elites, the
last tenet of populism that McKenna cites. ACORN chapters have
frequently been involved in public education affairs, including
tunning and supporting candidates to school boards and promoting
legislation for free textbooks in Arkansas. However, there have
issues or statement akin to William Jennings Bryant's
behavior at the Scopes Trial or George Wallace's attacks on
"intellectual snobs.
Anti-Ideology in ACORN. ACORN’s internal approach to
ideology and action is quite unusual for an apparently leftist
organization. ACORN's avowed reasons for being anti-ideological
are 1) the goal of redistributing power is adequate inspiration
and direction, 2) understanding of politics is best gained by
experience rather than study, and 3) it is not possible to predict,
given the complexity of society, what will be the best means of
redistributing power in every policy area.
Rest and Rathke argue that specific issues and policy stands
are not the essence of ACORN's activities. Rather, they contend,
that " [b] ehind the organization's concern with these issues is a
basic understanding that all these issues are mere manifestations
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of a much more fundamental issue- the Hict- -u
*
——
^
in the
country."^ Hence, the single concern that the organizers of ACORN
address is the distribution of power in American politics.
ACORN also claims that a well-developed ideology is not
useful for community organising hecause it is not possible to impart
political knowledge without a solid base of participatory involve.
Indeed, one of the most important reasons for designing ACORN
activities to involve as many members as possible is to provide
them with the experience necessary to develop a good understanding
of the political system and the alleged maldistribution of power.
U is the aim of ACORN activism to put low- and moderate-income
people in situations where they are making what they consider
reasonable demands and to have those demands resisted or rejected.
In this way, they will learn what to expect from politicians and
corporate representatives. Fainstein and Fainstein observed this
same process at work in several urban political movements they
2 6studied. Having experienced first-hand the maldistribution of
power, ACORN participants are then likely to see that the
connections between that issue and other issues revolve around the
distribution of power.
Finally, the ACORN approach is predicated on the claim that,
m order to make policy stances attractive to constituents, it is
necessary to be actively involved in those areas. In addition to
being a corollary of the preceding claim, ACORN strategists argue
that it is unwise to make claims regarding a policy area in which
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one had not taken sides on some matter directly affecting the
members of the organisation. Further, it makes no sense to take
a posit ion unless one is willing and able to act on it. Thus,
until one is in a position of some power and until one tas organized
constituents around an issue, there is no benefit and possibly some
danger in taking a position on it.
Rathke claims that "fa]n organization like ACORN doesn't
develop an ideology until it finishes growing, until it has some
exercise I m confident that that process produces the
best of all philosophies and ideologies " 27 Who t-hu . en the organization's
precepts are kept simple, educational functions are provided by
action, and issue stances are only taken in areas in which the
group is engaged. This assures the organization's needs can be
met, and also that it will not be encumbered with ideological
baggage that can lead to the kinds of goal displacement that Moe
describes.
Thus, ACORN's anti-ideological approach stems from several
concerns that are ultimately based on three considerations pertaining
to the low- and moderate-income constituency: 1) power in American
life is maldistributed
; 2) knowledge comes from power; and 3) action
is the most effective means of learning and expressing political
values. This level of abstraction and analysis appears to provide
sufficient direction to ACORN organizers and members without
painting them into the corner that Moe describes of goal displacement
and organizer dominance. The combination of the vagueness of the
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popular understanding of populist, and the fear of the organizers'
abuse of ideology warrants the use of the term
"anti-ideological"
to describe ACORN.
Anti-corporatism in ACORN The t-h-ir-a a-~ i i d dimension of ACORN's
Purposive incentives is a crude anti-corporati OT . Kest and Rathke
argue that the most important thing about high utility rates is
"the fact that.
..in reality rather than rhetoric a bunch of
corporate directors and New York bankers have the power to
unilaterally make decisions that affect the lives of ACORN members .
"
28
This claim that economic power is undemocratic and should be redressed
by political action permeates all of ACORN's activism and rhetoric.
ACORN chapters have fought corporations over toxic wastes disposal,
ility rates, plant sitings, tax structures and abatements, banking
and investment practices, and many other issues. The preamble to
ACORN People s Platform specifies a subordinate rather than
dominant role for corporations in American society:
"Corporations
shall have their role: producing jobs, providing products, paying
taxes
. No more
. No less Thpy cinnii ,J-es . t e shall obey our wishes, respond to
our needs, serve our communities."
In sum, ACORN's approach to ideology is a form of praxis
,
where action informs thought. This is augmented by the vague yet
appealing principles of populism, the "perennial" ideology of
protest in American politics, and a crude form of anti-corporatism.
The history of ACORN, its literature and the comments of observers
substantiate the nature of ACORN's ideology and suggest that it is
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effective in overcoming some of the diff-ir-, ifficulties in using ideology
as a purposive incentive for lmrt ow- and moderate-income Americans.
Ifejlgnbers' Contri hntinn
acorn organizers make it clear to prospective members that
t hey must contribute substantially to the organization ior it to
succeed. One of the major goals of the organizers in the • •ui d organizing
drive is to collect dues before the first meeting. This fact alone
makes the exchange relationship clear: members must provide the
means by which the organization survives. The principle that
ACORN uses is the Membership organization." Members and prospective
thus initiated into the organization with a clear message
that their role in the organization is contributory and not passive.
One of the clearest assertions of members' financial role in
ACORN stems from the organizational goal of financial self-sufficiency.
The "ACORN Members' Handbook" states
ACORN has always been committed to the principle ofmancial self-sufficiency and we've made great stridestoward that goal. The principle is important because
only an organization that raises and controls its own
un s can be truly independent. Because ACORN memberspay the organization's way, we call the shots
.
29
Hence, despite the fact that ACORN's constituency is on the lower end
of the income scale, the organization requires its members to contri-
bute dues regularly and with great emphasis.
ACORN organizers are also advised to persuade members to
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contribute as much time as possible to the organization as well
This begins with the exhortation to assist in the large task of
doorknocking the entire neighborhood in the organizing drive. The
Organizing Model is qnite blunt about this matter when it describes
the agenda for Organizing Committee testings: "Doorknockiny • Get
agreetents on when, not if. "30 The organlzers ^^ ^
delegate as much of the other duties of the group as possible,
including phoning, taking parts of the meeting agendas, distributing
fliers and fundraising. Moreover, one of the basic principles of
designing ACORN actions is to involve as many people as possible.
Thus, the level of expectations on the membership is quite high and
frequently involves a great deal of time and commitment. The
Organizing Model is quite explicit about the nature of the exchange
relationship
:
fservipP Q
Cl
^
ar [W]^ they Can exPect from ACORN( ces, research, assistance, contacts, politicalpower, itertures [sic], etc.), and what ACORN expects
e3^r°u p (dues, affiliation, news distribution,
G L C « y •
Organizational Structure
ACORN’s organizational structure can be described by its
organizational groupings, the three roles that participants play
in the organization, and the committee and governing structures
above the local level. All of these features of ACORN were designed
to contribute to the success of the organization and to fill the
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needs of the constituents and express the values of the organization.
The basic covenant of the organization is the neighborhood
organization. One cannot be a member of ACORN unless one lives in
an area that has been organized by ACORN and contributes dues and
participates in the group. The neighborhood structure is intended
to provide a physical association for the membership, i.e., the
organization represents a geographical entity with clearly defined
boundaries. Besides providing members with territorial allegiances,
geographical basing provides a seriQPs P n nse of permanence, according to Kest
and Rathke:
its members, the organization, rather than justhatever issue is being worked on at that time isof number one importance. The point is that inorder to address the fundamental questions of powerlow- and moderate-income citizens must be organized-
thaT over°ih
S
’-|
be COmmitted to a Permanent organizationat, t e long run, will attack the maldistribution
of power in every way it can. 32
This sense of permanence provides the necessarily long-term mission
with a concrete representation.
The local nature of the organization also makes the experience
of membership personal and tangible. Upper-income Americans fre-
quently participate in politics by writing checks to distant post
office boxes and following the organization in the papers and
monthly newsletters. Lower income citizens, however, respond better
to visible, tangible, and local organizations. The members are able
to meet face-to-face with leaders and can personalize the organization
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rather than experience it only in an abstract way.
The local groups meet monthly and constantly work on issues
within the neighborhood, as well as in the larger community, along
With other local groups. This is part of the strategy to keep the
organization constantly in view and maintain a degree of momentum
that organizers feel is necessary to keep members motivated.
Historically, lower-income people have seen organizations come and
go and the resulting mistrust of organizational solutions to their
problems creates the need to overcome constituents' skepticism.
This is done by keeping the local groups close to the members,
both geographically and temporally.
The local groups consist of approximately 100-200 members
who hold membership cards and pay dues. They are, for the most
part, the people in the neighborhood who joined during the organizing
drive or at the first meeting. Active participants number far fewer
than the entire membership. Active members are generally the
officers and a loyal cadre, usually around a dozen people in all.
They attend meetings regularly, respond to requests to assist in
distributing fliers and making calls, and participate in actions.
Moreover, they serve on larger committees at the community-wide
level, such as the ACORN Political Action Committees. The disparity
between active and inactive members is calculated into the organizing
strategy, as expressed in the Organizing Model:
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Attendance
: The majority of firat- *-
•
biggest meetings that prouncs m C ln§ s are the
on the quality of the issues
W\ hHVe ’ dePending
can depend on for consistency ln the
* C°re which y°u
size and qualitv ni' • ^
16 ®rou P i-n both
event
. You^ust 'convince^he^roups "SZ'T'T 1they never have enough people to be Satisfied w
s™bu
a
ity!33
nUmberS t0 d6preSS their activity ’o”
Thus, the reality-a
-.11 core of activists-is accounted for in
the organizing st rategy, yet an ideal is established that prods
the activists to greater efforts to expand their numbers. The
activities of this cadre, meanwhile, represent the tangible
organizational solution to neighborhood political problems.
Participant Roles
nzer
The three roles in ACORN are member, leader, and organ:
They are clearly defined in the organizing strategy and are essential
to understanding the nature of the organization. Briefly, members
pay dues and participate in the organization. Leaders are formally
elected or appointed to interim posts. Organizers are paid,
professional participants who are not indigenous to the neighborhood,
and rarely come from the constituency.
Members are formally designated by being current on their
dues and possessing membership cards. As stated above, one must
be a resident of an ACORN neighborhood in order to join a group and
become a member of the larger organization. They receive ACORN
publications and have access to the ACORN organizers and the
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services they provide upon request.
Leaders come from the membership, i. e
., they are residents
neighborhood who have agreed to serve in positions in the
local group. Oceasionall y> interin, officers are appointed when
circumstances require it, such as the sudden departure of a current
officer. Leaders are required to operate the group, chairing
meetings, leading actions, and conferring with organisers on the
operations of the organization nff
•
. Offices in a typical neighborhood
e chair, co-chair, secretary and treasurer. While the roles are
not tightly defined, they generally are for the chair and the co-
chair to be the executive leadership of the group, the secretary
fulfills communications functions, and the treasurer maintains
dues records and keeps the books.
Organizers, as in any voluntary organization, are the only
paid participants in ACORN. They are quite different from the
members and leaders in their demographical characteristics and
serve at the pleasure of the Head Organizer. Organizers are almost
all well-educated, white, middle- and upper-income young people.
ACORN recruits them most frequently from Eastern colleges and
universities from which they are then assigned to posts anywhere
m the twenty-six ACORN states or the District of Columbia. Thus,
there is some built-in distance between the members and the leaders
and the organizers-social
,
economic, geographical, educational,
and frequently racial. In addition, the organizers' allegiance is
to the organization at large while the members tend to perceive the
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organization mostly within theit neighborhoods
. FlnaUy> ^
organizers' perspective is that of professionalP t sionals applying skills
and ethical standards, while the constituents' main concern is
with issues and power.
lie the organizers are trained and encouraged to delegate
as many of their functions as possible, they have a tendency to do
as much of the work as they can. The ACORN model is built on
member control and participation which, it is expected, will lead
to commitment to the organization and its goals, but the nature of
the organizers tends to mitigate against this approach. The
organizers, many of them high achievers, feel the responsibility
of their jobs rather heavily and become uncomfortable when others
are doing the job for them. Structurally, the role of the organizer
counterposed against the constituency is a source of conflict within
the ACORN organizing strategy.
Regional Structure
The two main regional structures are the Executive Board
and the ACORN Political Action Committee (APAC)
. They manage the
citywide (or, in the case of rural areas, countywide) executive
and electoral activities of ACORN, respectively. The Executive
Committee consists of the Chairs of the neighborhood groups and
meets monthly to make the broader decisions of the regional
organization. The Head Organizer of the area reports to the
Executive Committee and confers with them on issues, strategies,
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and financial affairs. The APAC conducts the electoral
of the regional group by analyzlng campalgns> ^
dates, if any, to support, and co-ordinating the electoral efforts
Of the regional ACORN group. Both of these bodies^^
and leaders opportunities to contrihute. control, and participate
“ the larger workings of AC0RN
. Llke any boar<J Qf directors ^
political action group, they exercise as much control as they see
fit and oversee staff (organisers) as much as they feel is necessary.
There is nothing absolute about their functioning, which is in keeping
with standard practices in voluntary organizations of any kind.
This chapter has described the organizing strategy of the
ACORN model. Throughout, it is clear that- th „’ 8 at the strategy i s adapted
to the constituency and the goals of the organization. Moreover, it
Is clear that the decisions that go into it are conscious and goal-
directed. Thus, the concept of the organizing strategy is quite
capable of providing insights into the model ACORN applies in
organizing its constituency for political power. The chapters that
follow will examine the experiences and insights of ACORN participants
in the city of Boston through interviews in order to determine the
impact of the organizing strategy on its participants.
Consistent with the notion of the organizer/entrepreneur as
the rational (and, historically speaking, actual) progenitor of the
political organization, this study will look first at the perceptions
of the professional organizers. The interviews in Chapter 5 will
attempt to establish the intentions of the organizers and determine
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6£feCtS thSy "1Sh *»™ *» «-* interactions with the
targeted constituents of the organising strategy. Once it ls
estahiished what the technics the organisers use are designed to
achieve, the interviews with the memhers and leaders (the
constituents) will provide insights into their effectiveness and
thexr perceptions of the organisation and the organising strategy.
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CHAPTER I V
THE ORGANIZERS
Interviews with the organizers were designed to ascertain
their perceptions of their roles in ACORN and the impact of their
activities on ACORN, clearly, their role in ACORN as the profes-
sional staff and entrepreneurs of the organizing strategy is
critical to an understanding of ACORN, for they are the ones who
sell membership and participation in ACORN in return for the
benefits they claim they can supply. The responses of the organi-
zers will be discussed under four broad headings: 1) their
impressions of the nature of ACORN organizing; 2) their impressions
of the benefits members derive from ACORN; 3) their perceptions of
the decisionmaking process; and 4) problems they encounter in
their work.
The questions that the researcher used to explore the
organizers’ experiences approached their work as one would any
other occupation. ACORN organizers consider themselves profes-
sionals, i.e., political activists who possess practical and
ethical standards of performance.
Organizers * Incentives
The organizers’ perception of the experience of ACORN
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organizing derive from their reasons fnr ko becoming ACORN organizers,
the satisfactions they receive from their work as anK organizer, and
their experience with ACORN organizing. The impetus for the
organizers to "hire on" with ACORN appears to he either iheoiogioai
or social. The ideological attraction of ACORN starts from its
commitment to social change and social Justice for low- and moderate-
income people. The organizers themselves were all oriented to left-
g political activities prior to becoming ACORN organizers.
I was a radical in college and involved in a studentgroup there. I d planned to work for social change
into the t r
1 ®0t °Ut ° f SCh°o1
- 1 Kanted to 8°rade union movement but I... didn’t knowow to do that... I found out about ACORN... and sentm an application.
I’d always been interested in progressive stuff....
I d done a fair amount of work for a couple of yearsut of college with some peace and social justice
organizations, working on international and foreign
relations things like that, so, I’d gotten fairlyfrustrated with, number one, there were never any
concrete results, and number two, it really did seemwe were talking to the same people. So ACORN is a
real change of pace.
I had been involved in other things, like peace stuff,
and that just didn’t seem to be valid and it seemed
o be a shell game. I became convinced very quicklythat the only way to do something about the arms race
was to radically restructure the society that implied
e arms race. And any of the peace organizations
that are around now aren't in the least bit interestedin changing anything. That was the conclusion that I
arrived at and ACORN seemed to be the organization
that was interested in changing some very basic thingsin American society, trying to change the way people
think about themselves and their environment. So
that's why I began working for ACORN.
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It is notable, too, that this group, while not a valid sample o f
ACORN organizers nationall y , emphasized foreign policy issues as
the focus of their pre-ACORN activism.
The other major factor in their decision to become ACORN
organizers was the opportunity to explore a part of American
society that they had little experience with in their lives up to
that point. As a grassroots organization that works directly in
the neighborhoods, ACORN puts its organizers in frequent direct
contact with low-income minority people within their communities.
Hence, one organizer responded that he was to a great extent
motivated to become an ACORN organizer by his desire to learn
about the ACORN constituency because of a curiosity first peaked
by his study of social anthropology in college. For the ideologue,
the opportunity to work directly with low- and moderate-income
people also provides a test of ideological assumptions.
lor the most part, the organizers' experiences either met
or exceeded their expectations:
.t// down-to-earth, seriously organized group. Ididn t expect it to be so tight and well run. Interms of other organizations I've been involved in
oeing able to lay out a plan and go through with itbeing able to make plans for a year or more and
icing able to respond in a real way to things that
are happening in the community and the country.
Very much so and very much better. I couldn't
imagine myself, after working on disarmament, getting
terribly excited about vacant lots and stop signs and
all. But it obviously turned out to be a lot more
exciting than I expected it to be.
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The opportunities t0 Kork KUh low_income ^
c0mmunitles „ere also realized; due to the extensive ^
necessary Pc organise an ACORN gronp on the streets, in peoples'
homes, and in meetings at neighborhood churches and halls.
1,1 reCrUitlng
-ganizers-usually,
college-educated,
white, middle-class people like th«selves-the organisers voice
the same themes. They try simultaneously to make the experience
°£ AC0RN organizing attractive and to interpret the experience for
someone relatively unfamiliar with it.
What I try to do... is to try to deal Mi i-v. h, *-u
same way I deal with members. Before I into
in
yt^tr hdeT eh t1 11St“ t0 th™ t0 *“ what
I talk a lot^bouric^r'rt^ra'frT11^
transformation that you can see happening^^leader
s
eve/bei ^ 1*° thou 8 ht of themLlves as
on TV t-
^ in§ bUt 3 domestic worker. They getwo weeks after they join ACORN yelling at ?he
back
r
‘and
n
it
eVe
Wi>0dJ
°" the block Pats th™ °n the
at
C
the:felvL
^^^ the P“P la ^ok
I also spend a good deal of time trying to differ-
I wa's i„ rn
en AC0R” and ° ther grOUps
' 1 when
ACnPN i
’
-l
ege
L
t0 me
’
1 had heard about ACORN andOR was like the Mobilization for Survival, like
?eaU V eft ~Center P°litlcal groups. I didn'tr aliy understand what made ACORN different.
mk the contact with people in the neighborhoodis a major factor in new organizers. Basically, tryto make people feel comfortable on the job. You canget people to give you the political rap about any-thing, but they won't be willing to do the work.
These themes
—social
and social contact with the
justice, organizational effectiveness,
constituents prevail in the discussion
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of the experience
. They als0 donate the responses ^
about the Wads of satisfactions organlzers tave ^
acorn’s national goals ^ u
> ow successful they feel ACORN
has been in achieving its goals.
The pursuit of social justice retains a primary motivation
of organizers after their decision to join and after they have
been on the staff long enough for the novelty to wear off:
movement^ that]
. in Jhe'end^m toV^
°i
*
people, ’to overcote ?he
a
;;st«.
PO
BeLe
f
-
U° r
^
n
? •that is what I want to be right now and wtat
crpt-
y 6 Cl
J
arly What the PeoPle can do, how peoplege a sense of their power as a gro^T P
P ®
What keeps the job satisfying, according to the organizers, is the
experience and assurance of success in pursuit of social justice.
This point is particularly critical when the organizers consider
ACORN relative to other groups with the same goals but without
ACORN s successes and when they consider the relatively powerless
status of their constituency:
mg the 7 0s and 80s, no other left-wing organizationhas really survived and prospered in any real senseike ACORN has... and they’ve been around for fourteen
LsicJ years. As far as an independent, self-financing
organization, I don't know any other organization in
t e country that does that... apart from unions or
somebody that gets serious money from foundations....
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arena! '’S P°litlcal
our participation in a n^r hf StSs ^
C°Urted
amazing, and sort of grattfyLf
was pretty
other people are beginning lo J^ognize^te skSfs^d"power that we do have. Locallv mJi ^ ill and
our butts for him last fall Zh
1 inS
’
We busted
nai* j .re; c , s , and m many ways it 1 s
?h s r
He 8 SOln
?
t0 raise ?50 ° *or APAC
ACORK helped me in my campaign, you sill ^™ the p8°ple in his c«" a « »no other lefties around town, and things like that..
In the last year and a half...x've almost had to define
r«U?
S
? d
85 SUrVlva1
' We »ent through a couple of
thrllhlt
yea
?
8
’
really hard years
- 40(1 wa tameroug them okay, with a strong organization andhaving won some victories along the way. It speaks tosome internal strength that we did survive the listcouple of years. A lot of organizations didn't. A lotof people went under or stopped organizing or becausesome ing else. And we’re moving in broader directionsIn most cities that I know close up, it isn’t at the
xpense of the neighborhood base. We can still call our-selves, and mean it, "grassroots."
Clearly, the organizers feel that the fact that ACORN works for
social justice and general left-wing causes is not sufficient to
keep them involved. It is necessary that their efforts in ACORN
be rewarded by success, something they perceive as being rather
rare among such organizations.
Finally, as a motivation for staying on the job as a
political organizer with ACORN, social interactions are quite
effective. The following show several ways in which these incentives
operate:
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The social satisfaction the organisers reported included getting to
know a segment of the population they had never had the opportunity
to meet, individuals among that segment, and their fellow staff
within ACORN. Those incentives, coupled with the ideological
goals, compose the bulk of the reasons organisers work with ACORN.
None cited any other commonly used incentives such as income,
flexible work hours, working conditions, fringe benefits, and so on.
The Organizer Role
Another theme that the interviewees centered on was the
relationships they developed in the course of the organizing work.
While some of their experiences provide insight into the organizer’s
role m ACORN, others of them are reflections on the nature of the
work. It is important to recognize the context of the organizer's
responses. Their work for ACORN is usually the first full-time
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employment they have had after graduation from college, so they
have limited experience with which to compare it. Nevertheless,
all have some experience as political activists in other organizations
and, clearly, the venture from their middle-class backgrounds into low-
and moderate-income neighborhoods lends itself to a profoundly
different experience. Moreover, the organizing profession is, in
many ways, different from other occupations. The two themes that
the organizers developed most clearly were (1) that they "inject"
themselves into peoples' lives, neighhorhoods, and political
relationships, and (2) that they must create changes in peoples'
lives in order to succeed. The result, according to the organizers,
is that they occupy a somewhat unusual position in society.
One or the essential roles of the organizer in ACORN is to
knock on peoples' doors and promote membership in ACORN:
Part of the reason we have the ability to go door-
to door to recruit people that other organizationsdon t is because we have full-time professional
organizers. A group can maintain itself at some
level without an organizing staff, but there’s
always some amount of attrition, and unless there's
some constant recruitment of new members, it's just
a matter of time before the group kind of dies or
doesn't move forward.
At the same time, the experience is one that is somewhat alien to
the organizers in the beginning.
The organizing part of it is strange. Knocking for
three hours at strange doors, asking to come in the
door, we talk with them and for me it's something
I've never done before.
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Just by going door—knocking everv dav *
challenging peoples' interests o?property, and that varies from person to personThat may seem very trivial but ir • P i .
‘*'*
for much larger schemes"f’tSnWng
3 ”Pl“atl0ns
On the other side of the relationship, that of the "intruder,"
one of the organizers reported that the same sense of privacy
appeared to constrain some organizers’ behavior:
Not long ago, one of our newer staff members
th?rd
S
visits
m
t
heSltf ion about d°ing second andi o people on a drive because he felt
Mv exner
W°Uld
t* ^ ° f
"hounding" the members,
y p nence has always been just the reverse
e always hear that the members don’t hear fromus enough; I ve seen that happen.
To succeed as an ACORN organizer, it is necessary to intrude on
people's privacy beyond what is generally considered acceptable
m order to reach the constituents, and not all organizers are
entirely comfortable with this.
Once the organizers have entered their constituents’ lives,
the goal is to change their ideas about their neighborhoods and
political relationships. According to ACORN organizers, however,
it is not possible to change members’ thinking by persuasion or
lecturing. One organizer, for example, reported that "what makes
ACORN sometimes so frustrating is that its structural ideas are so
radically different from the mainstream structure of ideas in the
world today." ACORN organizers believe the only effective means
of imparting ACORN’s "structural ideas" on authority, social
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justice, the rights of low-income people, and other fundamental
political concepts is through experience,
one organizer if ACORN is able to educate
The researcher asked
its members in political
matters
:
people “ho gat
bLtr—^ct- 1 —zrzr
functions; U ’
h th government
power
±
s true ture? TtiTTTT
lot of peoples' notions oVTTTuTT:
realize ^tT ^TaTT^ ^
all our ,
1 a11 these agencies andtagets are real people and they’re reallv
lotTo UP ' T been a real eye-opener for a
?
£
a
“anbers who are active.
. .they'll get
letter^o
g a11 5™ have to do is write ater t your councilman and you'll get thispothoie repaired. Then people^ aefi^e andealize that, no, people in City Hall have theirown set of priorities and it's based on a whole
ttatT f
St ° f thingS
‘ Y°U need t0 influencehat set o priorities.
From the organizer’s viewpoint, then, "education" involves
more than information imparted to members. It requires members
to change their attitudes towards authority and their way of
dealing with it. Indeed the organizing process itself requires
many of the same skills that ACORN's opponents use to maintain
their positions against change, first, to motivate members'
activism and, then, to overcome resistance:
worrforlcOR/don’rtMnk
very“iff
6
^ ^people who work for New York law fims^^h *think very differentlv fm™ m j. lr s - They don’t
people. The strategies that we
1S°n Avenue advertising
powered as any of thTop os "J JuSt « •>**»-hand, if that’s the way the American V" ° therhave to beat people at their o™ game!!! W°rkS ’ ^
filled in. All it tool
getting an enormous trench
called and said they wer^fro^ACORN
6 S°me° n£i
action now or weM take sane a“dthat morning. » n lt: was d°ne
in order to carry out their mission as organizers, therefore, th<
interviewees reported that they have to invade peoples’ privacy,
pressure them to attend ACORN activities, and then apply strong
pressure to achieve goals that are not widely shared, or even
understood by the majority of people in American society.
Membership Incentives
One of the foci of ACORN organizing is the incentives used
to persuade its constituents to join and participate in the
organization. Critical to an understanding of these incentives is
the perception that the organizers have of what they are and how
they work to build and maintain the organization.
The organizers see three factors as playing a role in the
members’ decision to join ACORN: self-interest, anger, and the
nature of ACORN as an organization, but self-interest is the
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organizers'
members
:
bread-and-butter when they are appealing for new
People join around verv snen’f _• ~
and in their neighborhoods. Something ^hey^eelimmediately. The majority of our members join thin
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th‘“ the neighborhood,
r s iiy common denominator, things that almostanybody in the neighborhood, if they have any kind of
1th l
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h
Pr°Ve the Situatio
". will be upset about!,pc tho es abandoned houses... or if I work in a tenants'group, t e conditions of the apartments.
. .that's whatpeople really relate to
The obvious is t
can be achieved,
be big
. I guess
he feeling that community improvements
Whether they be small, whether they
that's the most important one....
The way self-interest operates in neighborhood organizing, however
seems to create a dynamic that expands the benefits beyond the
individual and into the larger community in some cases:
Some people, a person in my group is working really hard
for a park which she would never use because she lives so
far away from it. But she spends so much energy on it,
it|s crazy. I feel really strange about it. I think
it s great. She tells me she wants to see something
done. I think it's a commitment towards the community
which she really likes... and it '
s
a commitment towards
other members of the group that she enjoys that live
close to her.
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Self-interest then is the mainstay of the incentives used to
persuade people to join, but since ACORN organizes specific
geographical areas, self-interest can, a t times, expand to
include issues that are somewhat removed from the specific
individual.
One organizer took the notion of self-interest and
identification with one's neighborhood a step further and
suggested that some members join out of a desire to support
an organization to represent the community:
Another reason would be just to participate in beingpart of some organization within the community, the
notion that the community has to be more unified andto participate in it. Some are really oriented
toward the goals and some like the idea that there’s
a community group to belong to.
Hence, the notion of there being an organization to support is a
to persuade some prospective members to join. In a similar vein
but with greater emphasis on the goals and the creation of the
means of achieving them, another organizer stressed the value of
using the strength of numbers to persuade people to join ACORN:
Sometimes, depending on where somebody is politically,
I will talk about the general notion of having an
effective organization, touch on a wide range of issues
but usually just a real specific pitch emphasizing the
idea that you and I can't do it. If you and I go down
and complain 'bout getting a bus shelter, they’re not
going to listen to us. But I talked to six other
people today, and they’re concerned about it too....
We’ve got two hundred members in this group, don’t you
think even if half that many went downtown they’d get
something done?
way
Not unlike the role that effectiveness plays for the organizers,
that same role Is important In the decision that constituents
make to join ACORN.
Finally, a„ger is important in the organizers' calculate,
tor appealing to prospective members. The organizers claim that
many of their constituents are people who have been frustrated
because their needs have been ignored for so long:
People are attracted to ACORN because... we do a lotof actions, we make a lot of noise, we get some stuff
^ a" a
6™ 8 ° f gettinS “Provemkts In the neighorhood, different aspects of peoples' lives that
8
before they didn't know they had any control o^People who are fed up with it and feel that if theyband together they can get something done join ACORNbecause they see that it helps.
In addition to awakening peoples’ anger
problems, one organizer noted that the
problems they find in neighborhoods is
anger as a stimulant to join:
over long-neglected
severity of some of the
as effective in promoting
.ask very, very general questions and I use wordslike change, neighborhood," "What do you want?"What do. you think?" and sometimes people can’t think
° anYthing off the top of their head, so you toss
o a couple of specifics. That can get people oiled
up. They don’t like the fact that there’s a play-
ground around the corner from them that's filled withdrunks. You can get them steamed up about that.
The ACORN model depends on playing on peoples' anger
to get them to join, to get them to say what they
already know.
. .and capitalizing on that to get them
into the organization.
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Part of the organizer's tool hit for recruiting new m^bers, there-
fore, is the anger their constituents experience when they are con-
fronted with the condition of their neighborhood or the lack of
services they receive from the government.
ACORN members are thought by the organizers to stay in the
organization for somewhat different rMcnmoeasons than they join. These
reasons include commitment to the oreanizatinn ag o and some intangible
incentives that they receive from their participation in ACORN.
In addition, they also argue that some members stay involved with
ACORN for the continued supply of tangible rewards, clearly, how-
ever, the tangible incentives are not sufficient to maintain the
organization
:
.
pl!\° f
J
en Joln for one very, very narrow reason,treetlights on their block, and then after they getthem in the organization, they do work on otherthings They see other reasons for having an organi-
zation like that. 8
t ink people stay involved over time because.
.. theydevelop... a sense of what can be achieved through
organizing. And then there's definitely a core ofpeople..., especially some of the leaders, who stay
active out of a commitment to the notion of organizing.
It definitely goes beyond the issues.
Eventually, people go beyond an understanding of the
group as just a neighborhood group but also a political
force in the country. I think people get a sense of
that after they've been involved in the organization
for a while.
The organizers claim that the organization itself becomes the focus
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of the members’ energies and the force that keeps them involved.
The organizers offered several explanations of why people
become so committed to ACORN and its maintenance as an organization
The sum of these explanations seems to he a combination of qualities
that ACORN organizations possess and the qualities that committed
members possess:
I think that the general excitement of the Prn,m r
coTto“ ed - “s like actions, theyTiL
°
^H-rnn meet ings ... that do follow an agendaand get things accomplished. I’d say those two hv> •
more than anything else. And a lot of our m^Tbers
8S
’
they just like the notion of fighting City Hall.
’
My experience has been— that people who come to threeor more meetings or actions
... that
’ s the one objectivedetermining actor. The experience is somewhat' addJ!
also* tLT ry that pe°ple Wh° are willin§ to work,hat s a determining factor... who aren’t incredi-
! H
USV r ' 1“ 1f y ‘ Again, people who get out there
nhnnp
00r
^i*°
C
f
bl°Ck With an ^ganizer, Who make
p e calls for meetings and all that kind of stuff Iink it sets up a sort of dynamic in their head where
.
S ver y ifficult for them to live with the incon-
sistency of investing all this time and energy and then
not coming out for the meetings or actions themselves...People who s tay involved are people who have a littlebit of time on their hands, are genuinely concerned
about their neighborhoods and neighborhood issues, and
we ve gotten to come out two or three times.
I think that what enhances peoples’ commitment is just
that they do something that changes their way of think-
ing
,
they participate in some kind of action where the
action gets something accomplished or at least they
scare a person that they see has been pushing them
around for a long time or ignoring them. Or if you
have a big meeting and you have a new person who chairs
it or takes a big part of the agenda. That's the sort
of thing that enhances their commitment or it sort of
d iv ides ...
-some people will do that and feel really
good about it... other people won’t be able to handle it.
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In essence, the organizers believe that- uD t at when the right kind of
people are exposed to ACORN thev w-m a iokin n y W1li develop commitment to the
organization. Note the features of ACORm - • .S N activism that they claim
Will create this effect for the MbHS; excitement, effectiveness
in fighting City Hall, addiction, consistency of action and thought,
vented anger, and the opportunity to assume responsibility.
Because of this belief in the effectiveness of the ACORN experi-
ence in creating the desire for more, the organisers believe
strongly that persistence is the key to ACORN's success:
Lce
UldT^ tO ^be i AC0RN,S °r§anlzat:ional persis-
b _
* 1 ey don t let go of people. People who
to mee?
ieVe
r
* ° f theirS and don,t come outtings for a while but they’re on your listand you call them anyway. And then, once in awhile something comes up and they do come out. Iin w at keeps people in is that once ACORN hasits grip on someone, they don’t let go.
Finally, one of the organizers expressed the belief that
ACORN taps an understanding that low-income people have that they
should belong to organizations like ACORN:
Just the fact that they're joining an organization
shows some kind of knowledge that poor people,
wherever they are, have to get together to get
organized. There’s already that germ of conscious-
ness about how poor people have the same problems
everywhere and got to get together. I think
getting involved in the organization deepens their
understanding of that.
Once the understanding is realized by joining, he claims that it
becomes the source of continuing commitment to the organization.
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In addition to the commitment that organizers claim the
members develop toward the organization, several suggested the
purposive incentives operate to promote members' participation
ACORN. One organizer suggested that that was the only way the
organization could survive:
in
What gets them in is a more narrow view, what keepsthem in is a broader view. Because I've alwayshought about in some way the idea of keeping membersinvolved is so difficult because if you look at^twe either fight that specific issue that they're
out
C
again U *1 •'T’
they ’U 80 home and come. If „e fight on an issue and lose
...
•
probably have even more reason not to stay
aHir »L the ?f°T ?r “e d°n,t tackle tba S-e
i . * f
’
lf that s why y°u joined, they won'tbe inclined to stay involved, so the pressures or
nr^t
S keeP pe°ple from staying involved arep etty high.
By this logic, for ACORN to persist, it must recruit
members who respond to incentives that are not purely self-
interested. The organizers suggested that that was possible in
several ways. First, one organizer argued that the members
...are sophisticated enough. You have to give them
credit. Just because they aren't saying it doesn't
mean they aren't thinking it. You just haven't
asked them the right question, you haven't spoken
to them at the right time
Another organizer argued that purposive incentives can be experi-
enced m such a way that the individual can feel rewarded personally
for making a contribution toward a public good:
Probably the greatest selective inn PtlHvo
s tke tatangibl. one: people
part of an organization that Is fighting for a lotof important things. That's why pLss Coverage °sso important
,
so that our members that don't Iver
to
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ge?
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Ught
a
at'a
S
dan
AC°RN °" ™ fightinS
It makes them feel really proud^Trtink^S?'^ s°"'a real selective benefit, because other thlS^irchurch, there aren't that many organizations ourmembers can feel like are good, positive helpfulorganizations that they belong to. Ther^ areservice organizations like Eastern Star,... but 1hink it s a different feeling for most of ourmembers.
“
“?J
e deflnms that sense of "l'm involved insomething unportant , ". . .as the major selective
certainly People who feel that more
emphatically people who have been defining them-selves all their lives as being fighters, theydefinitely participate. That woman,... all of herife, she s defined herself as somebody who stands
up for the little guy and fights to change stuffdoesn t take "no" for an answer. And for that
r eason , . . . she * s out to everything
.
Thus, members apparently derive benefits from contributing
to what they perceive as the public good. Paradoxically, however
the same organizer who argued for the effectiveness of selective
purposive incentives also argued that ACORN organizations must
provide tangible benefits in order to succeed:
Members say you gotta crawl before you can walk. So
we do that in organizing. By working on tangible,
winnable, immediate, specific kinds of issues. We
d°n ' t knock on somebody's door and talk to them about...
socialized medicine. We deal with those issues that
we know we can win and we can look at and point to.
And when one of their neighbors say, "That guy who was
at your house— is he from ACORN? Did you join that
group? Do they get anything done?" They can point to
something
.
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Without actually winning something'
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!particular neighborhood, she won't necessarily 'bodisappointed. But she's obviously the LceptlonPeople who respond most to that sort of approach'
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are people who have tried on their own.. Sc
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tad“th
hav
f’
for “ample, called the ambulanceh e ambulance not show up for fnri v-n„ n
minutes and then they read that the...citv i - / ito triple the ambulance fee. They respond much°better
His argument makes two basic points: 1) you must keep working on
tangible benefits in order to keep recruits; and 2) those who
respond primarily to selective purposive incentives are really
quite rare and cannot be counted to constitute the entire organ!-
zat ion
.
The organizers, therefore, offered a wide variety of
comments on the kinds of incentives that they are capable of
offering to their constituents in return for joining and partici-
pating in an ACORN group. The incentive that plays the biggest
role, both in recruitment and maintenance, is the specific
tangible benefit that satisfies the self-interests of the
constituents. The organizers claimed that it is a necessary
component of the recruitment process, in particular, but was
actually quite significant in the maintenance of an ACORN group
as well. The other three incentives that they felt were important
in their efforts to create and maintain ACORN groups were anger,
the organization itself, and purposive incentives. By their
account, they are able to use all of those resources to persuade
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their constituents to part icipate in ACORN.
Organizational Goal:
The interview also elicited organizer responses on the
kinds of goals ACORN could pursue, given the nature of their
constituency. As professional organizers, they responded in a
way that reflects their relationship to the ACORN members and
their use of issues as organizing tools. This discussion will
deal with the organizers' perceptions of: (1) how broad ACORN's
goals can be; (2) what limits exist and why; and (3) how flexible
the members are.
The two most experienced organizers had a great deal to
say about the value of expanding the issue agenda at the same time
recognizing that is a difficult task:
It should be broader... in that—we'll probably alwaysbe able to say this, or I'll be able to say this—
again, because of the intense day-to-day demands,...
when doing direct neighborhood organizing, I didn't
spend nearly enough time talking with the leaders and
members about the broader issues involved. I would
talk to them about why it's important to work on this
campaign or that campaign, and . . . in a campaign against
a landlord, I'd talk about a particular landlord and
the injustices that we've got to fight to change, but
not often enough did I spend time talking about the
larger housing issue—why landlords get by with this
sort of thing. I sort of did with leaders but not
enough with members. Part of our whole philosophy or
outlook is that people don't learn those kinds of
things from conversation, they learn them from actions.
Issue generation, or the process by which ACORN organizers raise
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and articulat
constituents,
e issues that are both concrete and
pose the difficulty of translating
important to the
what organizers
see as worthwhile goals into campaigns the constituents will support
non ?
t:Tes ’ 1 think we have to work harder to get
this
63 :mt<“rest
’
or make People understand whyparticular issue is very important even though
saying"?' b
aren ' t
.
kn°Cking °n doors
8
y 8 ’ H y ’ why aren c y°u guys out there doingvoter registration?” So I think we have to workwith some of those issues a little bit harder andwe have to dig deeper into our membership and findthe people who are motivated by those things
His solution to this dilemma is the fact that ACORN pursues many
goals at the same time:
That’s one of the benefits of being a multi-issue
organization; people who are going to be coming totonight s APAC meeting
.. .may not have come to
neighborhood actions for four or five months.
They're just not that concerned with potholes or
whatever, but they do understand the importance of
electoral politics.
The goal of their organizing efforts, as the organizers
see it, is to impart their understanding of political issues to
the members through political action on those issues. The
potential for such a broadened understanding is equal to the
members potential for learning from experience, either in ACORN
or, as the following statement indicates, from daily life.
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One goal of ACORN organizing, therefore, is to reconcile
the organizers' political views with the daily lives of their
constituents by changing the batters' lives to include political
activism
:
The way a lot of these things can become reality isby doing the kind of work that we do
. I thinkthat the tilitary buildup is not going to he stoppedby. those who oppose military increases now. They’rejust a small, small percentage of the population.While a lot of peace groups will talk about getting
more rank-and-file blue collar worker people involved...by doing our work, we’re making their job easierbecause people begin to see the links. I alwaysdescribe our work to people as enlarging the whole
arena of political actors. We’re getting people who...have never defined themselves as being politically
inclined whatever ,... so we’re enlarging the progressive
end of the political spectrum.
The limits
several factors.
on issues that Boston ACORN can address stem from
First, there is the above-mentioned problem of
concreteness
:
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The organizer quoted above also expressed the ideal of reconciling
broad issues with the daily concerns n fy of members under specific
circumstances
:
ther e ff
^ membership side that
s a difference between peoples' intellectualresponses to things like that and peoples'
responses after some amount of discussion or
context put to the questions. Our board voted toendorse the Central American Referendum that wason the ballot in Boston last fall after a fair
amount of discussion on it. Because it was tiedto domestic spending and... social programs, andhen people make those connections there tends tobe more of a consensus on where that issue shouldgo than when it's talked about in a vacuum.
The second limit cited by the organizers is the problem of
natural divisions among their constituents: race, gender, and
ethnicity. One of the organizers voiced an acute awareness of the
limits Imposed by the differences within ACORN’s class-based
constituency
:
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The other limit that the organizers
the necessities of ACORN’s organizing style
responds to short-term, concrete issues and
style itself places limits on the kinds of
works on
:
discussed is created by
• Since the constituency
campaigns, the organizing
issues the organization
[Many issues] just don’t fit into the base. When I
go out on the doors with people and ask what they’d
like to see better,... I never hear anybody say,
Stop killer cops." I’ve never heard anybody say
that. But what we ask doesn’t lead to statements
like that. We ask what they want to see improved
on their block, around their neighborhood.
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Nevertheless, within the issue
pursues, the organizers claim there is
on which ones should be dealt with at
agenda the organization
significant flexibility
any given time:
1-L
Part,
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?
depends on what prompted the change [inthe agenda]. In one of our local groups recently
schools To
Ut
T h° ld k Campalgn °n asbestos in the. a degree, because the organizer wasreaily frustrated about the campaign. But we alsoput it on hold because there was a twenty-story,
168-unit elderly high-rise run by the Boston HousingAuthority that had two elevators that were alwaysbroken down. We actually cancelled a meeting on theasbestos issue. We called people back and said.,
we ve cancelled this meeting, this action is going
on the day after tomorrow, we need your help in it
I don t think anybody got terribly upset. One thing’you have to remember is that most of the issues that
our members are concerned about have been hitting
them in the face for a long, long time. If theydon t see progress over some long term, then it doesbecome a problem.
Most of the primary and secondary leadership see the
main goals of the organization, not so much the
neighborhood issues. So, if we drop everything and
work on the Dallas trip [to the ACORN 1984 National
Convention]
,
the members will get behind the idea
that we have to spend more time on Dallas and less
time on vacant lots.
This flexibility, they claim, stems from the long-standing nature
of unresolved grievances in their lives and organizational commitment
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and a broader view of issuer •just narrow concrete concerns.
The organizers
' statements regarding issues they use in
their organizing and their constituent*’ r-ooresponses to them center
on a recurring theme: the desire to generate left •-wing progressive
political issues limited by the narrower, more concrete political
vision of their constituents. The organizers claim that these
limits can be expanded by creative organizing and by the members'
commitment to the organization. The expansion of their constituents'
limits, in fact, seems to be one of t-v10 mo- ii the major goals of ACORN
organizers.
Views on Tactics
Several of the questions in the interview asked the ACORN
organizers to discuss the kinds of tactics they thought were the
most desirable for attaining the goals they seek. ACORN literature
emphasizes that it is a "direct action" organization; hence, the
questions asked why confrontational tactics are important, what
effect they have on members, what tactics members prefer, and if
organizers have philosophical commitments to confrontational tactics,
Once again, the critical question becomes: What technique is the
most effective for promoting low- and moderate- income membership
and participation in a political organization? Clearly, the
tactics the organization adopts to achieve its goals comprise a
major portion of the experience the constituents have as members
and therefore assume a critical role in the success of the
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organization.
The organizers expressed a preference for confrontational
tactics in their organizing for a variety of reasons: their
educational effects on the members, the excitement they generate,
their salutory effects on the organization, and the impact they
have on everyone involved. The organizers noted, however, that
they must be strategic in the choice of tactics; that is, they
must apply the style of tactic that will be the most effective at
any given moment in the campaign they are conducting. Moreover,
the organizers noted that there are costs for confrontational
tactics, even when applied at the appropriate times.
The campaigns for which the organizers develop strategies
follow a kind of natural progression that begins with requests
for action on an issue, as for example asking that a city agency
have vacant lots cleared in an ACORN neighborhood. If the members
are not satisfied with the response they receive, they become more
direct and forceful:
You just have to think organizationally, what's gonna
be best for us. If bargaining or building a coalition
xs going to advance your cause, fine, but if that
fails, then you have to confront people. That's one
of the reasons that ACORN is here—to confront people
with received opinions, to confront their... very
comfortability
. . .
.
While the organizers prefer the more direct tactics, they recognize
that the members do not want to be confrontational until the target
has had an opportunity to respond to their non—confrontational
requests first:
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Despite the organizers' preference for confrontational
tactics, one cited a case in his experience in which non-
confrontational tactics were preferable:
You build the organization more in the sense by
confrontational tactics, though, at the same
time, cooperative tactics can be good, I mean itdepends on what you're trying to achieve.
Cooperative tact ics ... can be very effective.
1 ve been dealing with vacant lots [since starting
with ACORN] and we're trying to get some fundingfrom the federal government or the city for a land-
scaping project. And that's definitely cooperative
tactics. It's gonna be the members doing most ofthe work, planting the seeds and all that. Rather
than getting the city to do it. In that sense, we're
getting money from the federal structure of the
group to get money from the city... so the group is
useful for that. Some people take leadership in
that project and are definitely developing their
leadership there....
Clearly, organizers apply tactics as they fit strategies, but for
reasons noted below, confrontational tactics are the most desirable.
The organizers cited four basic reasons why confrontational
tactics are the most effective for the long term: educational
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Two organizers noted that confrontational tactics
useful for educating members about the organizers
are particularly
perceptions of
the nature of authorities:
They re more polarizing. If you get somebody at a
neighborhood ACORN meeting and you're giving him or
.
er a teal^hard time, either they're going to cavem or they re gomg to become more defensive and
sort of lash out and that's really important becauseit shows our members [that] in the heat of confron-
tation people say things they really don't intend to
say and it shows our members their true colors some-
times. They'll make some terrible slur about poor
people or something
.. .and the members will learn that
when push comes to shove, everybody else is going to
stand up for his own self-interest and therefore you
can t believe him when he says, "Gee, I’d really like
to help you guys " So that's a tremendous benefit.
We went to the BRA [Boston Redevelopment Authority]
and the BRA director was furious and it was good to
see him get that angry. Because his notions of
order had been drastically rearranged. And it was
good for us because he was arrogant, rude, and
condescending and that helps us all the time.
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Thus, by stimulating conflict and forcing a situation in which
officers feel threatened and become less diplomatic, organizers
feel that members will have an opportunity to see what powerholders
truly think about ACORN members and their grievances.
The organizers also claim that the excitant of confron-
tational tactics generated also makes them more desirable. They
described the experience in terms of fo i • rthe feeling of power that it
creates for both members and organizers:
I'm sure people remember confrontational longer
taMon ^
arga
i
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\
lng ° r ne8°tiating. I think confron-
that l ^
m° r" f“n ‘ That ' s °ne of the reasons
I like this job, for the fun, sometimes.
Confrontational tactics also help keep the staffgoing. You can literally see targets sweat, sorae-times. And feel pressure you know they never, ever
The one street-blocking that I did, the people.,
thought it was fun. One man, who I just assumed
wouldn t come, came, and [while] everyone else was
sort of milling around he was the one who got theball rolling saying, 'Veil, I can give them some
garbage, " and then he began throwing things out on
the street. He had such a good time doing that!
it felt like you were nine years old. Everyone
had fun. The house visits were fun . . . they 're a
little afraid to do those, but once things got
moving and once a couple of people took charge,
people after the fact... tend to think they were more
fun than when they were doing it.
One organizer cited what he believes are organizational
benefits from confrontational tactics:
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front porch and rant and rave abont th u ,down_at City Hail and when they get do^the?^they re quiet and meek as a mouse. Avain iyou have a 58-year-old woman standing two ’feet"rom the mayor shaking her finger atViTand allIS stuff and two days later the vacant 1nt-ocut, everybody in the room knows that tasn'fcoincidence. So that's yet another benefu
In other words, besides providing clear and tangible benefits for
time and energy involved in ACORN activism, direct action helps to
separate the sheep from the goats, helping to determine the degree
of commitment members possess.
The organizers
' discussions of the impact of confrontational
tactics on members and targets identified two valuable results:
targets are moved and members feel satisfaction. The effectiveness
of confrontational tactics were critical to the organizers:
The
^
ones that are the most militant are the best
You ve always got the... sort of... "bad guys," thepeople [targets] that are extreme, but then’you'vegot people who are sort of trying to do something.
s far as tactics for the "bad guys," militant
tactics are the best because that’s the only way
you re ever gonna get them to listen to you, that’s
the only way you’ll get them to do something.
The more militant the better. It’s just so hard to
move people toward those things in a lot of ways.
And yet, when we do, we almost inevitably win. If
we hadn t squatted, we would be nowhere on the home-
steading
.
While effectiveness and satisfaction are not entirely distinct
categories there is a lot of satisfaction in winning—at least
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in addition to success
:
the organizers described was aprt from or
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really feel like.
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.they 're much more satisfied with
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ng hel1 to some official than being niceto them and not getting anything out of it. We wentdown to the HUD office and really got into a t
match with HUD, the head of the Northeast Region
8
catling hnn a liar and a bastard, people wer! sw^Hng
little t- f ant everythln8> and maybe we went ai oo ar, but people came out feeling muchbetter about that than if they had gone down and been
y nice to him and still not accomplished anything.
The organizers' evaluations of confrontational tactics are
not all positive. Given peoples' preference for dignity and
decorum, confrontational tactics have cost ACORN manbers at times:
A small down is that once in a while we lost some
of our more mild-mannered members who feel we've beentoo tough on a target, particularly if they come in
on the fourth action of a campaign and this is theirfirst action. They tend to think, "Gosh, why are
people being so rowdy?" And they . . .weren ' t paying
attention during the prep session or they didn't
really believe earlier when they said he wouldn't
return our phone calls... and that's why we're taking
this step.
People tend to just eliminate themselves without a lot
of conflict. Going to someone's house or doing a
street-blocking, you always lose people. We did a
street—blocking and a woman who was very active and
attended a lot of meetings just won't have anything to
do with us anymore. She hasn't come out and said it,
but she hasn't been to a single meeting since. And
she's very cool and noncommital on the phone now....
And so you just can't please everyone and change
things. You have to offend somebody.
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som^amor h°
^ °Ur membershiP rather thane am p ous group of people that haven’t doneanything but read a newspaper.
Finally, the organizers noted that, since confrontational
tactics require greater commitment, better preparation, and wide-
spread agreement on the goal and the tactics, their use makes
cooperative ventures with other organizations much more difficult
ACORN tends to "Lone Ranger” it a lot. And
,
I think,for really good reasons. What ACORN does best isdirect action, and a lot of groups simply don’t like
to do that. And if you get involved with coalitions
and if you need a consensus for what you're going todo, other groups are pointless. And if you get
wrapped up in coalitions, you dilute whatever strength
you have.
Thus, despite the drawbacks the organizers cited, they prefer
confrontational tactics for the benefits they provide the members,
the organizers, and the organization. While they do not and cannot
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to shake things up
indiscrim inantly
,
its effectiveness
,
and its educational value make it
> its ability
a desirable
choice of tactics.
The Decisionmaking Prop. ess
The organizers recognize the importance of the decision-
making process to the qualit y of their work. The organizers convey
a professional concern for the manner in which important decisions
are made, first, because they are sensitive to past criticisms that
they control the organization and, second, because they feel that,
if they are going to organize a group of low- and moderate-income
people to educate them in political activism, the place to start
is within their own organization. Consequently, responses to the
questions regarding the decisionmaking process stressed, in most
cases, the complexity of the process and the need to strive for
the ideal of member control.
Responses of organizers to the question, "Who makes the
decisions in Boston ACORN?" were quite consistent:
Different kinds of staff and different kinds of member-
ship—the head organizer, the rank-and-file organizer,
the leadership of the members, and the rank-and-file of
the ^members. In terms of who makes the decisions, you
can t pinpoint one of those four elements as making a
decision. It’s hard to say, because I don’t want to say
the members make all the decisions because it simply is
not true.
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" realit y> organizers have a tremendous
with arise r r^’
^ thln6= that ”e S^invoWldtl, strictly out of membership, things the bestorganizers would never have even thought of.
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f I ] he structure of the organization is such whereeven if staff is pushing for certain decisions
nothing s going to get carried out that the members
ciren t into There's no question the final say comes
out of the board and the leadership and that the
members perceive the staff as working for them, forthe organization.
These responses indicate that organizers clearly have a lot of
power within the organization but that there are important checks
on their power.
One of the most important checks is the desire expressed by
the organizers to develop the members' skills and commitment by
making sure they are the ones making important decisions. There
is a recurring theme throughout all the interviews that the most
effective organizers are the ones who delegate as much as possible
and confer with the members as much as possible, thereby diluting
their control over the decisionmaking process. Delegating power
and responsibility is a major topic and ideal expressed by the
organizers
:
[T]he times that I've grown most as an organizer anddeveloped rS when I've tried to juggle t» orThreelocal group campaigns at one time. By takins on thatadditional load, it's forced me to prod push “ U
what"!?; a°n TbeIS lnt° d ° ing m°re - that's ’
r. a
11
f
bout
> I think. If we take fewer[issues] we take more of the load as organizers and
Th«e's
r
al”
e d°" ^ empOWer pe°P le as much as we should.ere s ways a temptation to do more of the iob our-selves than we really need to be doing.
Allowing them to take part of the organization
allowing them to take a part of the agenda, allowingthem to speak at a public hearing, chair a meetingjust many of the million different ways of thingsyou need to do to get an organization going. Byletting the members participate as fully as possibleby delegating a lot of the stuff the organizer has todo to all the members. That really builds peoples’
sense of ownership of the organization.
It’s very interesting to me... the degree to which
we push membership ownership of the organization.
And getting leaders involved in a real serious way.
Something we could certainly do more of, and every
time we do more of it, it’s wonderful for both the
leaders and the members. I think that ma^ be one
of our shortcomings. We do need to make a concerted
effort, just constantly, to get members to be doing
things that they certainly are capable of doing and
that we certainly don’t need to be doing. I wouldn't
recommend that everybody be stuck in an office for
six months by themselves, but the benefits of that
were just tremendous. It made me feel somewhat
foolish for not having part of the members do more.
The process of conferring with members and leaders is
cr it ical to the proper practice of professional organizing,
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according to the organizers int srv iewed
:
a good idea to go ahead and move a campaign aboutsomething
. . .and said, "Let’s do it, we golL do
^ihin^. There’s all these people oU ? therethat want something to happen." And we didn’treally involve the leader in the discussion. Andwe went ahead and did it and she got all u^eta out it and how we bypassed her, even though itwas a good thing and she came, she thought it wasa bad way to do it.
I thinh conflict comes out of a lack of communicationwhen organizers stop listening to the members
.. .and
’
make assumptions. It’s a fine line the organizers
are walking sometimes, and that part of what happens...is that organizers.
. .expect.
. .members to pull the
reins It shouldn't work like that. The organizersthemselves
,
should be from the get-go just asking thequestions and making sure that they're structuring
things so it is the members making the decisions,
ometimes it happens almost out of convenience
an organizer knows this is what the group needs’or we
want to build the group in this way, so it’ll be
quicker if I just make these things happen.
Thus, the potential for organizer control of decisionmaking exists,
but at the same time, the organizers are sensitive to criticism and
express professional ethics that counter that tendency to some extent
The organizers’ descriptions of the process by which important
decisions are made seem to agree that the process requires member
involvement for them to be effective.
Ibourtrcamplian!
1 ^ ^ members and Baders
ten or't^rjSi; ^fa^Tur^^ C °issues than even our best leader does So STth0"
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... [ an organizer] wUl
leaders ' *nT “ SOmetlmes <»*>« the neighborhood
In one of the groups I have, they hav P i
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11
^ I
1 " “taOS
’
U ' S
^ USt ac™ss
1S
t
P
hrom quor store. I didn't all of a sudden decideto work on that like no one else had thought to do itefore People for years have been trying to do some-thing about that. And if you say that to someone andthe group will say, "Yeah, that's a good idea " Then
going V° eVer y°ne else . VO" have a campaign
ftet If ?" 1 f 7 ttat 1 ”ade a deoi=i°n to do
f] ,
people had said it's a bad idea, we just
In“the fact
V
rh
d
r
e Certalnly there's power
t at you re a catalyst, that you're
Thar
^
ln 7 th
f ?
nS that ' s br iuging people together.t s powerful. But on the other hand, people won't
vend I
together for a reason they don't think isgoo . So you re always held in check.
[Y]ou have a planning meeting before we have a big
meeting or an action or anything like that, and forthe planning meeting, in theory, the organizer who’spulling it together is supposed to consult with all
the different leaders, five or six leaders, and find
out what the key issues are, work on getting the
agenda together, finding out what people think we
should do... and at the planning meeting pretty much
make a decision on what we’re gonna do, or else, or
at least the rough guidelines of what we're gonna do.
Then we have a big neighborhood meeting where people
from the whole community meet to ratify the ideas of
the planning meeting. It’s a process between the
leader s .. .and the mass of the membership. The final
outcome is dependent on how it is accepted or how
people react to it.
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In terms of the issues to work on, I believe it's
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P th3t dSCldeS the lssues toworK . he way that can hannen -i
o
can talk about some issue and others » “ P“ P !about those issues at meetings The , re exclte<^nfr . , ccL u , l organizers snr-t-
people involved in the issues that „e work on!
Thus, the consensus is that for the organizers to do a good job of
promoting a decisionmaking process which generates popular decisions
that build excitement and enthusiasm for the organization, they must
consult with the members and leaders in a variety of ways, on the
doors, while planning meetings, and in the meetings. While all of
the organizers recognized that they and other organizers in Boston
ACORN possessed and exercised power, they also recognized that
ideally they should do so as sparingly as possible, for both
ethical and practical reasons.
Summary
The organizers interviewed considered themselves professionals
in a field that requires both expertise and responsiveness to their
constituents. The responses of the organizers to the questions that
sought to discover their motives for pursuing this profession
combined goals that they have for American politics, the progressive
political agenda, for example, and the opportunity to empower low-
and moderate-income people. The combination of these goals seems to
contain a contradiction that the organization attempts to reconcile
in the way it provides incentives to the members, pursues its goals.
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and makes its important decisions. By the organizers' admission,
the process is imperfect, yet the organizers claim to hold
professional standards of practice and ethics that they feel will
promote the issues they, as left-wing political activists, believe
in, yet preserve the democratic control of the organization for
the membership. The interviews with the members and insights by
the researcher and writers on the topic of community organizing
will examine their claim in chapters to come.
CHAPTER V
THE MEMBERS
This chapter will discuss the results of interviews with
ACORN members and compare them with the goals of the ACORN organi-
zing strategy. The topics explored by the interviews include the
characteristics of the members, their views on why they and others
join and participate in ACORN, their perceptions of the decision-
making process in ACORN, their views on American politics and
political issues, their sense of how the purposes of ACORN activate
members to contribute, and their perceptions of the tactics that
ACORN uses to attain its goals. The responses of the members
allow one to evaluate the impact of ACORN organizing on the
constituency. The members' responses also provide insights into
the questions raised by the literature and the problems faced by
the political organizers/'
It should be noted that the text of the interview responses willinclude grammatical errors and underlining to express emphasis
where the interviewee was clearly intending to emphasize a word
or phrase. The researcher has sought to reproduce the language
used by the interviewee as closely as possible and has used this
language in the text.
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.Thg_Character istics of the Int erviewees
The nineteen members interviewed are but a small part of
the 2,500 total Boston ACORN members. They do, however, represent
a fairly large portion of the more active m«bers and officers of
the organization. Among the interviewees were ten officeholders,
the representative to the ACORN National Board from Massachusetts,
and eight members who have attended national ACORN conventions.
The demographic characteristics of the interviewees are quite
different from the average political activist, however. Eighteen
of the members are black, one white. Seventeen are women. The
age and education legels of the members is given in Table 5-1:
AGE AND
TABLE 5-1
EDUCATION OF INTERVIEWEES
Age Number Education Level Number
18-25 1 Grade school 1
26-31 2 Some high school 3
32-39 4 High school diploma 7
40-49 3 Some college 3
50-59 2 College degree 3
Over 61 7 Graduate or professional
train ing 2
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Six of the interviewees are retired «- t „l
-
tw° are on welfare or disability,
and eleven are employed full-time. Only four of th vy em have spouses and
y all have children. Thus, the group is predominantly black,
female, older, high school educated, employed or retired, and single.
This is in marked contrast to the Boston ACORN organisers who are all
white, single, childless, and college-educated. Moreover, they are
considerably younger, between twenty-one and thirty-two, and only one
was a woman. Hence, the demographic data is important not only in
terns of how similar individuals tend to behave politically, but also
in terms of the differences between them and the organizers.
The participation rates of most of the interviewees is quite
high, though there was some mix of relative newcomers or people who
have remained somewhat on the fringes of the organization. The
activities members reported break do™ into four categories, from
those most frequently engaged in to those that are not often engaged
in. Table 5-2 gives the data on participation rates in these
activities. The average number of activities the interviewees parti
cipated in was 9.47 and the range was from one to all eighteen
activities. Nine of the interviewees are very active, six active,
and four not active. Nine of them are what might be called "charter
members" of Boston ACORN, joining during the first round of ACORN
organizing in 1980. Thus, the group interviewed comes primarily
from the most active, most knowledgeable and most committed segment
of the organization, and the responses generally reflect the
experiences and insights of long-time members who have participated
frequently and in a wide variety of activities.
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TABLE 5-2
ACTIVITIES IN WHICH INTERVIEWEES ENGAGED
Frequency Activity
No. who engaged
Most frequent Fundraised
17
Phoned
17
Marched in action 16
Very frequent Flyered
14
Recruited members 13
Campaigned in election 12
Served on APAC 12
Less frequent Held office 10
Chaired meeting 10
Recruited in public 9
Attended national convention 8
Doorknocked 8
Least frequent Led action 7
Hosted meeting in home 7
Attended national action 7
Attended public hearing 6
Signed support letter 6
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Ihg__Membership Der1fi1- nn
Responses to the question,
"Why did you join AC0RN? „_ ^
into four mai or categories: service to community, serving others,
specific issues, and self-development. Pew interviewees restricted
their answer to one reason, and some of those cited other reasons
in response to other questions in the interview. Hence, few of
the ACORN members ™de the membership decision for only one reason.
Rather, they were attracted to the organization for a variety of
things. It is also noteworthy that few of the interviewees joined
for clearly self-interested reasons, referring instead to broader
concerns.
The respondents that cited community or neighborhood improve-
ment, for example, discussed issues such as beautification, safety,
and crime. Beautification included cleaning up weeds and trash in
vacant lots, removing abandoned cars, and development of park areas.
Safety issues involved traffic controls at dangerous intersections,
WALK signals for pedestrians, and abandoned buildings that threaten
children's safety and present fire hazards. They addressed crime
issues by their desire to rid the area of buildings that are used
as drug hangouts, or that offer opportunities for rapists to hide
and commit crimes. They were also concerned with street corners or
parking lots in which people regularly gather to drink and dark
streets in need of lighting. In the typical ACORN neighborhood,
there is always an abundance of potential issues of this kind due
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to poor city services in lower-income, and especially black, areas
The ACORN technique of
issues that organizers
the interviewees cited
doorknocking virtually always uncovers
can use to recruit members. Eleven of
reasons of community improvement for
originally joining ACORN.
Two members stated that they joined ACORN in order to help
others. They welcomed the opportunity to get involved in a program
to do "something to help the poor." Several described ACORN as a
service organization like the Eastern Star (and were, in fact,
members of that organization also) in which they could help those
less fortunate than themselves to obtain life's necessities, such
as housing, health care, and public safety. For example, several
were involved in a campaign to improve a nearby elderly high-rise.
Hence, the felt obligation to help others prompted their decision
to join ACORN.
Several members said that they were originally interested
m ACORN because it gave them an opportunity to get involved in an
interesting organization and engage in new and educational activi-
ties. They felt that it would improve the quality of their lives
via community involvement, expanded horizons and chances to meet
interesting people. They expressed a need to find an outlet for
excess energy or extra time in their lives, a need that arose when
they experienced changes in their lives such as a move into a new
neighborhood or their children's leaving home. One woman said she
joined ACORN for two reasons:
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Number one, to get out of the house-interesting. It's very interesting]
o her things, other people, how they
number two, it's
You learn about
doing, how they
Another responded similarly:
I really joined because of my daughter
growing up. She was my last daughter. ! i
L"S
Tt
S
d°
lnS " te eavAg home°and
I
Ve g0t to o something for myselfthat s interesting to me instead of staying homeand being bored all the time."
§
Perhaps this motivation explains why so many of the members are
retired or older people, looking for stimulation once childraising
and work are no longer occupying their minds and energies.
Finally, at least five respondents mentioned specific issues
that do not fall into the above categories. Most of these were
interested in housing, a major campaign in Boston ACORN. Several
wanted to obtain housing for themselves. One woman stated : "I
got tired of renting and it got so high. And I want a house of my
own." A woman, who was in a HUD program already, stated: "I was
having a problem with housing. I went to ACORN. Someone had given
me the information that ACORN was helping the tenants get results."
For one interviewee, health care was the attraction to ACORN:
I got involved because of the health care issue....
They had started to let over half the staff go [at
the local community health program where she brings
her children] and say to us that they would still
§ive the same health care. We know that wasn*t
possible
.
118
Thus, in addition to place-related and self .taprovanent issues>
ACORN has appealed to people with individual economic problems,
particularly housing.
ACORN therefore appears to fill a variety of needs. Much
of the same response came when m^bers were ashed about attempts
to recruit new members, though neighborhood issues were more
frequently noted here. Thirteen respondents emphasized the
importance of stressing the benefits ACORN brings to the community
or neighborhood. One woman said:
to hpl
ac tually is an organization that is heree p with anything that you feel as though you can’tstand m the neighborhood. You can call thl office atany time and put in your complaint. And if it's some-
we“l
MLXhit?le! lt,U -etingTnd
6
Another responded: "They need to belong to something that is
concerned with the neighborhood and community. They do come into
the neighborhoods." Four members emphasized the opportunities to
satisfy personal needs. At the same time, they made it clear that
this could only be done by actively participating in the pursuit
of needed services or goods:
I explain to them that it is a self-help program.
A lot of people expect that you pay "X" amount of
money per year and you want something done, you
come to ACORN and ACORN do it for you. But it’s
people—ACORN is people. Getting together and
getting things done.
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^
done. Because you are ACORN. As thouch }
U Want
co,e in there, *ou We to bi £
there s something coming up, you have to get itdone because you are ACORN. Then’s a lot of mis-understanding among people—"I want ACORN tn Hn
are
a
ACORN°
RN
Yo°
*° that,,“AC0RN ca™°t do that. You’
ton y!\ C °me ’ AC0RN joins alon§ withy u.^ You have to work with us, you can’t say "Thisdidn t get done, that didn’t get done.” In other
A^l’tSl ^ that?
rk "ith
“*> 1 - «at.
Finally, the respondents noted the effectiveness of recruiting
new members by emphasizing the opportunities to help others:
It s helpful to others, a chance to help others
and serve themselves. To get knowledge, to know'how
to handle certain things in their life.
Thus, the respondents feel that the incentives that were effective
in recruiting them into ACORN are also the ones most likely to
persuade new people to make that same membership decision, con-
firming that their experiences in ACORN have met their original
expectations
.
Why People Stay
Members find satisfaction in their ACORN experiences that
run the gamut from solidary incentives to purposive incentives.
In the course of the interviews, virtually every kind of incentive
available to a political organization was articulated in some
fashion by the interviewees. They expressed satisfaction in
working with other members, gaining status by their association
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W±th AC°RN
’
learni"8^ and the world, Roving their
neighborhood
,
helping others, making their lives easier, contri-
luting to a worthy cause fnotiHnoy , fighting against a common foe, and so on.
Solidary incentives were clearly expressed by several of
the members. One woman referred to ACORN as "a friendly organiza-
tion where everybody is friendly and everybody tries to help one
another. [They] try to be cautious of everybody going home in the
evening after the meetings all by themselves." One woman went as
Ear as describing ACORN as "a big family. lt 's a very friendly
bunch of people and they’re concerned about what's going on in
their areas, no matter how small one might think it is, it’s of
importance An individual whose social and ethnic background
differed greatly from the main body of the ACORN membership stated:
A iot of it is social—I met a lot of nice people,the organizers, the members. I’ve met people whom
I never would have met before. The fact is, I
never went to Roxbury, and in the last three years
I ve been to situations where I’ve been the only
white man present. And there's never been any
unpleasantness
.
One member also reported solidary incentives in the form of status
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I ve gained a lot of ground with ACOKN t'
I even got a chance to be on the^laUto™'' m"
1 them ‘
presidential candidate. And 1 watched ^-““o 000wishful people Wishing they could be there’ L
?
got there through ACORN and I'm telline vn,’electrifying, it really was. I was in ™
3S
probabl
F SOt t0 6111131:306 Senator Kennedy who you'lly never see unless you talk to an aide andhe 11 say what he sa id but you're never 0™these people, but I was right there fee? • .
get near
important as they were. All through ACORN
JUSt ^
Material incentives clearly play . role ln keeplng manbers
involved in the organization. A woman, whose primary motive for
joining was to obtain housing, was asked why she stays involved
though she has succeeded in her original intentions: "We gotta
stay on HUD to be sure they do all the repairs. Hot water, holes
in the hallways, no security, no bells, leaks...." Another respon-
dent expressed satisfaction at the material successes within the
neighborhood
:
It gets a little more interesting every time we
accomplish something. And one thing that came
to light yesterday.
. .was the fact that we had
worked, and we worked very hard up here with
blocking the street up here, because we want a
streetlight up here. And to my surprise, this
weekend, we do have a traffic cop there. We
have accomplished the fact that the police have
been out.
Hence, material incentives provide satisfaction both at the indi-
vidual level and the collective level.
Purposive incentives were also among the responses of several
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of the members. The satisfact
the organization was revealed
ion of working toward
in statements such as:
a goal with
I get a great deal of sat i cf ,
involved with this particular thing '"a™!,,!;
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p p e s concerns, not only mine Hhat’e a .me is good for my neighbor. 3 S
°°d for
Another member expressed the sentiment that:
ACORN is the kind of organization that...„e fightfor what we really want. At first I thought itwas a place... like a church that just began, itjust a place where people go to talk over theirproblems. It's not that. People don't go the«to discuss their problems, they go there to tryto help other people that have problems likepolice problems, like the police should solvebut they don’t.
Hence, it is clear that, for some of the members, the organization
provides an opportunity to work on issues for the general good-to
influence public policy. Thus ACORN organizing does not limit
itself to one or several of the incentives available to such an
organization, but rather it provides all of those incentives in an
effort to maintain members' desire to stay and participate in the
organization. There is not a dependence on any one form of incen-
tive. In fact, for any type of incentive, there was a respondent
who articulated the importance of that incentive for ACORN's ability
to attract and maintain its members.
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The Decisionmaking Proc ess
Most of the recent literature on organising stresses the
importance of a decisionmaking process that is participatory and
democratic
. Respondents offered several views on the level of
membership control of ACORN's decisionmaking process. The dominant
response, however, was that ACORN is a democratic organisation with
an open agenda, debate on important issues, and a fair voting
process. Twelve of the respondents said that it is the members
who make the important decisions in ACORN; two said it is a
cooperative effort between members and organisers; one said that
organizers make the decisions; four said they did not know.
Naturally, it was the less active respondents who expressed no
opinion, but the other respondents were equally divided among the
active and less active respondents.
The interviewees who claimed that decisions are made
democratically were enthusiastic in their support for the process.
They expressed their view of the process in the following manner:
The members. All the members. They have a chance to
voice their opinion.
Everybody has their say. And then they decide. We
a ii s it around there, and we say, "you think we
wanna do so-and-so-and-so-and-so?" And then she go
around and ask, "What are you gonna think about this?
Do you think we should do so-and-so-and-so-and-so,
or shouldn't we do so-and-so-and-so-and-so?" That's
the way they do. It's very democratic, you can say
whatever you wanna say. At the meetings. I don't
know what goes on further up, but they must do it the
very same way. We decide, the members themselves...
what we gonna do, and how we gonna do it.
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have the member^c"^^ especially th^b "“Imembers... and they'll talk about the issue°thitIS at hand and they’ll come out w-irn u alike to see obtained from thS meetLv Thi T“the goals are set lng * s how
Some members were more critical
belief in member control or felt that
over decisionmaking than they should.
and either qualified their
organizers had more control
One suggested that organi-
zers were responsible for setting the agenda:
o^not^m PUt V" the taWe 3nd ask us whether
dLcuss it if t7P
°r n0t SUPP0“ a 8rou P- Wecus . I here are any questions, if We do or
control Seth
”lth US “hen th^ -ntioned rent
12 ft ^ “e^ SUPP°rt i,: ' 1 « prob-iem with i , supporting rent control. Everybody
ooked at me like this" and I said there's some newrules so I don t mind once they explained them to me.
Several went further and suggested that organizers dominate the
organization and should give the members more control of important
decisions
:
The organizers will maintain their control in the
organization. It’s not their place. To me, it is
not their place. It's up to the members to get
things going. And I hate to see them always say.
Oh, let’s organize." What about us, can’t we free
the organizers up?
125
My observation has bepn it- c
[who make the decisions]. And that°"n
Y
f
or
f
anl2ers
has been that they frequent^ sJt 5
™y Ejections
themseives and then try “ convince ^
" “lk
,
wlth
think, sometimes, that as well^iL *
say
6
!^rt11,ltn .“ WHat the »-bersWp
for the first
&
time rathe"
6
than"
1
""?6
1
“''°
'
S particlPatln8
his input and let him make up his
OWI1
,
aad talk and get
get done as well or“s quicUy If T ' “ may not
eighth 8rade dropout b^fultimately, that should be the wav n !, ’
zation works—the membership not only pay their dues"
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Hence, given the opportunity to criticize the decisionmaking
process or praise it, nearly all the members praised it.
Members were also asked how they felt when decisions are
made counter to their wishes. These questions included three
areas of ACORN activity: issues, support for candidates in
elections, and tactics. The intent behind splitting these responses
IS to give ample opportunity for interviewees to express their
ideas and to jog their memories for specific events. The responses
fell into four basic categories: 1) dissent and abstention from
the activity, 2) expression of disagreement; 3) disagreement and
then consenting to majority wishes; and 4) keeping quiet on any
d isagreement
.
The most common response was for a member to abstain from
participating in an issue campaign with which they disagreed, or
not to campaign for a candidate they could not support, or to
abstain from an action of which they did not approve. The following
are some clear examples of this response
:
That's happened once or twice. For examnl * m
card registration--! just don't beiieve In Jhat!
P
?
8t
just don t assist in organizing for rVwt •
Weli I still have to work to maintain unity. If Idrdn t agree on it, the majority wins. As I said wetake a vote on it Ana nt <- -\ » a,
and T'm fh .
* d lf twelve members are there
tht three tten"
1116
T' three d°n,t ’ Vm one °f
the board * rn l ?’
1 ^ tQ go alon« wlth. I 11 support it. That doesn't mean I'llwork on it, but I 11 support it.
More than likely I won't support them. It goes backto the type of person I am
. I would say, "No, youcan forget me this time. I 'll catch you when you get
1 d°n,t feSl Uke
That has happened. And I have managed to kind of workaround tha
t
As they were working with different
candidates. So I get to work with a candidate that Iliked
. That has happened.
I would have no part of it
. I wouldn't bother
There was one night they was having a meeting... at
the church. I had on some pants that night and it
was kind of cold. And I don't believe in wearing
pants to church. That night we attending meeting
outside because I refused to go in. There was two
or three other women in pants and they felt the same
way. If you feel strongly, speak your mind, stand
by it
.
Thus, these members express their views and act on them by
absenting themselves from the organization's activities, a form
of democratic choice.
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The second response that members expressed, disagreement,
contains an element of obligation on the part of the dissenter.
The following statements express a readiness to dissent openly
and clearly as a part of the decisionmaking process:
I’d tell 'em. That's as
Do you mean would I pull
enough I'd just disagree
far as I'd go with that,
out? If it bothered me
with them, that's all.
I would tell them. The majority wins when you startyou know. If they decided and I didn't agree with
’
Jtat's
e
aU I
0 ' t
!7'.
knOW 1 dldn,t a«rea with it,th ll 1 wouldn't say that I'd win. But just
« I dTX I*"? el f e ' Vm ^titled to my opinion.d
U
lke ”hat they was doing, then I wouldn'tagree with them. [What if you lost?] I'd just drop
* he
.y?
te Went a§ainst me and the majority
won, I d still support it.
Everything's supposed to have a leader, yes, butyou re not supposed to be a blind follower. Ifyou disagree, disagree. It's a democracy; you're
entitled to your own opinion.
Interestingly, these interviewees expressed the willingness to go
along with the decision once the process had been followed. This
sentiment was most clearly expressed in the following statement:
If I m outvoted, then I go along with the organization.
Because I realize that no matter how strong I feel like,
it doesn't make it the best way to do it. So I go with
the majority.
Despite the eagerness many expressed to dissent when they
were not agreeing with the ideas that were being considered, one
member took a rather different view of the role of the dissenter:
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1 guess I would just have to keep quiet Thor*' -many members for me to be Hip . J " rliere s too
A decision „nl H k a , t0 Persuade anybody,wouid be made by the three communities[Roxbury, Dorchester, and Mattapan]
.
Thus, the members seem generally willing to exercise their rights
to dissent within ACORN. Failing that, they recognize the oppor-
tunity to dissent by abstaining from whatever activity they wish to
In a similar vein, the researcher asked if there was any
persistent conflict between participants in ACORN. The existence
of such conflict and the manner in which it is resolved would
reflect on the degree of democracy in the organization. Few inter-
viewees felt there is any serious conflict. Only five could iden-
tify any significant conflict in Boston ACORN. Of these, none
thought the conflict presented a serious problem, as the following
statements suggest:
I ve seen conflict, for example, where members feel
the organizers are having too much to say. And that
has been the cause of a group of people splitting off
who felt they should have a bigger say and that the
organizers should be sitting back from it. Usually
if there is a dispute, the members speak up and the
organizer adjusts. They don't realize they're intruding
too much. The organizers I've been with have universally
been well-meaning and if you tend to say, "Well, look,
I think we should do it this way instead of that,"
they'll be reasonable to listen. And if they don't
think they should back off, they'll convince you or
if you think you're right, they'll do it.
Since I am the head person within the community...
the membership will call on me and make a complaint.
Then I'll go directly to the organizer. And it's
always worked out.
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One might reasonably expect members to be somewhat reticent to
scuss serious dissatisfaction with the organization's handling
of conflict with a researcher, but the evidence that they provide
under the circumstances does not suggest that it is a serious
problem.
Thus, the interviewees expressed rather strong endorsement
of the quality of democratic decisionmaking in Boston ACORN. Their
perception is that they play the most important role in the process
and that organizers do not dominate the organization. While several
of the respondents expressed mild dissatisfaction, this was out-
weighed by the enthusiasm of the others. Moreover, the interviewees
who serve on important committees such as the Boston ACORN board and
APAC are in a position to observe the decisionmaking process and many
of them are very concerned that they be able to control the organiza-
tion.
Members* Political Views
In order to assess the value of purposive incentives in ACORN
and understand the potential conflicts that such incentives may
create, it is necessary to determine the members’ political views
and analyze them. Also, if ACORN is attempting to politicize its
constituents and involve them in a progressive political movement,
then one way to assess this effort and its impact on ACORN consti-
tuents is to examine the members' political views. The interview
included two sets of questions designed to do this. The first was
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a set of opinion questions on issues that are generally associated
with a progressive political agenda. The second asked what the
interviewees' ideological views and party affiliations are.
The opinion questions included a variety of issues and
allowed for five responses: "Strongly agree," "agree," "disagree,'
"strongly disagree," and "don't know." The questions included
topics from nuclear power to a guaranteed annual income. TVo of
the questions were about issues ACORN has been actively involved
in: housing and health care. Several issues (the Equal Rights
Amendment and abortion) were social issues included to determine
if responses would differ from those for the economic issues.
Finally, there were foreign policy and arms spending questions to
determine if they were part of a significant pattern in the inter
viewees' political views. (The complete text of these questions
is found in Appendix I.)
Responses to issue questions fell into three patterns of
consensus and dissensus among the respondents. Table 5-3 shows a
distribution of the members’ responses dividing the issues into
categories based on level of agreement among them.
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TABLE 5-3
MEMBERS’ ISSUE STANDS
Str
.
Agree
Dis-
agree Agree
Strong consensus
Pass ERA
Free medical care
for needy
Free housing for
needy
Dissensus
Provide guaranteed
annual income
Govt
. should pay for
abortions for needy
Women have a right
to abortions
Dissensus with many undecided
Should socialize
essential public
services 0 5
Should stop
nuclear power 3 8
Cease U.S. involvement
in Latin America 2 6
Should continue
arms buildup 1 7
11
10
1
0
1
7
8
5
7
4
4
5
Str. Don’t
Disag. Know
0 1
o 0
0 0
1 3
2 2
1 1
1 6
0 4
1 6
1 5
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The three patterns one may discern in n, Q •y m the interviewees* responses
are the "strong consensus,"
"dissensus " nna "a •, a d dissensus with many
undecided." The question on ERA healt-v,
’
alth care, and housing elicited
strong agreement among nearly all the respondents with only one
"don't know" response among them. This suggests, first of all, that
the members' involvement in ACORN campaigns on the health care and
housing issues may have influenced their responses. Also, since
all but one of the respondents were women, the support for ERA
suggests a high level of solidarity among them on this issue. It
is not possible to determine if this came before or after the
members* decision to join ACORN.
There was strong dissensus on the issues of guaranteed
annual income and the abortion questions. Again, there were not
many "don’t know" responses, indicating strong and well-developed
opinions. The "strongly agree" and "strong disagree" responses
suggest more than mild disagreement being expressed on these issues.
Moreover, the dissent from the progressive agenda is clear. The
dissensus on the social issue of abortion demonstrates that social
conservatism is present among the interviewees in this study. The
question on the guaranteed annual income also suggests problems
surrounding government benefit programs for low-income people. Thus,
the group of issues labeled "dissensus" reveals problems that pro-
gressive political organizers must deal with when they work with
this constituency.
The third category had fewer responses in the "strongly
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agree" and "strongly disagree" categories and many ,„re "don . t knOK„
responses. This suggests that these Issues, vital to many activists
on the progressive left, are not saliPnf t-o ^ •’ r e t to the interviewees. It is
particularly noteworthy that the issues of African involvement in
Latin America and the arms buildup under the Reagan Administration
are quite similar to the kinds of issues that the organizers cited
as being critical to their original involve in political organi-
sing. Moreover, the question on socializing essential public
services such as electric companies might well have struck a
responsive chord among political activists who have been involved
in many utility rate conflicts. Certainly, the utility issue has
not been framed in that manner, but long-time members surely have
had opportunities to acquaint themselves with issues related to
public service corporations. Hence, this third category included
some important issues that have not been addressed directly by
ACORN but are important to the progressive left agenda.
The contrast between the organizers’ views and the members’
views can be demonstrated as well by comparing their responses to
these issues. The four organizers were unanimous in their "strongly
agree response to the following questions: pass the ERA, free
medical care for the needy, housing for the needy, and the woman’s
right to an abortion. The only other responses were "don't know"
(3)
,
agree (6)
,
and two "undecided" responses. (The question on
the arms buildup was transposed to correspond to progressive views.)
Thus, it is clear that the organizers adhere to the progressive
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agenda contained in the issue questions in a way that is both
consistent and intense.
Another way to compare the political views of the members
and organizers is to look at their responses to the questions on
ideology and party identification. Table 5-4 compares the
ideologies of the two groups:
TABLE 5-4
IDEOLOGY OF MEMBERS AND ORGANIZERS
Very
Liberal Liberal
Mod-
erate
Conser-
vative
Very
Cons
.
Don ’ t
Know
Members 3 5 8 1 1 1
Organizers 2 1 0 0 0 1
The members show a tendency toward the middle, hence, the eight
"moderate" responses. Nor were they reluctant to describe them-
selves as conservative" as two of them did. The organizers, on
the other hand, readily referred to themselves as "liberal" or
very liberal." One refused to classify himself since he felt his
ideology is too unlike the categories offered to be included with
them
.
Party identification showed differences between the members
and organizers as well. Table 5-5 presents these differences:
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TABLE 5-5
PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF MEMBERS AND ORGANIZERS
Strong
Democ
.
Democ
.
Ind ep
.
Repub
.
Strong
Repub
.
Don ' t
Know
Members 6 7 4 1 1 0
Organ iz ers 0 1 2 0 0 1
The organizers have either weak or no allegiances to party while
some members have strong allegiances showing further differences
in political views and perspective.
ACORN Activism and Political Views
Since organizers operate under the assumption that ACORN
activism will change the way members think about politics, it is
useful to compare levels and longevity of activism with political
views on the issue questions in the interview. The respondents'
length of membership in ACORN and the number of activities in which
they have engaged can be multiplied to create an overall measure of
ACORN activism or Activity Scale. When the respondents' Activity
Scores are computed, they fall into three levels of participation.
A level of progressive ideology can also be calculated by assigning
a value of two to "strong agree" responses, one to "agree," zero to
don t know," minus one to "disagree," and minus two for "strong
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disagree" with the arms buildup responses reversed. This presents
an estimate of the conformity of the respondents' responses to a
left progressive agenda, a Progressive Index. Table 5-6 provides
the scores of all the respondents on these indices.
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TABLE 5-6
ACTIVITY SCORES (Years in ACORN x Activities) v
.
POLITICAL VIEWS
Activity
Score
Years
Member Activities
Party
Ideology id
Progressive
Index
72 4 18 L D 12
56 4 14 VC D 7
45 3 15 VL I 10
44 4 11 M I 8
42 3 14 L SD 4
40 4 10 M D 6
39 3 13 VL SD 5
36 4 9 L SD 10
30 5 6 M R 2
28 4 7 M D 2
26 2 13 L SD 3
22 2 11 M D 4
18 2 9 M SD -1
16 4 4 C R 1
2/3 2/3 13 VL D 7
2 1/2 4 M SD 1
1/2 1/2 3 L I 3
1 1/6 5 DK D 5
3/4 3/4 1 M D 7
138
The respondents' scores on the Activity Scale fall into
three categories: high, medium, and low. The respondents with
the high scores are all long-time members who have engaged in most
of the activities cited in the interview. The middle category
includes members who have been in ACORN for a moderate length of
time (two years) or have been in longer but have not participated
in a wide variety of activities. The respondents with the low
Activity Scores have all been in ACORN for less than a year. The
distinction between the categories as determined by score—high
equals 36-72, medium equals 16-30, and low equals 3/4-8 2/3
corresponds to distinct differences between the interviewees’
experiences. It is useful, therefore, to compare the three
categories according to ideology, party identification, and
Progressive Index, to determine if there are significant differences.
Any differences, of course, would only suggest possible differences
within the ACORN membership. The small size and unscientific
nature of the choosing of this sample prevents making claims about
ACORN members generally. Table 5-7 shows the ideology and party
identifications of the thr ee groups.
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TABLE 5-7
ACTIVITY SCORES v. IDEOLOGY AND PARTY ID
POLITICAL VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS WITH HIGH ACTIVITY SCORES ( N=8)
Ideology
Very conservative 1
Conservative o
Moderate 2
Liberal 3
Very liberal 2
Party ID
Strong Republican 0
Republican q
Independent 2
Democrat 3
Strong Democrat 3
POLITICAL VI EWS OF RESPONDENTS WITH MEDIUM ACTIVITY SCORES (N=6)
Party IDIdeology
Very conservative 0
Conservative 1
Moderate 4
Liberal 1
Very liberal 0
Strong Republican 0
Republican 2
Independent 0
Democrat 2
Strong Democrat 2
POLITICAL VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS WITH LOW ACTIVITY SCORES (N=5)
Ideology *
Very conservative 0
Conservative 0
Moderate 2
Liberal 1
Very liberal 1
Party ID
Strong Republican 0
Republican 0
Independent 1
Democrat 3
Strong Democrat 1
*1 "Don't Know"
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There do seem to be some significant differences between
the high activity group and the others in the ideology responses.
They seem to identify with liberalism more clearly. To a lesser
degree, they express allegiance to the Democratic Party. What
most clearly distinguishes them from the others, however, is the
Progressive Index. The average index for the high activity group
was 7.75 with scores ranging from four to twelve. The medium
activity group average was 1.83 and the range was from minus one
to four, while the low activity group averaged 4.6 and ranged from
one to seven.
The evidence from this data shows that intensity and duration
of ACORN activism has had an impact on the interviewees’ political
views. It is noteworthy, also, that the low activity group exceeds
the medium group in several of the categories, which suggests that
Boston ACORN has attracted some individuals with progressive views
from among its targeted constituency and not had to rely solely on
ACORN participation to instill those ideas.
The differences among the interviewees, while not conclusive
and only suggestive, raise some questions about the way that
purposive incentives operate in ACORN. The members that fell into
the middle category, for example, who had been long-time members
yet were quite conservative, raise the question of what the members
perceive as the goals of ACORN. In other words, why do they contri-
bute to an organization that promotes a program designed to foster
progressive leftist change in American politics yet they do not
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share those values? The entire question of
between ACORN activism and ideology surely
the relationship
merits further study.
The next section raises
trying to accomplish and
the question of what they think ACORN is
,
of equal importance, how likely it is
that ACORN will succeed, for what ls the purpose of contributing
when the chances of success are small?
Organizational Goals
Members were asked about the goals of ACORN and in parti-
cular about the goals of Boston ACORN. While some members
responded with specific goals, such as rent control or more housing
for low- and moderate-income people, others spoke in more general
terms about creating a power base, such as the following:
We hope to gain more political power through the
neighborhood structure. And that’s by getting more
people involved in political issues. Say, for
instance, ... the majority of people in the neighborhood
don t know who their representatives are so that’s one
of our goals we would like to give the people, so at
least they know who their representative is and make
the representative accountable to the neighborhoods.
Those who responded with specific issues were asked to be as
thorough as possible in order to obtain a numerical count of issues
and be able to better compare answers. One interviewee could not
cite any goals of Boston ACORN, four cited fewer than three, eight
cited between four and seven, and five either cited more than
seven or gave responses that reflected a broader, more involved
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understanding of Boston ACORN's goals such aq6 s n s the one quoted above.
When members were asked about ACORN's national goals, they
gave similar responses but with lower frequencies. Six stated
they did not know of any national goals that ACORN had, some
adding they were not at all familiar with the national organization.
Five cited four or fewer goals, two cited a moderate number of goals,
and six either gave a long list of goals or made broader statements
such as:
All the things we've been trying to work: unitybetween low- and moderate-income people, and that
way we can crack poverty and all the hardships
poor people have, education-wise, foodwise, even
in some cases, things like that.
or :
Better conditions of the poor. That's the way I
see it. They want change, they want things people
are entitled to. That's the way I see it.
It is clear from the higher incidence of "Don't Knows" that the
members were more familiar with local than national activities of
ACORN.
A further sense of identification with the goals of the
organization was tested when members were asked if and why they
thought ACORN was successful in attaining its goals. The positive
responses followed three themes: unity, hard work, and the develop-
ment of political clout. Negative responses centered on the
difficulties of motivating members to participate and the
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recalcitrance of powerhold ers m the political system. Thirteen
of the nineteen responded that thev felt apormy t ACORN was quite successful,
one said it was unsuccessful
not have an opinion of ACORN
Positive responses to
unreserved in their praise,
comments such as:
’
and three were ambivalent. Two did
s degree of success.
ACORN’s political success were
The ones who praised its unity made
It s an organization. It’s a community. It's
working with different issues. You work withhousing, there’s a number of organizations that
only work on one issue, they only work on housing.But. if you ve got a health problem, that’s not
their problem. That makes a big difference inhow ACORN works and how other organizations work.
Togetherness they have been. In dealing with
people. They even brought people together that
wouldn’t be together.
We fight hard. Like I said, it's a handful of
people, but when a handful of people band together,
it’s a whole community. All we do is just band
together
.
We're always just like a big happy family. When
they come in and we all go out to a meeting they
all come back here to my house and sit down and
eat together. They get tired out in the street,
that’s [pointing to her couch] they bed. We’re just
like a big happy family. There’s no prejudice with us.
Further evidence of identification with the organization and its
goals was shown by statements regarding the hard work invested
in ACORN’s success:
144
Communications among the people and t-p Q ,
hard work. Very hart work
"embers, and
Because they are very active. And they started offWith nothing they've been working up and I thinkthey’re doing good.
Finally, those who cited ACORN’s political power as a
reason for its success displayed a degree of pride and identi-
fication though not as direct as the statements of the kind made
above
.
Because sometimes when you call the people [ e .g.,city officials] up, they think you’re another ACORNgroup. They have heard about ACORN. There really
is some recognition there. I think they’re success-ful where they need to be successful—the people
that s responsible for the things we want. They
seem to know that we are here. We’re not an invisible
person... as we were without the organization.
In the different campaigns that we have launched, we
have ^gained more recognition, more clout and every-
body’s really acknowledged in the goals that we’ve
had how really successful we are....
For one thing, they have the backing and support of
the people. And then, I notice that when we have
to go to city officials or state officials, they kind
of fear ACORN for some reason. I guess they're aware
that we're a group that has a lot of power and
strength behind us. When we send them a letter or
make a phone call or go to their office for an action,
nine times out of ten, they respond quickly. Because
they fear if they don’t, ACORN is going to go to the
newspapers and blow it up. So they get results
because I think they really fear they’re playing
around with a powerful organization.
Among the respondents who thought ACORN was successful, therefore,
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ee themes of unity, hard work and power were clearly articu-
lated to explain that success.
Not all of the respondents were as sanguine about ACORN's
level of success. Doubts about Its performance center on the
difficulty of developing a powerful organization of low- and
moderate—income people:
VouVe dealing with people who are inexperienced in
?eopL
1C
i,;in
n
f„d
a
H
UraUy
’
th6y make mistakes
'
sometimes,
sider ,i h
dr° P °Ut - Ultimately, when you ten-we began with people who were just unemployed
sharecroppers out in Arkansas, and we're in twenty-sixtwenty-seven states now, and in three or four cities
’
sLTjTuU^ ““ E£feCt “ the £l“s ™*re very
not *1? k
§ Way S° yet * Wel1
’
mostl y» I knowall members can be like me, but I haven’t been
attending the meetings and keeping up with what’sgoing on, but the rest of them don’t do that either.
t s going to pot. If the younger people stick withthe meetings and keep up with what’s going on they
can do much better.
If we don’t get the members to actively push foraH these issues then we're not gonna get anywhere.
think that Boston is a little slow compared to some
of the other places.
Hence, several of the members recognize that low- and moderate-
income people lack skills and experience and, as much of the
scholarly literature attests, are not strongly motivated to parti-
cipate in political organizations on a sustained basis.
Finally, one respondent emphasized the resistance that
ACORN faces in working on its goals:
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At City Hall they more or less ipnnrodon't see the importance Th! '
§ issues, they
the business dStrS in puttLT lnteresCed in’ ing more money in that.
The final set of questions, designed to determine the
members' oommitment to ACORN's goals, asks what they would do if
ACORN departed from its multi-issue agenda and became a single-
issue organization. The researcher chose the single issue the
interviewees had previously stated was most important to them.
Many of the responses asserted strongly that ACORN's goal was power
or that remedying the problems of all of the members was the
primary goal:
I think all goals are important. I can’t say that
one is more important than the other. No matter how
small, they re all important. Ten blocks away mightbe an issue concerning street lights that ACORN'sdealt with. To those families over there that's a
major importance to them because of safety in their
area to walk and there's no streetlights and it'sdark and there's crime, people are afraid. So that's
important to them. I think every issue is important.
The most important, of course, is jobs. And the
health. And housing. All of it is the most impor-
tant. Trying to separate is kind of hard, because
they're all like connected. You've got to have
health to work, you've got to have a house to live
in when you come home from work, so they all connect,
so you can't say, "The most important."
The important goal is power. People are getting some
sense of control of their own lives, rather than
simply following the drift of obeying orders from
some civil servant. They can organize and get some
input for a little bit of control over their day-to-
day lives.
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The same sentiments were expressed when they considered the
question of transforming ACORN into a single-issue organization
I wouidn't feel too great about that because that'swhat makes us an organization above all other oreani-“ M° st o£ the «her organizations just hfve
"
with nth® Y
Can dSal with; they can't dealo er issues. I think that's a handicap. Iwould not feel good about it at all.
If you just start focusing in on just housing, onjust jobs, then you're coining away from where you
said you were. And I wouldn't like to see them dothat at all. I like the way they're set up, I likethe way they work, I've been happy working with them,and if there were any changes geared that way, in
other words, coming in from other organizations,
focusing on just main issues, I wouldn't like to seethat.. Because ACORN has many goals, and the maingoal is to help the low- and moderate-income person.
The response indicated a high degree of confidence in the organiza-
tion and satisfaction with the multi-issue format. Further, many
of them articulated one of the central themes of the ACORN organizing
strategy within their responses: the necessity of the multi-issue
strategy for building power and realistically addressing the needs
of the low— and moderate—income constituency.
Tactics
Given the organizers' views on tactics and their impact on
the members and the kinds of effects they are designed to create,
it is useful to examine the members' views on those tactics,
especially confrontive tactics. It is critical to the success of
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the organization that the members are positively disposed to the
tactics in which they are engaging.
Discussion of tactical questions with the members took two
paths: questions as to 1) the kinds of groups the members feel are
good allies, and 2) the kinds of tactics that are effective in
achieving the organization’s goals. The first set is designed to
determine how the members feel about other organizations; the
second set is intended to probe the experiences members have had
participating in these tactics, discover their preferences, and
determine their readiness to engage in the various tactics. Finally,
interviewees were also asked if they prefer confrontational or
bargaining tactics. This gave members an opportunity to expand
on their preferences and cite which features they think are most
important about the tactics the organization uses: respectability,
hostility, drama, camaraderie, dignity, and so on.
Table 5-8 gives the results on questions about coalition
partners the members feel are most effective to work with:
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TABLE 5-8
COALITION PARTNERS
Excellent Good Fair Poor
Don
' t
Know
Unions 4-1/2 9-1/2 0 0 5
Churches 2-1/2 5 4-1/2 1 5
Peace groups 2 4 4 0 9
Politic ians 1 9 3 0 6
Community
organizations 2 6 4 0 7
Student s 1 7 1 0 10
TL shows little difference between organizations. The only impor-
tant difference seems to be that between unions and other groups,
as it is the only category in which there are no "fair" or "poor"
responses and it leads in "excellent" and "good" responses. Aside
from that, members seem to be rather charitable in their assessments.
Only one poor" was chosen, and every choice got at least one
excellent." Thus, the responses do not seem to indicate a distaste
for other organizations for whatever reason, and some sympathy for
unions, suggesting perhaps, some class solidarity.
Table 5-9 also shows few differences in responses.
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The two tactics that received the highest number of 'Very effective"
responses were actions in a public office and inviting opponents to
attend ACORN meetings. Both of these held honored places in the
standard notions of what is democratic in American politics.
Certainly, one must be able to protest to public officials for
redress of grievances, and one should give an opponent an opportunity
to be heard. The two "don't knows" given to inviting opponents to
meetings also seems to indicate that members are familiar with this
tactic, as it is widely used by ACORN groups. The same can be said
about endorsing candidates, an activity that the Boston chapter of
ACORN has done a lot of in the last two years. Conversely, ten
don't knows" for referenda campaigns shows a clear unfamiliarity
with this political tactic. Finally, the four "not effective"
responses given to blocking streets seems to indicate a distaste for
this activity among the interviewees. The difficulty of executing
it and the risks involved could explain this figure.
The interviewees expressed several different views on the
desirability of confrontation versus bargaining tactics. Their
support for confrontation was not strong. The categories of responses
include: 1) confrontation is the most effective; 2) bargaining works
better; and 3) one must choose the style that fits the given situation.
People who preferred confrontation did so for a variety of reasons:
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..Everyone knows and sees and hears about it. And
the
those things are embarrassing to the public—
... y don t want to be embarrassed. It's morepublic..
.people know more what’s going on. We’vebeen out marching and dealing and people they had no
Iffec^e i?
PS“8 ‘ ThS "°re Pe° Ple kn°“’ the
Bargaining can be a long, drawn-out thing. To do itirectly is much more impressive to the people [thetarget of the action]
.
It s a shock to the system. To shake you up. Wake
up somebody. Somebody said once they didn't thinkthere was a racial problem in Boston. They needed
confronting. Because if they can’t see a problem,
something wrong somewhere. They probably have neverbeen confronted with the real issues. Sometimes it’s
more effective.
[confrontational?] Always. You have to meet the
person face-to-face. In order to get whatever you
want done. You cannot, I never like an aide writing
me back for anything. The mayor, for example, "the
Mayor said... There’s nothing like meeting the
Mayor ^ face-to-face. I'd rather hear it from the
Mayor's mouth. I want to hear it from the Senator's
mouth. I want to hear it from the President of the
bank’s mouth. I don't want to hear it from his
secretary.
It is clear that the members who chose confrontational tactics
feel that opportunities to address the individual responsible for
solving a problem and express grievances directly is both more
effective and more satisfying. Moreover, the public nature of it
draws attention to an issue that the members feel strongly about
and increases their moral leverage. Finally, their responses
indicate they feel that confrontation conveys more information to
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the target about the gravity of a situation and
more powerful in moving the target.
is capable of being
Not all of the respondents share this affection for con
frontational tactics. Several felt they hurt more than helped
I thought they carry to many members when they wentdown to talk with city officials. It was to get into talk with city officials. It was hard to get into talk to them, but if they'd had two strong mens
or a woman and a man, to... sit down and talk to them
t ey might have talked to them. We couldn’t get toMayor White, none of them. We just couldn't get tothem, they just wouldn't come out.
...We went there with papers demanding and as a
result, we didn't get it. I don't think it was a
good tactic to use.
Others seemed more pragmatic and suggested that the tactic should
fit the situation. Hence, bargain when the other party seems pre
pared to bargain in good faith and confront when they do not:
They all work. It's according to the people, but the
end is the same because you never start out confronting
them. We always start out calling them and talking to
them. And if that gets what we want, that's all we do.
We only confront them when they will not talk. When
they tell you they're going to a meeting and they will
not give you an appointment to come in and talk to them,
the response you get from whom you are approaching
determines what procedure you're gonna follow.
Thus, some of the answers express desire to confront, others, a
reluctance. Still others feel it is a matter of expediency; what-
ever will succeed in a given situation.
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Conclusion
The members' comments and responses on the Interviews pro-
vide a great deal of information on their experiences and percep-
tions of ACORN membership. They help answer some of the critical
questions regarding political organizing of low-income people in
American politics: why they join political organizations, what
their role is in such organizations, and how it affects their views
on American public policy issues. While the data from this inter-
view is limited by the number and selection process of the respon-
dents, it does provide substantive and interesting data on this
topic
.
CHAPTER vi
CONCLUSION
When this researcher completed the fieldwork for the
Master’s Thesis, organizing a neighborhood in a low- and moderate-
income area of New Orleans, he experienced two overwhelming
feelings: satisfaction and wonder. The satisfaction came from
looking over the neighborhood and seeing stop signs erected and
vacant lots cleared at the request of the newly-formed group in a
period of a few months. Residents of the neighborhood were aware
of the problems that existed and over the years, had made attempts
to form community organizations to deal with them. At no time,
however, had so much been accomplished to improve the quality of
life in so short a time. Moreover, the improvements came as a
result of a group effort by community residents. This laid the
groundwork for continued improvement by and for the community.
Several years after the group was organized, an open drainage
canal that bordered two sides of the neighborhood was covered over
at a cost of several million dollars, attesting to the continuing
impact of the organization—and adding to the wonder that the
researcher experienced.
The researcher had no significant political experience
prior to the fieldwork he conducted. Had he gone into the
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neighborhood and begun speaking to its residents about the need
for improved traffic safety or covering the drainage canal, there
is no reason to believe that he would have succeeded in creating
the degree of change that actually occurred. Nor did the researcher,
despite many hours spent in the hot New Orleans summer sun, sense
that he had done anything dramatic, difficult, or brilliant. Rather,
he simply followed the ACORN model of neighborhood organizing
relatively closely, maintaining procedures and schedules prescribed
by the model. The experience was very much like following a recipe
in cooking and creating a beautiful dish, never having made anything
similar to it or understanding the theory behind the process. The
process unfolded, the members joined, the "wins" were achieved, and
the organization succeeded. It was a process that has occurred many
times m ACORN's history—a new organizer without skills or experience
signs on and receives training on the job in the first neighborhood
organizing drive.
This experience goes to the heart of the study. The satis-
faction and wonder this researcher experienced is integral to an
understanding of the creation and maintenance of political organiza-
tions as this case study approaches it. The two vital ingredients
to which the political science literature has not given adequate
attention are the organizer/entrepreneur and the organizing
strategy. Both of these are implied in much of the literature, but
this case study has sought to expose them more fully and recognize
their importance for the understanding of political organizations.
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The satisfaction and wonder this researcher experienced
point up several of the dynamics that emerge from the interviews
in this case study as well. First, the satisfaction was not what
the researcher would have predicted. While the ideological leaning
of the researcher was generally to the left and sympathetic to
ACORN rhetoric, he did not expect that stop signs and mowed vacant
lots would be critical to fulfilling ACORN's fundamental goals.
Second, he did not realize that an individual organizer was so
critical to the success of an organizing drive. Neighborhood
residents made major contributions to the organization's ultimate
success, but it was the organizer who initiated the process,
coordinated the work, maintained the schedule of events, and
orchestrated interests, issues, energies and goals. Without the
initiative of the organizer to enlist members, either personally or
with the help of members, virtually no one would have joined. Few,
if anY, joined without being asked directly to pay dues and take
part. Some, in fact, only joined after being approached several
times and, of those who participated, most did so in response to
frequent and repeated requests to take part in a number of specific
activities, from meetings to actions at City Hall. The requests,
however, were not appeals to specific self-interest but were part
of the organization's routine activities as the organizer presented
them
. For the most part, neighborhood residents and members were
largely ignorant of the implications and significance of their
participation in ACORN. Nor did they know if these activities were
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routine for ACORN or similar political organizations
,
4. i iv—
on the judgment of the organiser and on their sense of the
legitimacy of the organization. Eventually, the researcher’s
notions of what would attract npnnl p t- nt people to the organization and sustain
their allegiance were discarded in favor of the members’ options
about what projects to target. Indeed, the process taught by the
ACORN Organizing Model and the Head Organizer who trained the
researcher seemed to involve little in the way of rational calculation
or thorough organizational planning, yet it resulted in an organiza-
tion that had a significant impact on the quality of life for the
neighborhood and its residents. This study has sought to frame
that satisfaction and wonder into a better understanding of the
process-one that strengthens understanding of political organizations
in general.
The data from the interviews do not provide conclusive findings,
nor are they major departures from the conventional wisdom regarding
the membership decision and subsequent formation of political organi-
zations. The analysis of incentives and the application of the
concept of organizing strategy do not revise thinking on political
organizations, either. Rather, they confirm some notions and refine
others in the process of reorganizing the concepts in a systematic
fashion. Clearly, an additional strength of this study is that
it offers two levels of analysis and two perspectives from which
to view these data: 1) from the individual level, and 2) from the
organizational level. The perspectives are those of the constituent
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and of the organizer/entrepreneur
. We are able, therefore, to learn
what the entrepreneur is trying to do and what the constituent
reports is the impact of the entrepreneur's efforts. The result
is that we can evaluate the theories of group formation and member-
ship decision in light of each other. The conclusions one can draw
from the data are not new but possess an added degree of validity
owing to their origin.
Theories of Group Formation Revisited
Before evaluating the results of the interviews and their
implications for the major theories of group formation, it is useful
to review the contending theories. Essentially, they fall into two
categories, plus a synthesis of these. These categories are generally
referred to as the sociological theory, argued by David Truman
,
1
and
the economic theory first proposed by Mancur Olson
.
2
Truman's
sociological theory claims that stress on a group that shares interests
in the political system by virtue of, for example, common socio-
economic status, will cause members of that group to increase mutual
interaction and therefore promote the formation of groups that will
protect their shared interests. The economic theory argues that it
is not rational for people to behave in that manner under most
circumstances since they will not benefit from it given the costs of
group formation and the likelihood of recovering these costs by the
benefits of the group activities. Hence, the people who are under
stress calculate that their decision to join the organization to
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promote their interests will cost them more than they will get
return. Thus, the focus of study becomes the tradeoff of contri-
butions required and incentives offered.
Syntheses of the two theories, especially Terry Moe3
,
argue
for a more complex process of group formation. Moe focuses on the
relationship of the constituent and the entrepreneur and how the
constituent is capable of calculating tradeoffs of contributions
and incentives in the complexity of the actual political process.
He notes, for example, that the entrepreneur is strongly motivated
to manipulate the information so that the constituent is more likely
to decide to join. This notion of "bounded rationality" is clearly
more like a real interaction between organizer/entrepreneur and
constituent than either of the theories above. Moe also provides
the broader categorization of incentives that includes all of the
varieties that James Q. Wilson4 identifies: material, solidary, and
purposive. With this broader categorization, it is possible to
appreciate the complexity, again, of the actual political interaction.
The ACORN Model of organizing, in essence, makes claims about
the manner in which constituents make the membership decision and
the means by which it is possible to create ACORN organizations. In
particular, the organizing drive described in the model should be
considered as a prediction of results one should expect if an organizer
follows the model and attempts to organize a neighborhood. It is the
experience of the researcher that following the organizing drive recipe
works quite well despite the inexperience of the organizer. Naturally,
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experience and acquired skills improve the quality and efficiency
of organizing work. Yet. the model, based on an incentive system
of collective material benefits, anger, and constituent desire to
join forces with others in the neighborhood, is sufficient to
recruit approximately ten per cent of a low- and moderate-income
neighborhood one is attempting to organize. This has been borne
out by hundreds of successful drives, many conducted by very
inexperienced individuals. Thus, it is a case of technique based
on organizing principles applied to constituents of similar economic
background in Organizing Committee meetings and at their doors via
direct contact successfully persuading people to join and create
ACORN groups anywhere in the country.
The organizers of Boston ACORN speak in terms that are nearly
identical to those of the ACORN Model that they all study and apply
in their organizing. They claim, for example, that self-interest
is necessary to motivate constituents to join an ACORN group. The
organizers recognize that the self-interest they describe is,
perhaps, somewhat broader than the individual, i.e., it frequently
involves the quality of life for the neighborhood at large and may
not specifically affect every individual member. They attribute
the impact of their claim to produce deliverables to be self-
interest that is then calculated in a manner very much like Olson's
analysis of tradeoffs and decisionmaking. The purposive incentives
they cite include the opportunity to build an effective community
group and take action on what one organizer said were "aspects of
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peoples' lives that, before, they didn't know they had any control
over." They also adm it to using anger-getting constituents "oiled
UP”“aS Per thS AC0RN Model
- it is the perception and expec-
tation of the Boston ACORN organizers that the bases of the ACORN
Model are valid both as predictors of phenomena and analyses of
the relationship between the organization and the constituents.
Group Formation According to ACORN Member;
The responses of the members differed from the ACORN Model
and the organizers only in emphasis. Even the members’ responses
were almost xdentical when they discussed the means by which they
recruited people themselves. The most important factor that influ-
enced members to join was the opportunity to help the community.
While similar to the claim that the constituents are responding to
se‘^~ :*-nterest writ large in the form of community, this appeal
shifts the emphasis to community service and away from individual
benefit. The category of service to the poor is an even greater
shift of emphasis away from self-interest. The most direct
articulation of the pursuit of self-interest is the desire to work
on specific issues, such as health care or housing, and the desire
for self-improvement expressed by several of the respondents. The
question that helped to augment the interviewees’ contribution to
the understanding of the membership decision. How do you recruit
new members?, provided the response that most clearly resembled the
approach that the organizers used to persuade people to join.
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Hence, it seems that the answer to the question of what induces
people to join depends, in its emphasis, on whether the interviewee
is referring to his or her self or another who is being recruited.
The literature does not provide any insights into this phenomena,
nor does the data from this study.
The case study is useful in considering the debate between
the sociological and the economic approaches to the membership
decision. The members and the organizers of Boston ACORN seem to
agree that the ACORN Model is fundamentally sound, that some notion
of self-interest combined with anger, a desire to serve the community,
and the purposive incentives that ACORN offers are effective in
motivating people to join. This conclusion supports the economic
model, more because of the involvement of the organizer/entrepreneur
than for any other reason. Truman's contention that increased inter-
action causes group formation fails to take into account the potent
impact of face-to-face contact between organizer and member that the
interviewees describe. One organizer stated the point clearly from
a strategic point of view:
I think that s something that we really pride ourselves
on is that that's how we recruit our members ,... byknocking on peoples' doors. And that's why, in a lot
of ways, our base is made up of a lot of people that
aren t necessarily gonna get themselves involved
politically or organizationally in something else.
Thus, the claim that increased interaction alone leads to group
formation is inadequate, especially in reference to a group in
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society that is nearly always in some kind of social or economic
stress low—income people.
When one attempts to analyze group formation (as opposed to
the individual's membership decision), it is clear that this case
study provides a basic insight into a theoretical claim: Robert
H. Salisbury's argument 5 for the importance of the organizer/
entrepreneur is strongly substantiated by the researcher’s
experiences and observations, the literature on and by ACORN, and
the comments in the interviews of both members and organizers.
The organizer/entrepreneur is an essential feature of group formation
and an understanding of that role is required for an adequate analysis
of political organizations. The fact that the interviewees, both
organizers and members, responded positively to questions that
implied the economic model concepts helps to substantiate that model
as well. Moreover, their articulation of the goals of the organi-
zation provides support for the expansion of the incentives beyond
purely economic ones, despite the arguments that Wilson offers that
low-income people require greater economic incentives than higher
income people do. But perhaps what is most compelling as a refutation
of the sociological model is the fact that the actions of the
professional organizers are what is critical to the creation of
political organizations, just as it is for increasing the likelihood
that individual constituents will agree to join the organization.
Thus, from either the level of the organizer or that of the members,
the successful creation and application of an organizing strategy is
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what creates organizations and enlists members.
Maintenance of Membership
The basic question of what keeps members in ACORN or organi-
zations in general is closely related to the membership decision.
This is even more so for a voluntary activist organization of low-
income people. Unlike organizations that require only that members
send their annual dues, voluntary activist organizations continually
ask their members to provide resources that the organization requires
Hence, members ask themselves, in the model of the economic analysis,
IS it in my self-interest to engage repeatedly in the activities of
this organization? Moreover, as Richard C. Rich argues
,
6
the nature
of the voluntary organization offers the exit option each time the
organization requests resources. Again, while this feature of the
organization lowers the costs of membership for the constituent, it
raises the cost of organizational maintenance.
Given the nature of ACORN as a voluntary activist organiza-
tion, David knoke and James R. Wood's analysis of social control,^
or commitment, is applicable to this question. Their argument is
that commitment grows from three features of an organization:
purposive incentives, member participation, and professional
legitimacy. The interviews treated these topics in several ways.
Purposive incentives involve either goals or ideology.
Hence, the interview questions that dealt with ACORN's goals are
pertinent as well as the questions that probed the members'
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perceptions of policy issues. It is clear that members did not
articulate ACORN's goals effectively, especially its national
goals. Only the members who had attended national conventions had
a good sense of the national goals or of the nature of the national
organization. Several suggested that issues like stop signs were
important for the national organization. According to Gary Delgado,
realization of the members’ lack of understanding of larger issues
in ACORM is what led to the People’s Platform in 1980. The process
of widespread input into the planks of the platform was specifically
designed to integrate the national organization by articulating
national goals and involving members in the creation. The responses
of the interviewees in this study show that this strategy did not
touch many ACORN members.
Ideological commitments of the members were neither uniform
or strong. The only issues on which there was solid agreement were
ERA, housing, and health care. While it is important to note that
the consensus on housing and health care issues very likely resulted
from ACORN's efforts, it is also important to recognize deep splits
on issues like abortion and, potentially, government income supple-
ment programs. These splits suggest limits on issues on which ACORN
can effectively mobilize its membership.
Interviewee responses to the questions relating to ideology
present more insights into this problem. Several of the members
stated that ACORN's goal as an organization is to create power for
low- and moderate-income people. This kind of organizational
167
purpose seems sufficient as a purposive incentive, however vague.
Nevertheless, m apparent contradiction to Knoke and Wood’s thesis,
these interviews suggest that numbers are willing to continue to
contribute to ACORN despite a lack of commitment to goals they
cannot articulate and an ideology that
to them.
xs not particularly salient
The question of participation as a means of enlisting the
continued allegiance of ACORN members raises a related question:
How much control do members have over the decisionmaking process
in ACORN? Knoke and Wood argue the necessity for involvement of
members in the decisionmaking process, but this in fact raises
some serious problems for the organization. To operate an organi-
zation of low-income, inexperienced activists effectively, an
organizer must at times make important decisions. This dilemma
has troubled ACORN greatly. While the professional role of the
ACORN organizer is to promote maximum participation in the decision-
making process and the formal structure of the organization is
designed to ensure member control via the board of directors, ACORN
is faced with the classic problem that all organizations of its
type face: the desire of the professional staff to control the
decisionmaking process in order to ensure the success of the
organization
.
The ACORN Model and the responses of the members and organi-
zers in the interviews all suggest that the organization generally
succeeds in eliciting members' participation and allowing them at
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veto over the organization's decisions. Moreover, many of
both types of participants argued strongly that the members have a
profound control over the decisionmaking process. One organiser,
for example, claimed that issues never arise solely from the orga-
nizing staff but only from the inputs of the members via the door-
knocking process.
Delgado, a long-time ACORN organizer, also found that when
asked, ACORN members only cited the "technical assistance and/or
resource development" as the role of ACORN organizers
.
9
He goes
on to say that
Within ACORN, as within most large community
organizations, organizers do in fact call the
shots in terms of organizational direction;
the organization has in fact become a staff
oligarchy. That development is understandable:
with greater size and complexity, increased
specialization, and departmentalization, it is
simply not possible for all members to possess
enough of the relevant information for informed
decisionmaking; therefore, communications
increasingly flow from the top down.^
The importance of this kind of dynamic for the role of the organi-
zation in the lives of the members is that, without genuine involve-
ment of the members, it is not possible to change their perceptions
of themselves as politically efficacious and as identifying with
the organization. Moe argues this point as pertaining particularly
to voluntary membership organizations with mixed incentive systems:
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While Delgado refers only to decisions of the national organization,
the fact remains that participation in the decisionmaking process
is not possible. Thus, at that level, members cannot use partici-
pation opportunities to develop their commitment to the organiza-
tion. On the other hand, local chapters of ACORN do involve the
members, both on the board and in the local groups. Judging by the
interviews, however, organizers frequently are the ones who translate
the issues they hear in their contacts with members while in meetings
or while doorknocking into campaigns, strategies, and tactics. Thus,
even at that level, there appear to be limits to membership control
of the organization and the commitment that that engenders.
There are virtually no limits, however, on the amount of
participation that is possible for members in functions such as
member recruitment, leadership roles at lower levels, fundraising,
actions, and so on. Organizers use every opportunity to involve
members in activities such as these, not only to lighten their load,
but to build involvement and commitment among the members. The
members' listings of activities in which they engaged attests to
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the success of the organizers in this effort. Further, the members'
increased identification with the progressive agenda that results
from the long-standing and intense involvement with ACORN indicates
that Knoke and Wood's thesis can be brought to bear at a level of
participation below that of the decisionmaker.
The third part of the social control concept offered by
Knoke and Wood is legitimacy of the professionals. The question
that this raises is the faith that the membership has in the
integrity and abilities of the organizers. The lack of conflict
members report with organizers is one component of professional
legitimacy within ACORN. The members also defer to the organizers'
ability to make important decisions regarding tactics and issues.
Moreover, descriptions that the members gave of their initial
reluctance to engage in some kinds of tactics, particularly
confrontive ones, and their subsequent participation in them attests
to their faith in the judgment of the organizers. Interviewees
also reported a willingness to change campaigns on which they were
working without particular distress or misgivings. Hence, when
the organizers suggest that a particular tactic or issue is vital
to the organization, the members go along with that decision.
Thus, in applying Knoke and Wood's formula for organizational
commitment, the interviews suggest that the degree of commitment to
purposive incentives is limited, opportunities to participate in
decisionmaking are limited, though other kinds of participation are
extensive, and professional legitimacy is high. This combination
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has been effective on those interviewed: nearly all were very
enthusiastic about ACORN and many contributed their time and
energy generously. While some of those have strong commitment to
ACORN's goals, and are involved in important decisions, others seem
to be active due to the organizers’ persistence combined with
tangible results and opportunities to serve their community. Thus,
the goal of creating an organization of involved, informed, and
progressive low- and moderate-income people is being achieved but
only with the support of those who join and support ACORN without
developing the world view of the progressive political activist.
Organizers
The professional organizer is a poorly understood role in
the study of American politics. Recent studies of political
organizations have given the organizer a theoretical place in
political science literature and begun a process that should bring
that role into a proper focus as creator and motivator of many
political organizations, especially voluntary membership organiza-
tions. This study began by examining some important questions
about political organizations in the light of the perceptions of
participants in a particular organization. These perceptions have
led back to fundamental questions of organizational dynamics that
can only be appreciated if one understands the role of the organizer.
Moe argues forcefully, for example, that limited rationality is the
basis for the membership decision, and that this prompts organizers
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to "bend" the realities of group membership in a way that is most
likely to persuade people that their interests will be served by
joining
.
12
Yet he does not fully develop the concept as it applies
to continued participation by members. Knoke and Hood stress the
importance of social control for the organizer's success but do
not pursue the extent to which the organizer devises and implements
the organizing strategy.
The lack of attention to the central role played by the
organizer is probably a function of the kind of organization
studied. Moe concentrated on economic organizations; Knoke and
Wood examined middle class cause organizations. Both types rely
on organizers in different ways. Economic groups prefer to leave
the operation of the group to professionals entirely. Middle-class
groups can and do call on a reservoir of experienced and educated
members to serve in planning and organizing roles. Boston ACORN
recruits a constituency of inexperienced, poorly educated people
who, unlike small businesspeople and professionals, for example,
have few organized means of expressing political interests. The
impetus for organizing the ACORN constituency comes from outside
the constituency. A consciously devised plan is articulated and
applied by professionals, who have a vague but compelling goal for
their constituents. As Delgado points out, the continued operation
of ACORN requires more skill, time and energy than the membership
has available to it. Hence, the organizers have a more demanding
role in the organization than might otherwise be the case. It is
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a role that this case study, owing to Its methodological limits, can
at best only suggest.
The value of a better understanding of the organiser's role
in an organization like ACORN yields practical as well as scholarly
insights. For anyone interested in creating an organization with a
constituency similar to ACORN's, the conceptual groundwork has been
laid by ACORN in the Organizing Model and the incentive system, i.e.,
the organizing strategy that has proven effective over the years for
ACORN. For students of American politics, this approach to political
organizations provides useful insights about the members of such an
organization, e.g., that they are generally not highly ideological
but are at the same time committed to the organization and its goals.
For both practitioner and scholar, it is important to recognize the
significant but limited role of the organizer. Constituents are not
controlled or even manipulated to any great degree by the organizers,
and recognition of the limits organizational dynamics place on the
organizers allows one to see the relationship more clearly.
The Organizers 1 Relationship to the Members
Given the connections between ideology, socioeconomic and
cultural background, and goals for involvement within ACORN, it is
necessary that a special kind of relationship be established between
the organizers and members. This is particularly true in light of
the importance of professional legitimacy for many of the members’
continued involvement in ACORN. This relationship centers on two
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basic ideas: the exit option and professionalism. Both of the,
rein in the organizers’ notions of what ACORN should do, both
terms of issues and tactics. Thus, when organizers want to pursue
issues or tactics that fit their views on politics but do not fit
their members’ perceptions, they limit themselves by their profes-
sional ideals, and the members limit them by exercising the exit
option. Thus, if the members perceive that an issue, candidate,
or tactic is not desirable, given their ideology or views on political
life, the organizers are unlikely to persuade members to participate
m those activities. In an important sense, then, the exit option
keeps the organizers honest, keeping the ideological differences
between organizers and members from causing serious problems in
ACORN
.
It is more, however, than just the exit option that controls
the behavior of the organizers. It is also the professional ethos
that they share. It is clear from the responses of the organizers
that they feel an ethical obligation as professionals to promote the
maximum amount of member participation in ACORN in order to gain
the benefits thereof: increased allegiance, improved skills,
increased resources, greater turnout and enthusiasm, and democratic
control of the organization. One purposive incentive that drives
the organizers is the desire that ACORN play a democratizing role
in the political system, give low- and moderate- income Americans a
genuine opportunity to influence the political system without being
controlled by organizers.
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In the ease of the ACORN organisers, the ethos of member
participation contains within It several other elements as well.
First, it is part of the democratic ethos that has shaped reformist
and radical components of American political culture. This is
profoundly different from the role which the organizer/entrepreneurs
play in traditional economic organizations. They perceive their
role as professionals akin to lawyers: hence, they provide the
incentives, operate the organization, lobby according to the
interests of their constituents, yet have no desire to train their
constituents to become more effective citizens. Lawyers have no
desire to teach their clients the law or improve their ability to
promote their interests via legal means. Traditional organizer/
entrepreneurs operate similarly, keeping information costs high so
that their clients will need their services as much as possible.
While ACORN’s organizing ethos does not prevent ACORN organizers
from controlling many of the decisions of the organization, it
acts as a constraint against it. Second, the democratic ethos the
organizers articulate is as much a part of the organizing strategy
as the organizing drive itself. It has proven an effective way to
recruit and maintain membership, as is evident in the almost mythical
quality it has attained among members and organizers. That the
organizers also recount instances when it has benefited them in
their organizing efforts further attests to its utility.
Thus, the strains within ACORN created by cross purposes of
organizers and members are, to some extent, controlled by other
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features of the organizations: professionalism and voluntarism.
The ethic of the organizer to maximize member control and the fact
that the organization is a voluntary one with the option available
to abstain from whatever activity is undesirable provide clear
constraints against organizer abuse of power within the organization.
Ideology as Incentive
The treatment of ideology of ACORN is particularly important,
given the responses of members and organizers to policy questions.
There are clear differences between members and organizers, and the
way these are handled is critical to the success of the organization.
The motives of the organizers for taking a low-pay, high-demand job
are strongly centered on the desire to change society and pursue
left-wing internationalist goals. There is no indication in the
members’ responses that they share these kinds of goals. Some of
the members have adopted the rhetoric of ACORN—power for low- income
people. Taking What's Ours!" and so on, but there are clear differ-
ences of ideological perspective in specific policy areas, ideological
se lf — ident if ication
,
and party identification. The organizers avoid
conflict or erosion of trust by using vague language and populist
sentiments rather than Marxist ideology or leftist rhetoric. This
allows a degree of latitude for the organizers to pursue policy goals
that are anti-corporate without being explicitly leftist; it provides
a broad canopy for both white and black constituents; and it excludes
as few people as possible given the possible range of political views
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chat could be attracted to such an organization both in terms of
potential organizers and members. Thus, ACORN's approach to
ideology serves organizational ends of unity between disparate
groups whose energies and commitment are both engendered and
endangered by ideology.
The interviews suggest that ACORN’s approach has been
effective. The members regularly defer to the organizers' views
on what the organization should do. The level of conflict between
the two groups is low. Moreover, both members and organizers agree
that the sources of conflict that do exist have nothing to do with
their views on politics, but rather center on the operation of the
organization without proper consultation by the organizers with
the members. The members believe the organization should be run
by them and, when it is not, they make it an issue. Members and
organizers agree on how ACORN should be run and act accordingly.
The closest thing to ideological conflict is that which arises
occasionally about the level of confrontational tactics that are
desirable. As the organizers note, they sometimes have difficulty
persuading members that they should confront their targets. The
difference surfaces not on the issue or the choice of target, but
on the degree of conflict that is appropriate for the situation.
Hence, there is an area of agreement on issues and broad goals
large enough to appeal to all the participants in the organization,
conflict only arising around the intensity necessary to pursue these
these issues and goals.
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Confrontation as Ideology
The issue of confronts tactics has several dimensions:
demands on the membership, tactical effectiveness, and organizational
identity, both internal and external. In addition, confrontive
tactics are part and parcel of the vague ideology that ACORM has
adopted.
Confrontive tactics increase the demands on the members in
the exchange relationship. Members recognize immediately that one
difference between behaving with decorum in a meeting and carrying
signs and raising hell is that more is being asked of them. More
energy is required; more risks are involved; there is greater chance
of arrest; they will not be welcomed. Participants in prospective
confrontations commonly have doubts about the propriety of rowdiness,
and the justification for disrespect expressed toward the target.
Mike Silver notes that members are "sometimes .. .most put off not by
fear of arrest or violence but by confusion, uncertainty, and a
sense of helplessness in unknown situations."13 Mary Kay Harrity,
writing about members of the Bridgeport, Connecticut chapter of ACORN,
noted that the members
seem somewhat hesitant about some of the more dramatic
actions ACORN has used to make its point, like a candle-
light march in Colorado that ended with demands for
changes in utility rates being nailed to wooden planks...
or claiming "squatters’ rights" in abandoned Philadelphia
homes .... "14
The cost to some members is in social status as they perceive it:
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respectability. Thus, confrontational
members; they increase the demands the
membership
.
tactics have costs to
organization makes on the
Confrontational tactics, according to several writers on
organizing, are the bread-and-butter of low-income organizing.
The low-income constituency has rather limited resources available
to it. If their resources are forcefully and directly applied,
the argument goes, they will be more effective:
t isn t conflict for its own sake, but to createincentives for the other side to negotiate in good
raith, to reach an agreement that takes care of aproblem. The point is, to have genuine bargaining
first we have to show the other side we have power! 15
Frequently, the mass confrontation is the most powerful weapon the
ACORN group has available to it. Thus, as Lee Staples suggests,
it is wise for local ACORN groups to reserve that tactic for a
point in an issue campaign in which other less costly and difficult
tactics have proven ineffective.^^
The importance of confrontational tactics extends beyond
their ability to move others to respond to their demands. It
involves the identity of the organization in some important ways.
First, it separates ACORN from its opponents: utility companies,
many of the local politicians, bureaucrats, and others who are in
a position to satisfy or deny their demands. They also unify ACORN
internally, building identification among the membership:
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Taking demands to the extreme and engaging in highly expr<
protest creates strong ties among the members and shared feelings
of great intensity, especially if the tactics pay off in a victory.
The memory of the activity and the expression of solidarity builds
into the organization a sense of unity and identity. A tactic at
the 1982 Democratic National Mid-Term Convention illustrates this
point well. While ACORN members demonstrated in the street for
low- and moderate-income representation in the nominating process,
a group of ACORN members snuck into the hotel where a fund-raising
luncheon was being held with some large donors of the Democratic
Party. The ACORN members worked their way into the hotel via the
coffee shop, the gift shop, and other avenues singly and in small
groups that would not attract attention. When they arrived at the
service door of the luncheon hall, they burst suddenly into the
hall chanting and demonstrating in what was a directly confrontive
tactic. This and other tactics that require bravado and make noise
all serve to increase the solidary benefits of the organization and
increase the members’ shared identity with ACORN.
In light of the above discussion of ACORN’s approach to
ideology, the role of confrontation as ideology becomes clear.
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While avoiding specific issues such as abortion, ACORN has defined
itself in terms of its opponents and its internal solidarity. Also
when ACORN assumes a policy position, it expresses that position in
terms of action and style rather than specific points of argument.
Delgado explains the manner in which ACORN used this technique to
express its views on housing issues:
While it is clear that tactical militancy does not
necessarily relate to or translate into a progressiveideology, ACORN's recently launched multistate
squatting efforts, in which low-income people in
twelve cities are taking over abandoned houses,
certainly demonstrates the organization's attitude
toward private property and translates the attitude
into action
.
0
The use of squatting actions gave the membership an opportunity to
express its views without having to articulate complex arguments or
adopt ideological stances. For their purposes and ACORN's, the
actions were sufficient for the need to create and pursue purposive
goals
.
This approach, ACORN organizers hope, will avoid internal
division over ideological issues and alienation of potential members
and allies. Perhaps more important still is that ACORN organizers
avoid expending energies on deciding the "correct" stance to take
on issues. Rather, as Rathke has stated, the way to organize is to
appeal to constituents' concerns, not philosophical issues:
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Hence, developing an ideology is not a part of effective organizing
according to ACORN organizers. Confrontation is an important means
by which ACORN can maintain purposive incentives while keeping
goals as vague as possible.
The ACORN Organizing Strategy and the Majority Constituency
The goal of ACORN from its inception as an organization has
been to organize a majority constituency of the lower 70% of the
income scale. ACORN's history and the history of similar organi-
zations indicates that there are formidable problems involved in
achieving this goal. While ACORN's organizing model is capable of
creating organizations in neighborhoods of either low- or moderate-
income people or mixes of them, difficulties have arisen when ACORN
has pursued objectives broader than neighborhood improvement issues
developed while doorknocking or in Organizing Committee meetings.
Moreover, the confrontive tactics have created divisions among the
low- and moderate-income groups.
The unifying feature that Rathke defines for the constituency
ACORN targets is that they are not participants in the important
decisions that shape their lives. He claims that the important
decisions in American political and economic life are made by large
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corporations and the very wealthy. His goal for ACORN has always
been to unite low-income and moderate-income Americans into a
unified organization that can vie successfully with the decision-
makers in American society. The unity of these two groups, however,
requires that they can be convinced of their mutual interests.
That has not always been the casa.
This problem of unifying the targeted constituency has
arisen in a variety of ways, including disagreement over tactics,
dominance by moderate-income members, and conflict over issues.
Each of these issues has been a problem in ACORN's history that the
leaders and organizers have grappled with in an effort to keep ACORN
moving toward its organizational goal of organizing the majority
constituency. Both the problems and the means by which they have
been addressed provide insights into the nature of political
organizations and the organizing strategy they employ.
As noted above, confrontive tactics have not been popular
among all of the ACORN members. This plays a role in the internal
divisions within ACORN as well. Low—income members more readily
agree with organizers that the issues that concern them and the
resources they possess to promote their interests require the
adoption of confrontive tactics. If they need jobs from construction
firms building in central city areas, they do not have resources to
pressure the job providers behind the scenes. Rather, they must
disrupt the job site or go to City Hall with pickets in order to
get results. This situation is quite different for moderate-income
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people. Cloward and Piven, writing in 1979 about the differences
between community organizing among the two groups, distinguished
between low-income organizing and "citizen action" organizing.
They note that citizen action organizing
produces a membership with a marked reluctance to gobeyond conventional political channels. Citizen
action consists mostly of meetings, hearings
research memoranda, petitions, lobbying, and ’ref erenda
.
The impulse not to demonstrate," says Mark Splain[an ACORN organizer], "but to call the alderman
because they know the alderman! "20
Moderate income members who are originally attracted to ACORN for
community improvement are often repelled by confrontational tactics
that hardly correlate with the genteel goals they joined to promote
In 1979, Pearl Ford, a board member resigned from ACORN due to the
tactics in which she was asked to engage;
The tactics sounded good at first. They come into a
neighborhood and ask if you need stop lights and your
trash picked up. The next thing you know they get
you involved in storming City Hall and other things
that I don’t approve of. ^
Conversely, low-income members would not respond to the same kinds
of tactics that the moderate-income members prefer. The low-key
style of politics denies them the opportunity to participate
effectively using the resources at their disposal—anger, disruption,
and enthusiasm. Moreover, the issues that they must address
—
jobs,
housing, medical care—for their livelihood are often controlled at
a higher level of society than city services like streets, vacant
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lots, garbage removal, and stop signs. Thus, there is a distinct
difference between the tactics that are usable for the two different
ranges of income within the intended ACORN constituency.
Writers on community organizing have noted a tendency among
community organizations to be dominated by moderate- income members.
Michael Walzer argues that
n°£
>
by any maans, a "poor people’s move-
V. They have not done very well among welfare
recipients, tenants of public housing projects, unem-
p oyed men and women. The groups they are able toform and sustain mostly involve (relatively small
numbers of) better-off workers and members of the low-to middle class. And the politics of these groups is
clearly reformist; the neighborhood alliances often
take on a kind of "community uplift" character. Self-help against crime, the defense of old residential
areas, improvement of local services, beautification;
these are the goals, to which the organizers too must
stand committed. z
Cloward and Piven recognize this same phenomenon and argue that it
results from three causes: 1) the search for anti-corporate issues
via consumerism; 2) the ease of organizing moderate-income neigh-
borhoods; and 3) the dependence of many neighborhood organizations
on canvassing as a source of income. 23 In an effort to forge an
an ^
i
-c °tporate stand that will attract members, particularly from
the upper end of their constituency, consumer issues have been
effective and attractive. Also, moderate-income neighborhoods have
residents that are less intimidated by political activity and
organizational membership. Finally, the canvassing method of
fundraising in which canvassers go into upper-income neighborhoods
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and request donations has had a conservatizing effect on so.e groups
dLendence°of
b
the
t0 ^ the gr°Wlng facialependence o se groups on canvassing contributestheir emphasis on popular consumer issues and onconventional politics. "If our canvassers tell us thatan issue or tactic won't sell in the suburbs," one
organizer said, "we give it a second thought."24
Cloward and Piven, however, excepted ACORN from the organizations
that had adopted this course. They attribute this difference to
ACORN s organizers [who] have a commitment that guides their
organizing and orients them to low-income people. Much of this
direction probably comes from Wade Rathke, ACORN's chief organizer,
whose professionalism is tempered by a strong sense of mission."25
In the late 1970s, Rathke and other members of the national
ACORN staff recognized the upward drift in the incomes of their
members and adopted a course of action to involve more low-income
people in the organization. They pursued organizing drives of the
unemployed in several cities and worked to organize low—income
labor groups such as household workers in New Orleans and home
health care workers in Boston. The result has been that ACORN has
avoided an overdependence on moderate-income members as some other
groups have.
The history of ACORN has, in fact, followed that pattern of
development, at one time pursuing one end of the income scale, at
another, the other end. Madeleine Adamson and Seth Borgos, both
former ACORN professional staff, describe the process of alternating
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between the two ends of the income spectrum of ACORN's targeted
constituency
:
For ACORN, the squatters campaign was the culmination
of a five-year quest to recover the audacity and
militance of its welfare rights origins
—
qualities
which had been diluted in the pursuit of a majority
constituency. More recently, ACORN has moved closer
to the contemporary mainstream, organizing a national
coalition of labor, church, minority, and peace groups
to challenge the policies of President Ronald Reagan.
Such periodic swings are characteristic of ACORN's
evolutionary pattern: a continual dialectic between
low- and moderate-income, mobilization and organization,
expansion and consolidation, militance and accomodation
.
26
Thus, ACORN has sought a balance between the desire to include
low-income constituents and the need for the resources that the
moderate-income constituents can provide. The historical evidence,
however, provides clear arguments for the difficulties of unifying
ACORN's targeted constituency. As Adamson and Borgos claim, ACORN
has been forced to "drift towards one or another segment of their
constutuenc [y] or to oscillate between them, never really mobilizing
the whole.
The problem with issues within ACORN clearly demonstrates
this dilemma. Historically, the lower-income ACORN members have
pursued more progressive issue stands than the moderate-income
membership. This is very clear from the events surrounding the
drafting of the ACORN People's Platform. Delgado reports that the
difference between the income groups was reflected in the age of
the groups represented:
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The older ACORN groups were dominated by low-incomepeople who had fought for welfare and Medicaid reform-
ed "”n
S ”ere ”°re llkely to comprise homeowner^and blue-collar workers. The difference was especiallyprevalent in the ACORN affiliates in California Lrtharoiina, and Georgia, where the lowest-income elementswere the senior citizens' groups.
Some of the Arkansas representatives were people who had been a
part of the original drives to organize welfare recipients in
Little Rock and who were disposed to pursue clearly progressive
issues such as the guaranteed annual income:
It was on this issue that the tenuous coalition oflow- and moderate-income people on which the organ!
zation is built was most seriously challenged.
Advocates of the plank (mostly black and low-income
members) argued that all families were entitled to
a basic income, health care, and housing; opponents
of the plank (the most vociferous of whom were also
black but more moderate-income) argued for income
based on employment. ^
The responses of the Boston ACORN members to the same question
showed a lack of understanding of the issue and certainly no
unified support. Thus, the problem of creating and maintaining
the majority constituency manifests itself in terms of tactical
militance, the attractiveness of the moderate—income group as
organizat ion—builder s , and the conflict that arises between the
two groups over issues within the organization.
Nevertheless, the necessity of unifying the two groups is
clear. If one is attempting to oppose the political and economic
elite in American politics, it is not possible to do it with only
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part of the low- and moderate-income constituency. Saul Alinsky
recognized that fact late in his career as an organizer, while
he began his career in 1939 in the Back of the Yards area of
Chicago, one of the most desolate slums in America at the time,
by the early 1970s he began advocating for a rather different
organizing strategy. His pursuit of a middle-class constituency
that would promote radical or anti-corporate goals led him to
devise the proxy strategy. This strategy would enlist middle-class
corporate shareholders and those who are capable of influencing
institutions that hold shares, such as universities, to raise
issues at shareholders’ meetings of large corporations and disrupt
their proceedings.
I m directing all my efforts today to organizing the
middle class, because that’s the arena where the future
this country will be decided. And I'm convinced
that once the middle class recognizes its real enemy
—
the megacorporations that control the country and pull
the strings on puppets like Nixon and Connally— it will
mobilize as one of the most effective instruments for
social change this country has ever known. And once
mobilized, it will be natural for it to seek out allies
among the other disenfranchised—blacks, chicanos, poor
whites . 0
Alinsky did not live to pursue this strategy to its end. Never-
theless, ACORN's experience suggests that the assumptions he made
about the natural inclination of the middle class to seek allies
among low-income and minorities is questionable.
An observer of ACORN politics, however, must recognize that
Rathke and the other top leaders and organizers in ACORN are working
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toward long-term goals. As Rathke has stated, his goal is power for
the majority constituency over the fundamental decisions in the
American political and economic system. Because the goal is so far-
reaching he argues that it is not possible to predict what form that
power will take. Moreover, it is not possible to predict under what
circumstances that assumption of power might occur. It is
conceiveable that an extraordinary turn of events, a crisis of great
proportions like the Great Depression, could provide unity for the
low- and moderate-income groups. In order to take full advantage
of the situation, it would be necessary for ACORN to be an operating
organization; that is, to survive and be ready for such circumstances.
Thus, if there were an economic disaster, the alienation of the middle
class from the upper class and the issues that would naturally align
lower-income Americans with middle-income Americans would create the
opportunity for the larger goal of ACORN organizing. Until that
time, ACORN organizing continues in its present strategy of fluctuating
between the desire to be radical and the necessity for organizational
survival
.
Organizing Strategy and Political Analysis
Organizing strategy, a notion originally conceived by
political organizers to facilitate organizing by replicating
organizational characteristics in many places at once and ensure
effective organizing, is also an effective means of analyzing
political organizations. In this case study of Boston ACORN the
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use of the concept of organizing strategy has succeeded in directing
the research at the important features of the organization and
appreciating their interaction in the functioning of the participants.
Perhaps the most important contribution of organizing strategy
to political analysis is the stress it places on the strategic nature
of political organizing. Because it compares political organizing to
product marketing, it illuminates the kind of thinking that is
required for the organization to succeed. The organizers, as entre-
preneurs, must decide on a constituency and determine what incentives
will effectively mobilize that constituency. They must also decide
what resources the organization requires from the constituents in
order for it to succeed. Finally, they must determine what organiza-
tional structure will best serve the goals of the group. The concept
of organizing strategy requires that the analyst see all of the above
decisions as part of a whole. For example, the decision to use
neighborhood improvement as an incentive to initiate members into
ACORN requires that the structure of the group be based within
neighborhoods; the desire of ACORN organizers to pursue progressive
political issues prompts them to organize a low—income constituency
that will agree to those issues in an enthusiastic way; the need for
a broad—based constituency requires that organizers demand a maximum
amount of participation by the membership.
Finally, organizing strategy helps to explain some of the
wonder and satisfaction the researcher experienced upon completion
of organizing an ACORN neighborhood. It makes the connection between
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mundane items like
democratic control
Stop signs and great issues like housing and
of corporations. It helps to explain how an
organization is capable of bending and shaping the goals of both
members and organizers to coincide in a mutual effort. It shows
how well an organization is capable of developing the political
skills of people who have historically both avoided and been
excluded from political participation. It explains how the
apparently undramatic actions of organizers and constituents in
neighborhoods across the country have the potential for dramatic
impact on the lives of many low- and moderate-income people and.
conceivably, the American political system.
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appendix
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES
Member Interv iew
I. I want to start with some qustions about how you and othersoriginally get involved in ACORN.
1) How long have you been an ACORN member?
2) Were you involved in politics before you joined ACORN?fell me about that.
3) Why did you join ACORN? What attracted you to ACORN?
4) What does it mean to you now to be an ACORN member? Whatdo you get out of it?
5) How has the experience of being in ACORN differed from
your original expectations?
6) When you talk to someone who is thinking of becoming
involved in ACORN, what reasons do you give them to°join?
II. Now, I want to talk to you about your activities and
involvement in ACORN.
1) Do you belong to other organizations? Are you active in
them? Hold office in them? How many hours a week do you
spend on them?
2) How many hours a week do you spend on ACORN?
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1963)
Which of the following have you participated in?
Attend ed a national ACORN convention
Organized or worked for an ACORN fundraiser
Held an office in ACORN
Signed a letter of support for ACORN
Recruited new members
Spoken at a public hearing,
as an ACORN representative
Marched in an ACORN action
Led an ACORN action
Canvassed your neighborhood
Held meetings in your home
like the City Council,
- got out on the doors
Flyer ed a neighborhood
Talked to people about ACORN in a public place like
a store
_Cha ir ed an ACORN meet ing
Made phone calls for an ACORN meeting or action
Worked on an election or issue campaign
Helped provide direct member services
Attended a national action or training workshop
Served on the ACORN Political Action Committee
If
III. The next set of questions deals with ACORN’s goals and your
feelings about them.
1) Can you list ACORN's political goals here in Boston and in
your neighborhood?
2) What are ACORN's national goals?
3) Has ACORN been successful with those issues?
If YES
,
what do you think makes ACORN successful?
If NO, why do you think ACORN has not been successful?
4) Which goal is the most important? Why?
5) Are any of these goals not very important? Why?
6) Do you think ACORN should pursue more issues or less? Why?
7) If ACORN changed the way it operates—say, it only dealt
with one goal ["most important goal" above]—how would
you feel about that?
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IV. I d like to learn some things about ACORN
services. Things that only ACORN members
newsletter
.
s direct
can get,
member
like the
1) What direct member
you participate?
services does Boston ACORN offer? Do
2 ) If ACORN stopped providing
worked on political goals,
direct member services and only
would you stay in ACORN?
3) If ACORN stopped working on
the direct member services,
political goals and only gave
would you stay in ACORN?
V. Now I want to talk to you about your views on some importantpolitical issues.
1) First, which of the following best describes you?
a) very liberal
liberal
moderate
conservative
very conservative
b) strong Democrat
weak Democrat
Independent
weak Republican
strong Republican
2) Now tell me if you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please respond: "Agree strongly," "Agree,"
"Disagree Strongly," or "I Don't Know."
1-
The federal government should provide a guaranteed
income to all citizens.
2-
The government should take over industries that provide
public services, like the utility companies.
3-
It is important to pass the Equal Rights Amendment.
4-
The federal government should provide free medical care
to all needy citizens.
5-
The construction and use of nuclear power plants should
be stopped.
6-
Government should build or subsidize housing for those in
need
.
7-
The federal government should help low-income people pay
for abortions.
8-
Abortions are a constitutional right.
9-
The U.S. should not get involved in Latin American affairs.
10-The U.S. should continue to build up its military defense.
198
VI
.
VII.
3)
Is ACORN working on the right issues'?issues you think should be addressed?
Do they ignore
I’m interested
tactics
.
m how ACORN makes decisions about issues and
1) Who makes the Important decisions in ACORN? How is it done?
2) Are you involved in making important decisions?
3) If your ACORN group took a stand on an issue that you couldnot agree with, what would you do?
4) If your ACORN group endorsed a candidate you could not
support, what would you do?
5) If your ACORN group used a tactic you could not participatein—picketed a church gathering, for example—what wouldyou do?
6) Do conflicts ever arise over important issues within ACORN?
II so, how are they worked out?
7) Are there ever conflicts between organizers and members?
What causes them? How are they resolved?
I d like to know some things about the way ACORN pursues its
political goals. Use the choices on the sheet to answer
these questions: "Very effective," "Effective," "Somewhat
effective," "Not effective," or "Don’t Know."
1) Of the following groups, tell me what you think of them as
partners in coalitions with ACORN:
—unions
—church groups
—peace groups
—elected officials
—other community organizations
—student groups
—any I left out?
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VIII.
2 ) Of the following tactics, tell me what you think of themas a means of achieving ACORN's goals.
ACORN members running for office
demonstrating in public offices; the Mayor's, forexample ’ L
bu^ld ing^
ing ^ prlVate offices
> like a corporate
—demonstrating in the street
—speaking in public hearings
—inviting opponents to speak at ACORN meetings
—inviting supporters to speak at ACORN meetings
—blocking streets
—endorsing candidates
—campaigning for endorsed candidates
running referenda campaigns
—anything I left out?
3)
Which do you think are more effective: confrontational
tactics or bargaining tactics?
Finally, I d like to discuss with you your feelings about
your impact on politics. Use the choices on the page to
answer this group of questions: "Very Likely," "Likely "
"Not Likely," "Very Unlikely," or "Don't Know."
1) If the Mayor and City Council were considering an
ordinance that would hurt your neighborhood, could
you help prevent it from passing?
2) If the state legislature and Governor were considering a
law that you considered unfair to you or your interests
could you help prevent it from passing?
3) If the President and Congress were considering a law that
you opposed, could you help prevent it from passing?
4) If you took an issue to a government office to express
your views—on a budget question or a housing program, for
example—would you be treated as well as anyone else?
5) If you tried to explain your views on an issue to city
off ic ials, would they take your point of view into serious
consideration?
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6) Do you think: a) city politicians in Boston do-
b) Mass, state politicians do
—
c) politicians in Washington do
—
an excellent job?
a good job?
a fair job?
a poor job?
don't know.
PERSONAL DATA:
Race
:
Asian
Black
Hispanic
White
Other
Sex
:
Male
Female
Age:
18-25
_
26-31
32-40
41-50
51-60
61 or
Education
:
Completed 6th grade
Completed 9th grade
Completed high school
Some college
Completed college
Graduate school
Household Income:
under $8,000
$8 ,100-$9, 999
$10, 000-$l4 , 999
$15, 000-$19 , 999
$20,000-$29, 999
$30,000 or over
Number in household
:
one
two
3-4
5-8
9 or more
Occupation
over
Spouse's occupation
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I.
Organizer Interview
I'd like to start with a discussion of why people setinvolved in ACORN. y F x g
1) How long have you been an organizer?
2) Why did you become an ACORN organizer?
3) Has ACORN organizing been what you expected it to be?Explain. •
4) What do you get out of ACORN organizing?
5) What attracts members to ACORN?
6)
make?
reCrUitinS ^ members
’
what kind of appeal do you
7) What keeps members in ACORN?
8) When recruiting new organizers, what kind of appeal do
you make?
9) Do you think members’ goals for ACORN change over time?
10)
Do you think organizers’ goals for ACORN change over time?
II. Next, I d like to discuss peoples’ level of involvement with
ACORN.
1) What kinds of members become most committed to ACORN?
2) Do you think level of involvement enhances commitment?
3) Do you think organizers are subject to those dynamics?
4) What about your involvement—have you held staff or
supervisory positions?
5) How long do you expect to keep on with ACORN? Why?
Other plans?
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III.
IV.
ach1^e\^alk ab°Ut AC0M ' S 8°alS 3nd US abilit ^ t0
1) What are ACORN’s political goals locally/statewide/
nationally?
2) Is ACORN achieving those goals? Explain.
3) Should ACORN tackle more or fewer issues?
4) Do you think ACORN’s goals should be broader or narrower?
5) Are members flexible about changes in goals? Is one type
more or less flexible than others?
I need to learn some things about ACORN's selective incentives
1) What selective incentives does Boston ACORN offer its
members
.
2) What is the participation rate?
3) Do selective incentives improve recruiting or membership?
4) What purposes do they serve?
5) Are selective incentive participants more or less goal-
oriented than non participants?
I’d like to discuss your general views on political issues.
What are your politics?
1) First, which of the following best describes you?
a) very liberal
liberal
moderate
conservative
very conservative
b) strong Democrat
weak Democrat
Ind ep end ent
weak Republican
strong Republican
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VI.
2)
s^t«eits
e
Ilf"
38166 ° r diSagree “Uh the snowing
up..
* pleas e respond:
"Agree strongly "
"Agree "Disagree Strongly," or "I Don't Know."
’
1-
The federal government should provide a guaranteedincome to all citizens.
2
-
The government should take over industries that providepublic services, like the utility companies.
4 The
1
? rPTant t0 PaSS the Equal R1Shts Amendment.
to aU
Sh°Uld Pr °Pide ^ ad o-
5
"be
e
s“ppe^
Cti°n and “ Se ° f nUClear P0“er Plants should
6-
Government should built or subsidize housing for thosem need
7
-
The federal government should help low-income people payfor abortions. ^ 1 y
8-
Abortions are a constitutional right.
n*Q*
S
l!
OU
^
n0t get involved in La tin American affairs.ID-The U.S. should continue to build up its military defense.
3) Is ACORN working on the right issues?
you think should be addressed?
Do they ignore issues
I m interested in how ACORN makes decisions about issues and
tactics.
1) Who makes the important decisions in ACORN? How?
2) If ACORN took a stand on an issue that you disagreed with,
what would you do?
3) If ACORN endorsed a candidate you could not support, what
would you do?
4) If ACORN used a tactic you disagreed with, what would you do?
5) Do conflicts ever arise between members and organizers?
between members and members? between organizers and
organizers? If so, how are they resolved? Wht is their
source?
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Vn* I d I lke to discuss some of the ways ACORN exercises itspower tactically.
1) Tell me what you think of the following groups as
coalition partners. Are they "Very Effective,"
Effective," "Somewhat Effective," "Very Ineffective,"
or "Don't Know"? ’
—unions
—church groups
—peace groups
—elected officials
—other community organizations
—student groups
—any I left out?
2) Tell me what you think of the following tactics. Are
they "Very Effective," "Effective," "Somewhat Effective,"
"Very Ineffective," or "Don't Know"?
—ACORN members running for office
—demonstrating in public offices
demonstrating in private offices
—demonstrating in the street
—speaking in public hearings
—inviting opponents to speak at ACORN meetings
—inviting supporters to speak at ACORN meetings
—blocking streets
—endorsing candidates
—campaigning for endorsed candidates
—running referenda campaigns
—anything I left out?
3) Do you have any philosophical commitments to specific
tactics or types of tactics?
4) What is the importance of confrontational tactics? Do
they have advantages over cooperative coalition-building?
5) Do you find that some tactics are more popular among members
than others?
VIII. Finally, I'd like to discuss the members' efficacy and
conf idenc e.
1) How do you build efficacy among your members? How effective
is it ?
2) What kinds of members respond best to efficacy-building efforts?
3) How do political officeholders and bureaucrats respond to
ACORN members? Do they take them seriously? Why or why not?
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